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Public organizations see transparency as a promising tool to boost relations with 
citizens and their perceptions of public performance. Due to transparency, 
however, the work of street-level bureaucrats is also scrutinized. Moreover, 
technological advancements have empowered any societal actor to make the 
behavior of street-level bureaucrats transparent by, for instance, filming it with a 
smartphone. This doctoral dissertation examines the effects of transparency on 
the daily work of street-level bureaucrats and their interactions with citizens. By 
studying food and product safety inspectors, this dissertation shows that 
transparency helps street-level bureaucrats do their job. By studying citizens’
perceptions of multiple enforcing street-level bureaucrats (e.g. parking wardens), 
this dissertation reveals that citizens are biased about the street-level bureaucrats 
they meet, but this does not mean they will make what street-level bureaucrats do 
transparent to others. This dissertation concludes that transparency matters for 
the daily work of bureaucrats and, in turn, the citizens they meet, but it is just the 
beginning of grasping what happens when ‘the frontline’ is made transparent. 
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On July 11th, 2019, the court ruled that a report of the Dutch Education inspection on the Islamic 
Cornelius Haga School in Amsterdam could be published (NOS, 2019a; 2019b). The report of the year 
before had concluded with a positive evaluation of the education of the school. However, in March 
2019, the school was brought to the attention of the Education Inspection after the National Coordinator 
of Terrorism Control and Safety1 issued a warning that students influenced by teachers after close 
contact with ‘radical’ individuals (NOS, 2019a; 2019b; Zwart, 2019). The report of the Education 
Inspection did not find evidence to support this warning but did find other ‘severe’ shortcomings 
(Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019f). The school tried to prevent the report from being disclosed 
via legal proceedings. Their lawyer argued that, while the inspection report concluded that several 
aspects of the school were not up to par, the Inspectorate mixed its own interpretations with the law. 
Their lawyer stated, “if the Education Inspection, who, by definition, has authority because it regulates 
education, publishes that report, people think it is correct. We cannot compensate that effect with our 
own vision on that report” (NOS, 2019b, para 5). 
This example is not unique and illustrates that transparency of a report about public performance 
can allow journalists, citizens and many more on the outside to look inside of a public organization. 
Moreover, it depicts the complex nature of making information collected by public organizations 
transparent, the consequences it can have and the potential pressure that its puts on street-level 
bureaucrats, such as inspectors, collecting the information on which the reports are based. This 
dissertation has delved into the phenomenon of transparency both, like the example above, when the 
information is provided by public organizations, but also when citizens make performance of societal 
stakeholders public. More specifically, it investigated what transparency does to the frontline and, 
thus, street-level bureaucrats (e.g. inspectors) and those they meet face-to-face (e.g. entrepreneurs 
or citizens). 
1.1 Transparency and the public sector
Transparency is seen as promising for governments and its public organizations because, it is held, 
it is a way to show others (i.e. citizens) that you (i.e. the government) have nothing to hide. In this 
way, transparency is seen as one way to improve relations with citizens. This government-citizen 
relationship on the citizens-side has been characterized by an under-estimation of public performance 
and trust (Alon-Barkat, 2019; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Van Ryzin, 2011). A good relationship between 
public organizations and its citizens is important, because it can stimulate citizens’ cooperation during 
service provision and, in turn, facilitate successful implementation and performance (Alon-Barkat, 
2019). This positive connotation of transparency to achieve effects external to public organizations 
(e.g. increase trust and performance perceptions) has become dominant in the academic and societal 
debates. In turn, transparency has become hard to argue against and achieved a ‘cult-like’ status 
(Bernstein, 2017). 
Governments and public organizations ‘going transparent’ is nothing new. In the 80s and 90s, the 
instrument of transparency was believed to be a practice of good governance. Transparency was 
thought to be a remedy to multiple societal problems, such as low public trust, corruption and poor 
government performance, because it enhanced accountability and stimulated public participation 
(Birkinshaw, 2006; Hood, 2007; Michener, 2019; Nye et al., 1997). As a result, a wave of New Public 
Management reforms was implemented to enhance transparency of public organizations. These 
reforms also painted a picture of transparency that was full of promises (see also Fung et al., 2007). 
At the same time, public organizations and their managers were generally geared towards avoiding 
political risks or ‘blame’ (Hood, 2007). Avoiding blame becomes harder in a transparent society where 
1  Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid van het Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid
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information is readily available to non-governmental actors. In turn, public organizations have become 
more aware of how their intentions, capabilities and overall track record are perceived by external 
audiences and try to adjust their management accordingly. Thus, organizational reputation and how 
to manage it has become an important part of how public organizations function (Carpenter & Krause, 
2012). Public organizations even use transparency proactively to brand themselves with promotional 
symbols, such as logos (Alon-Barkat, 2019; Karens et al., 2016; Teodoro & An, 2018). 
Transparency scholarship has skyrocketed since the NPM reforms (see Cucciniello et al., 2017 
for an overview). Transparency scholars initially investigated the functioning of transparency (i.e. 
‘promises’), such as effects on citizens’ trust and participation. However, results have been mixed and 
given rise to debates between optimists, pessimists and sceptics – all of whom have empirical backing 
for their arguments (see Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012 for an overview). Despite the fact that there is no 
clear-cut answer, governments have continued to embed transparency in their everyday functioning. 
In 2009, Barack Obama initiated the Open Government Partnership (OPG). This has inspired open 
government initiatives across the globe built on access to information laws (Piotrowski, 2017). 
This open government movement is not solely devoted to transparency – but also to collaboration 
and participation – and this movement shows that transparency is continuing to root itself into the 
functioning and management of public organizations. 
1.2 Defining transparency
Specifying what transparency entails is not straightforward. Therefore, it is often labelled an ‘umbrella 
concept’ (see Hirsch & Levin, 1999). To illustrate this, freedom of information (FOI) laws, user-
generated data, self-disclosure of performance information or whistleblowing have all – at least 
to some extent – been discussed under the heading of transparency. Despite the fact that these 
transparency practices seem distinct, what they have in common is that they address information 
provision (see Alon-Barkat, 2019). Information provision allows for ‘inward observability’. This means 
that individuals external to the organization can see what happens on the inside (Grimmelikhuijsen, 
2012). Societal stakeholders, such as citizens, are enabled to hold decision-makers accountable 
using the information provided by putting pressure on them to improve their services and regulations 
(see Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016; James, 2011; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). 
This line of reasoning defines transparency as “the availability of information about an organization 
or actor allowing external stakeholders to monitor the internal workings or performance of 
that organizations (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 5; see also Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; 
Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). This definition, first and foremost, reveals an instrumental and 
informative focus, since transparency is understood to enable monitoring and accountability 
mechanisms by external stakeholders. Thus, transparency is seen as a tool to achieve citizens-
oriented goals (i.e. increase legitimacy, trust, participation, satisfaction) or public organization-
oriented goals (e.g. increase accountability, performance or decrease corruption) (Alon-Barkat, 2019; 
Cucciniello et al., 2017). Second, this definition is distinct from conceptualizing transparency as a 
human right. A human’s ‘right to know’ is distinct from available information that allows monitorization 
by others (e.g. Birkinshaw, 2006; Florini, 2007). Finally, this definition focuses more on the pro-
active provision of information, such as disclosing the inspection report of Cornelius Haga School 
in Amsterdam. It does not focus on reactive provision of information, such as a municipality obeying 
a citizen organizations information request under the Freedom of Information law (Hood & Heald, 
2006). The definition does not include the act of demanding information, as would be the case under 
the Freedom of Information law, but rather information made available pro-actively by actors without 
a request (see also Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). 
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1.3 Why frontline encounters matter 
In addition to transparency’s external effects, such as on legitimacy, trust, participation, satisfaction, 
accountability, performance or corruption (Cucciniello et al., 2017), there could also be internal effects, 
particularly on how street-level bureaucrats and citizens interact when they meet at the frontline. 
Understanding how bureaucrats implement policies during face-to-face encounters with citizens is 
crucial for an understanding of the functioning of public organizations and the state at large. Zacka 
(2017) highlighted that “public policy remains an abstraction until it is carried out. In an important 
respect, public policy is the sum total of the actions taken by street-level bureaucrats” (p. 16, italics in 
original). Public policies come to life when street-level bureaucrats transform them into realities during 
face-to-face encounters with entrepreneurs, clients or citizens (Bartels, 2013; Goodsell, 1981; Lipsky, 
2010; Zacka, 2017). Traditionally, this public encounter was deemed problematic to accountability 
of the democratic processes because of the inevitability of discretion involved. Bureaucrat-citizen 
encounters were understood as being set in highly regulated environments. Street-level bureaucrats 
had to be impersonal and impartial by acting solely on rules and expertise and, in this way, were 
steered towards acting in the public, rather than their private, interests (Bartels, 2013). 
Lipsky’s (2010) work changed this perspective by acknowledging the value of discretion. Lipsky 
stressed that street-level bureaucrats have discretion because they must implement policies 
in complex realities that do not match written policies fully, while, at the same time, dealing with 
numerous stress factors: limited time, resources and information. Ultimately, bureaucrats must cope 
and develop mental shortcuts to process citizens and this often results in unequal treatment (Bartels, 
2013). Hence, “the reality of the work of street-level bureaucrats could hardly be farther from the 
bureaucratic ideal of impersonal detachment in decision making” (Lipsky, 2010, p. 9). 
Much of the classic work on street-level bureaucracy has focused on what different types of street-
level bureaucrats, such as nurses, teachers or police officers, have in common, such as their 
discretion (e.g. Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Goodsell, 
1981). However, there are also important differences between street-level bureaucrats, for instance, 
whether bureaucrats’ (1) decisions concern policy implementation, (2) interact with vulnerable or non-
vulnerable clients or (3) meet the same citizen once or repeatedly. Zacka (2017) illustrates “unlike 
teachers, police officers carry guns and sometimes make life-or-death decisions; unlike welfare 
workers, these officers interact not just with individuals seeking services but with the population at 
large; and unlike social workers, who have repeated encounters with clients through which a personal 
relationship can develop, our encounters with police officers are often episodic and happen on a one-
time basis” (p. 23). By this line of reasoning, Maynard-Moody & Musheno (2000; 2003) revealed that 
street-level bureaucrats use two narratives when using their discretion to make decisions; namely, that 
of the ‘state-agent’ or ‘citizen-agent.’ While the former puts the state at the centre of their decisions 
by sticking to rules and striving for consistency, the latter puts the citizen at the heart and focuses on 
the morality and ethics of their decisions (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003). This dissertation 
focuses on enforcing bureaucrats who, in particular, may tell predominantly state-agent narratives 
(see section 1.7. for a discussion on the implications of this focus). 
1.4 Why transparency matters for 
frontline encounters
To date, street-level bureaucrats have been neglected by transparency scholars (see also 
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Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). However, there are substantive indications that transparency may 
matter for (1) how street-level bureaucrats implement policies at the frontline and (2) how bureaucrat-
citizen interactions evolve. 
Firstly, transparency can make implementation actions by street-level bureaucrats visible to the public. 
As a result, they too can increasingly be monitored and held personally accountable, for instance, for 
individual perceived wrongdoings (see Hood, 2007; 2011). To illustrate this, we can see that public 
organizations and their street-level agents have become increasingly prone to online reviews written 
by citizens. Several countries host popular websites, such as zoekdokter.nl, which allow patients to 
rank and review profiles associated with specific doctors. These doctors are identifiable by name 
(Adams, 2013; Trigg, 2014). Thus, transparency does not just have external effects on organizations 
or citizens, but also internal ones for street-level bureaucrats’ day-to-day work and their encounters 
with citizens. 
Secondly, when street-level bureaucrats interact with citizens, there are two ways transparency has 
always been present by design. The first one is part of the design of bureaucrat-citizen encounters. 
This is because some encounters are, by nature, more transparent than others. More specifically, 
some bureaucrat-citizen encounters happen ‘on the street’ with bystanders. Thus, the work of 
these street-level bureaucrats is set in physically open spaces. However, other bureaucrat-citizen 
encounters are not transparent since they happen behind physical doors, such as in offices. Notably, 
the work of these street-level bureaucrats takes place in closed spaces (Gofen, 2015). Police officers, 
for instance, work in a more open space when they patrol the streets, whereas social workers are more 
isolated within offices or when visiting a family at their home. Moreover, transparency also plays a 
role in the information exchanged when bureaucrats and citizens meet. While street-level bureaucrats 
provide services or enforce laws, they rely on their own observations of citizens’ behaviour. Thus, 
citizens are critical in providing additional contextual information about their individual situation. 
Street-level bureaucrats need citizens to disclose information about their circumstances to make 
full sense of their cases and to decide how to implement or enforce public policies accordingly (de 
Bruijn et al., 2007; Raaphorst, 2018). Transparency is, then, related to what contextual and clarifying 
information the citizen discloses or not to the bureaucrat. This information is also provided without a 
request and enables street-level bureaucrats ‘on the outside’ to ‘look inside’ the citizens’ situation (see 
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). 
1.5 Changing transparency dynamics at 
the frontline
However, the context within which bureaucrat-citizen encounters occur has changed over recent 
decades due to developments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and so, in 
turn, has the role of transparency. From the citizens’ side of the story, ICTs have created a ‘global 
village’ (McLuhan, 1962) where anyone can access information anytime from their technological 
devices and has lowered boundaries for societal actors, such as citizens, to get it to the public. This is 
especially important to understand when studying bureaucrat-citizen encounters. Public encounters 
include, by definition, a street-level bureaucrat and a citizen and citizens are not just passive actors 
during service delivery (Gofen, 2013; 2015). Citizens executing transparency about what happens 
when citizens encounter street-level bureaucrats is an increasingly common activity. A smartphone 
empowers citizens to film street-level bureaucrats they encounter or have encountered, upload the 
video material or write about them online. Some scholars have even labelled this type of transparency 
‘computer-mediated transparency’ (Meijer, 2009).
On the outside, looking in
18
A recent example illustrates the empowerment of active citizens during bureaucrat-citizen encounters. 
In 2016, a Dutch woman released a satirical fake advertisement on YouTube for a new mobile 
application called Poke-a-Cop Go (a reference to the popular game Pokémon Go) as a response 
to police violence during Blackface (i.e. Zwarte Piet) protests. She included faces of actual police 
officers from her hometown in the video, which were photoshopped onto the bodies of famous 
Pokémon characters. The video depicted that you could ‘catch’ the police officers by throwing stones 
at them (Sonnemans, 2018a; 2018b). This example is even an indication that it forms part of a bigger 
movement aligned with the cop watching movement in the United States. Cop watching is a movement 
where citizens team up to film police officers in order to expose and prevent police misconduct and, 
ultimately, participate in help deliver the democratic process. The organization Copwatch started 
this movement by releasing a documentary in 2017. This started a website with information on 
citizens’ rights to film police officers and even led to them offering courses. What originally started 
as a collective process, where groups of organized citizens would stimulate individuals to film police 
officers, has now also become associated with incidental filming of photo-taking of citizens (Brucato, 
2015a; 2015b). 
In this way, society is moving from surveillance to sousveillance: ‘the watching of publics of those 
with institutional authority’ (Brucato, 2015a, p. 45). Thus, sousveillance is the watching of those at 
the top by those at the bottom. While citizens increasingly use transparency practices during public 
encounters to make the ways of behaving of street-level bureaucrats more visible, public organizations 
have responded by implementing transparency policies enabling street-level bureaucrats to make the 
behaviour of citizens during interactions also directly transparent.  For instance, many street-level 
bureaucrats have started wearing body cameras (Bromberg et al., 2018). Some public organizations 
have even started to make the databases storing the body camera footage public (Ramirez, 2018).  
From the bureaucrats’ side of the story, ICTs have amplified both the amount and scope of the 
information about governments and its street-level agents being made available to citizens 
(Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012). Due to the lower boundaries, public organizations have increased 
their transparency practices as well. Recent technological advancements have allowed public 
organizations to easily display their performances on a range of online platforms, such as Twitter, 
Facebook and YouTube. Some bureaucrats even have their own Twitter account. Hence, “although 
freedom of information laws forms the backbone of government transparency, computer-mediated 
transparency is an essential part of modern-day government transparency” (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 
2013, p. 575). 
Moreover, the role of transparency for bureaucrats during their service provision has expanded the 
wide implementation of transparency policies because it makes bureaucrats’ performance indirectly 
visible. When societal stakeholders are empowered to look inside, the day-to-day outputs of street-
level bureaucrats’ work also becomes more visible and, in turn, ‘monitor-able’. Public organizations 
may publish reports that include performance criteria, such as the number of cases processed, which 
indirectly include street-level bureaucrats’ performance. The performance of individuals that street-
level bureaucrats encounter also becomes more transparent. To illustrate this, the Dutch Education 
Inspection publishes annual reports on an interactive map on their website indicating which schools 
perform as either ‘excellent’, ‘good’ or ‘poor’ and this includes a full report by a jury. Although no 
teachers are named in the report, there is ample reference to how teachers are doing and how 
colleagues work together. Thus, indirectly, the performance of teachers is visible to anyone visiting 
the website or with access to the jury report. 
In summary we have seen that a variety of transparency activities have changed one-on-one 
bureaucrat-citizen encounters into one-on-many encounters by making both policy implementation 
and enforcement actions of street-level bureaucrats part of the public sphere and empowering citizens 
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to contribute to that visibility. This dissertation studied the implications of transparency by both public 
organizations and citizens for the day-to-day frontline work of enforcing street-level bureaucrats and 
their encounters with entrepreneurs and citizens. This introductory chapter will highlight the aim and 
questions underpinning this dissertation and indicate its relevance for academia and practice. 
1.6 Research question
This dissertation set out to understand the effects of transparency on the two central actors in 
frontline encounters: the street-level bureaucrat and the citizen. It did so specifically in enforcement 
contexts where street-level bureaucrats are powerful because they implement obligations rather than 
services (see section 1.7. for a more elaborate discussion). The overarching research question of this 
dissertation was:
What are the effects of transparency on street-level 
bureaucrats and citizens?
This question is answered in chapter 7. To answer the general research question systematically, it 
was broken down into five sub-questions. 
1. How can street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement during frontline encounters be conceptualized and 
measured?
2. What is the effect of transparency on street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement and experienced 
resistance by citizens during frontline encounters?
3. What is the effect of transparency on regulatory performance and does street-level bureaucrats’ 
relational distance from citizens matter?
4. In frontline encounters with little transparency, how are different street-level bureaucrats assessed 
by citizens in terms of warmth and competence traits?
5. What is the effect of street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement during frontline encounters on citizens’ 
transparency and obedience?
Chapters 2 through to 6 each provide empirical backing and an answer to one of the sub-questions 
above. These chapters can be clustered into two general parts of this dissertation. Part one consists 
of chapter 2, 3 and 4, which aimed to understand the perspective of the street-level bureaucrat. These 
three chapters all draw on large-scale surveys among street-level bureaucrats of the Netherlands Food 
and Product Safety Authority. Part one, as a result, primarily addresses the effects of transparency by 
a public organization. Part two consist of chapter 5 and 6. These aimed to understand the perspective 
of the citizen, including if and how they make enforcement of street-level bureaucrats transparent. 
Both chapters used multiple survey experiments among citizens to test the hypothesized relationships. 
1.7 Focus on enforcement 
This dissertation has studied the effects of transparency on street-level bureaucrats and citizens 
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within a specific type of context, namely enforcement. This section will discuss the particularities of 
this focus for answering the research question(s). Enforcement is a suitable context for two main 
reasons. 
First, transparency is tool in the toolbox of enforcement agencies (e.g. Austin et al.,2015; Rothberg 
et al., 2008; Van Erp, 2010). In this dissertation, part one focuses on inspectors from the Netherlands 
Food and Product Safety Authority (i.e. NVWA), which operates under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food quality. The NVWA is tasked with regulating the safety of food, consumer products, 
animal welfare and nature. The authority of the NVWA ranges across numerous sectors and many 
companies. To illustrate this, the NVWA regulates, amongst others, food safety of the catering industry 
(roughly 80,000 companies), industrial eatables (roughly 10,000 companies) and slaughter houses 
(roughly 200). Therefore, it works predominantly based on risk-based regulation (Nederlandse Voedsel 
en Warenautoriteit, 2019a). The NVWA is also one of the largest regulators of the Netherlands with, 
in 2016, 1,201 inspectors conducting inspections, making it particularly suitable to study street-level 
bureaucrats using large n methods. 
More importantly, the objective of the NVWA is to actively make all relevant information about 
regulation and its execution transparent by 2022. Moreover, it sees transparency as a regulatory 
instrument because it defines it as the publication of information about how individual entrepreneurs 
comply with laws and regulations with names and address of individual companies, product names or 
brand names. In this way, the NVWA wants to disclose which entrepreneurs do well and which do not 
do well in terms of their compliance and, in turn, stimulate them to continue to make compliance their 
priority (Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit, 2019b). Around the time this dissertation collected 
survey data among inspectors, the NVWA was in the middle of rolling out a large-scale transparency 
initiative for the catering industry in a few major cities in the Netherlands. Hence, inspectors of the 
NVWA would already, or by 2022, deal with transparency of their inspection results, making this a 
relevant context for this dissertation. 
Second, much like any other street-level bureaucrats, inspectors have a great deal of discretion 
to implement policies during face-to-face encounters with citizens but also face stressors, such as 
limited time. In this way, inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). As mentioned 
in section 1.3., however, inspectors may tell predominantly ‘state-agent’ narratives and put the state 
rather than the citizen at the centre of their decisions (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003). In 
turn, inspectors have unique characteristics. For instance, they deliver obligations rather than services 
(Sparrow, 2000). Inspectors are tasked with detecting wrongdoing and sanctioning accordingly. Thus, 
when using sanctions, inspectors constrain the person that they inspect from possibly behaving in 
the way they want to (Baldwin et al., 1998; Sparrow, 2000). Moreover, street-level bureaucrats often 
interact with vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or the unemployed (Lipsky, 2010). However, 
inspectors also often interact with a heterogeneous group, such as powerful corporations (Braithwaite, 
2003; Nielsen, 2015). Finally, when street-level bureaucrats meet citizens, this is often voluntarily. 
However, when inspectors encounter citizens, this interaction is often unwanted by citizens because 
often they are thought to have possibly violated laws and do not have a clear exit option (Nielsen 
2015; Winter & May, 2015). Like other enforcing bureaucrats, inspectors are especially powerful 
(Raaphorst, 2018). 
By focussing on enforcement, this study has been able to dissect clear effects of transparency in 
highly regulated settings where most power is in the hand of the bureaucrat. Notably, part two (i.e. 
citizen-perspective) focused not only on inspectors but on a variety of enforcing bureaucrats, such 
as municipal enforcers, healthcare inspectors and customers officers. This approach was suitable 
because citizens encounter multiple enforcing bureaucrats in their lifetime and not just one.
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1.8 The contribution 
Why does this dissertation matter? This section first highlights the relevance of this study for the 
academic community (section 1.8.1.) followed by its societal relevance (section 1.8.2.). 
1.8.1 For academia
This dissertation marries two streams of literature that previously have been disconnected: 
transparency and street-level bureaucracy. As a result, this study has contributed an entirely new 
perspective to the transparency scholarship, namely that of street-level bureaucrats. Notably, street-
level bureaucrats play a crucial role in implementing transparency policies (Hyun et al., 2017), but 
have been neglected by transparency scholars (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). Understanding if 
and how transparency affects street-level bureaucrats’ day-to-day behaviour is important because 
street-level bureaucrats’ work is already inherently complex, characterized by uncertainty and 
dominated by stressors with which they cope (Lipsky, 2010; Tummers et al., 2015; Raaphorst, 2018). 
The street-level bureaucracy literature helps transparency scholars understand how transparency 
further complicates frontline work and also investigates its implications for effective service provision, 
treatment of citizens, and, in turn, better governance (see Hood, 2007). 
This dissertation also contributes to the street-level bureaucracy literature that focuses predominantly 
on the street-level bureaucrat side of service provision (e.g. DeBois, 2016; Gofen et al., 2019; 
Harrits, 2019; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Tummers et 
al., 2015; Zacka, 2017). However, delving into the citizen-side of service provision rarely happens. 
This is surprising because citizens are not passive actors (DuBois, 2016; Gofen, 2013; 2015). This 
dissertation contributes to the street-level bureaucracy literature by revealing what happens at the 
citizen-side of frontline encounters (chapter 5 and 6). It specifically contributes to the understanding 
of citizens’ complaint filing via informal channels, such as social media by delving into their public 
shaming of bureaucrats. 
Finally, this dissertation methodologically advances our understanding of street-level bureaucrats 
and bureaucrat-citizen encounters by not taking the predominantly qualitative approach (Van Engen, 
2019). Qualitative methods are invaluable because they allow researchers to unravel how street-
level bureaucrats make decisions and deal with service provision within complex realities. Much of 
the classic work is based on qualitative inquiries (e.g. DuBois, 2016; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody 
& Musheno, 2003). However, qualitative methods complicate comparisons across street-level 
bureaucrats. This is because they do not allow for generalization about all bureaucrats in a population 
(see Hupe et al., 2016; Van Engen, 2019). Qualitative methods also do not allow researchers to 
dissect the clear-cut effects of explanatory variables on bureaucrats’ work because, for instance, 
they cannot control for extraneous variables. This dissertation is not the first to notice the under-
representation of quantitative work in street-level bureaucracy scholarship. Consequently, there has 
been a recent rise in quantitative scholars addressing frontline topics (e.g. Andersen & Jakobsen, 
2017; Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Jensen & Pedersen, 2017; Guul, 2018). This study contributes to this 
‘quantification’ in the street-level bureaucracy literature which includes substantive insights from both 
qualitative and quantitative studies.
1.8.2 For society
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This dissertation also provides valuable insights for society. The ever-increasing amount of information 
available to citizens and street-level bureaucrats is unprecedented. Increasing numbers of (public) 
organizations disclose what and how they are doing publicly on their website or via their developed 
mobile applications. On top of that, freedom of information laws/acts have been adopted increasingly 
across the globe and have allowed citizens, when the information is not yet voluntarily disclosed by 
public organizations, to request it anyway. It is not just changes in public organizations themselves, 
but also technological advancements that have anyone with a digital device literally to upload 
whatever and whenever s/he likes to global audiences or store it for personal use (e.g. Bromberg 
et al., 2018; Brucato, 2015a; 2015b; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Ramirez, 2018). At the same 
time, misinformation on the Internet is on the rise (Iyengar & Massey, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 
2017; van der Linden, 2017). This misinformation is not limited to just political campaigns, but covers 
societal issues, such as vaccinations (Poland & Spier, 2010; Lazer et al., 2018; Van der Linden, 2017). 
There are even indications that misinformation can lead to physical danger for enforcing street-level 
bureaucrats, such as police officers (Phartiyal et al., 2018; Roozenbeek & Van der Linden, 2019).
These societal changes impact street-level bureaucrats who, daily, face a clientele who are more 
transparency demanding, sometimes misinformation-based and armed with smartphones to ‘watch 
the watchmen’ (Brucato, 2015a; 2015b). More importantly, when every step a street-level bureaucrat 
takes is already disclosed, can be disclosed, or ‘watched’ by citizens, this may have important 
implications for how bureaucrats deal with face-to-face encounters and, in turn, decide how they 
enforce policies and sanctions. 
This dissertation offers valuable insights into the impact of transparency on frontline encounters, 
both from the perspective of the street-level bureaucrat, as well as from the citizen. These insights 
are useful for three reasons. First, for public managers and street-level bureaucrats, it has shown 
how a rise in (perceived) transparency affected bureaucrats’ enforcement attitudes during encounters 
with citizens and how they related to citizens. Second, it is helpful for policy makers tasked with 
drafting transparency policies or implementation protocols because it can help them make the 
consequences of street-level bureaucrats’ daily work explicit. Finally, this dissertation is insightful for 
citizens themselves, since it reveals how transparency practices alter street-level bureaucrats during 
the encounters they are part of. In turn, citizens may better understand why street-level bureaucrats 
enforce the way they do and act accordingly.
1.9 The outline
The outline of this dissertation is as follows: This first introductory chapter has discussed the reasons 
why this dissertation studied the role of transparency for both street-level bureaucrats and citizens in 
frontline encounters and, more specifically, within the context of enforcement. Chapters 2 through to 
6 are the empirical chapters that show what this dissertation found with each chapter answering one 
sub-research question. 
This dissertation includes five empirical chapters of which three (chapter 2, 5 and 6) are single-
authored. Chapters 2 through to 4 have all been published separately and previously in international 
peer reviewed journals, specifically International Journal of Public Administration, Public Administration 
Review and Public Administration. All these three chapters draw on survey data collected from 
inspectors of the NVWA as respondents. Chapter 2 answers the first sub-question. More specifically, 
chapter 2 aimed to dissect what constitutes as a bureaucrats’ enforcement during frontline encounters 
and how can it be measured. Chapter 3 (co-authored by Erik Hans Klijn and Jasper Eshuis) 
investigated how transparency affects bureaucrats’ enforcement and their experienced resistance 
23
Chapter 1
by citizens during frontline encounters. Chapter 4 (co-authored by Jasper Eshuis) investigated the 
impact of transparency on bureaucrat-citizen relations and bureaucrats’ perceptions of performance. 
Chapter 5 and 6 aimed to understand the effects of frontline encounters on citizens, including 
their transparency practices. Chapter 5 is under review at an international peer reviewed journal 
while chapter 6 is revised and resubmitted to an international peer reviewed journal. Both chapters 
used multiple survey experiments among Dutch citizens. More specifically, before testing the effect 
of transparency by citizens, chapter 5 first aimed to understand citizens’ biases when assessing 
bureaucrats in situations where there is not a lot of transparency. Chapter 6 aimed to unravel the 
effects of transparency by citizens, but also to test whether the enforcement of street-level bureaucrats 
during frontline encounters (see chapter 1) contributed to this transparency or not. 
Chapter 7 discusses ‘so what’ by presenting the four key conclusions and a discussion of their 
implications for academia and practice. Chapter 7 also answers ‘what is next’ by presenting an 
agenda for future research.

Part 1
The street-level 
bureaucrat 
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This chapter has been published as: de Boer, N. (2019). Street-level enforcement style: A 
multidimensional measurement instrument. International Journal of Public Administration, 42(5), 380-
391.
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Street-level enforcement style: 
A multidimensional measurement 
instrument
Abstract
This study investigates street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style and its underlying dimensions by 
developing and validating a multi-dimensional measurement scale. Developing a measurement scale 
for enforcement style is relevant because the number of underlying dimensions is contested and 
studies developing measurement scales are scarce. This complicates cross-sector and cross-national 
comparisons. Using a survey among inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority (NVWA), street-level enforcement style is found to consist of three dimensions, (1) 
legal, (2) facilitation and (3) accommodation. This study contributes to more validated measurement 
instruments by presenting a 13-item measure that can be used to study street-level bureaucrats’ 
enforcement style. 
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2.1 Introduction
What happens at the frontlines of policy implementation has long been at the centre of public 
management and public administration research (Hupe, Hill and Buffat, 2016; Lipsky, 2010). Scholars 
increasingly address specific attitudes, capabilities, decision-making processes and motivational 
dynamics of street-level bureaucrats to better understand street-level dynamics (Etienne, 2014; May 
and Wood, 2003; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). A diverse range of street-level behaviors 
are studied, such as policy alienation (Tummers, 2012; Van Engen, 2017a; Van Engen et al., 2016), 
coping (Tummers et al., 2015) and uncertainty experiences (Raaphorst, 2018). An explicit focus 
on enforcement at the street is, however, missing from this debate (May and Wood 2003). This is 
surprising since street-level enforcement is increasingly addressed by regulation scholars (Lo et al., 
2009; Mascini and van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003; Nielsen, 
2007). 
Street-level enforcement is better understood as enforcement style of individual street-level 
bureaucrats. Enforcement style concerns how street-level bureaucrats, such as inspectors or police 
officers, enforce at the street during interactions with inspectees (May and Winter, 1999; 2000). 
Street-level enforcement style is, thus, a type of attitude of street-level bureaucrats during inspectee-
encounters which can differ depending on the situation at hand. When enforcement style is studied, it 
is generally understood to be two-dimensional (May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003). 
May and Winter (2011), contrastingly, highlight that there could be even more dimensions. This multi-
dimensionality, however, has barely been further explored (Lo et al., 2009). On top of that, scholars 
generally agree that street-level bureaucrats have different enforcement styles during exactly the 
same inspectee-encounter, but what makes up these different styles remains unclear (Etienne, 2014; 
Nielsen, 2015; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; Winter and May, 2002). It, thus, remains unclear how 
many dimensions underlie street-level enforcement style and how they are composed (May and 
Winter, 2011). 
This study sets out to address this multi-dimensional nature of street-level enforcement style and the 
dimensions underlying it through measurement scale development and validation. Existing studies 
using measurement scales to study street-level enforcement style are scarce (e.g. Lo et al., 2009; 
May and Winter, 2000), based on qualitative or mixed-method research (e.g. Mascini and Van Wijk, 
2009; Nielsen, 2015) or are tested among inspectees rather than street-level bureaucrats themselves 
(e.g. May and Winter, 2000). More importantly, these studies use scales created ad hoc and, thus, 
for the specific purposes of the respective studies. These scales are valuable, but rarely follow all 
measurement development steps, such as generating – and reviewing an item pool, or running 
extensive statistical tests for reliability and validity (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017b). Measurement 
development steps ensure valid and reliable scales that allows for cross-sector and cross-national 
comparisons. This, ultimately, contributes to a better understanding of street-level enforcement style 
which is crucial because the style of enforcing has implications for the implementation of public 
policies, street-level bureaucrats’ interactions with - and treatment of inspectees and, ultimately, the 
legitimacy of government (Lipsky, 2010).
Therefore, this paper investigates: What dimensions underlie street-level enforcement style and how 
can they be measured? by developing as well as validating a multi-dimensional measurement scale 
for street-level enforcement style. This study investigates a specific type of street-level bureaucrats, 
namely inspectors. Inspectors are suitable to study because they have considerable autonomy and 
discretion when enforcing rules and regulations and while interacting with inspectees. They are, thus, 
classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010; May and Wood, 2003). However, inspectors work for 
rule-enforcing organizations focused on delivering obligations by catching and punishing wrong-
doers during interactions with inspectees (Sparrow, 2000) making them very powerful street-level 
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bureaucrats (Raaphorst, 2018). 
This paper is structured as follows. First, the conceptual foundations of enforcement style will be 
discussed. Second, the empirical part is based on a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors. It 
reports steps taken in scale development and assesses the psychometric properties using exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis and validity tests. Third, results are presented and discussed with 
regard to their theoretical contributions as well as how scholars and practitioners may benefit from 
them in terms of understanding and executing policy implementation.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The inspector
Street-level bureaucrats’ autonomy and discretion for delivering obligations and interacting with 
inspectees sets the stage for their ways of inspecting at the street-level (Nielsen, 2015; Sparrow, 
2000). Street-level bureaucrats are defined as ‘public service workers who interact directly with 
citizens in the course of their job, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work’ 
(Lipsky, 2010, p. 3). Inspectors implement public policies with considerable autonomy and discretion 
during inspectee interactions and are, therefore, classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). 
The implementation strategies of the public organizations that employ inspectors determine what 
to enforce, how to enforce and when to enforce (see May and Burby, 1998; May and Winter, 2000; 
Sparrow, 2000). These organizational boundaries partly determine the parameters within which 
inspectors can make judgments about the application of enforcement policies during on-site visits with 
inspectees (Nielsen, 2015; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Hence, within these parameters 
inspectors have their own discretionary room to behave as they see fit during regulatory encounters 
(May andWinter, 2000; May and Wood, 2003). 
Inspectors, however, also have distinct characteristics. First, most street-level bureaucrats, like 
teachers, social workers and physicians, deliver services to clients. Inspectors, however, deliver 
obligations to inspectees (Sparrow, 2000). Regulators and their inspectors set out to minimize social 
risks by detecting wrongdoers and punishing them accordingly. By using sanctions, inspectors, thus, 
limit their inspectees freedom of acting the way they want (Baldwin et al., 1998; Sparrow, 2000). 
Second, whereas some street-level bureaucrats often interact with vulnerable inspectees, like social 
clients or the unemployed (Lipsky, 2010), inspectors mainly interact with a heterogeneous clientele, 
such as powerful corporations (Braithwaite, 2003; Nielsen, 2015). Third, the inspectees do not have 
a choice when interacting with inspectors, because there is no exit option (Nielsen, 2015). When an 
inspector fines a bar owner for violating smoking regulations, for example, this inspectee does not 
want this interaction and cannot choose to exit it. Inspectees, therefore, often view the intervening 
interactions with inspectors as unwanted since their intention is to detect criminal behavior and punish 
accordingly (Nielsen, 2015; Winter and May, 2016). In sum, inspectors are powerful (see Raaphorst, 
2018) because they limit inspectees freedom and interactions are obligatory and unavoidable.
Defining enforcement style
Street-level enforcement consist of enforcement actions and enforcement style. Notably, enforcement 
style is also frequently used to study the ways of enforcing of regulatory agencies (e.g. Braithwaite et 
al., 1987; Carter, 2017; McCallister, 2010). In this article, however, street-level bureaucrats and not 
the regulatory agency are the unit of analysis. Both enforcement actions and enforcement style are 
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related since they address the behavior of street-level bureaucrats during the enforcement process, 
but they are conceptually different (May and Winter, 2000). Enforcement actions address behavioral 
activities conducted by street-level bureaucrats before and after a public encounter. They include, 
for instance, finalizing sanctions, specifying specific indicators that are inspected, or the planning of 
day-to-day inspectee-encounters and executing accompanied administrative tasks (May and Winter, 
2000). Enforcement actions are enforcement tasks that a street-level bureaucrat executes before s/
he visits inspectees and which are, thus, not directly related to the behavior of a specific inspectee. 
The behavior of street-level bureaucrats, however, also has a relational dimension because they 
implement policies during inspectee interactions (De Boer et al., 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, 2018; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000; Pautz, 2010). Bruijn et al. (2007) highlight that enforcing 
regulations is inherently a game between the inspector and the inspectee. The relational attitude 
of inspectors during these interactions is captured in their enforcement style. Enforcement style is 
defined as ‘the character of the day-to-day interactions of [street-level bureaucrats] when dealing 
with regulated entities’ (May and Winter, 2000, 145). During these face-to-face interactions street-
level bureaucrats behave a certain way towards inspectees, predominantly focusing on implementing 
enforcement policies but also giving advice or tips on how to improve compliance. In sum, the most 
important difference between enforcement action and style is that the latter is relational coming to 
to light during face-to-face encounters with inspectees but the departure point for decision-making 
remains the rules that street-level bureaucrats need to enforce (May and Winter, 2000). The focus 
here is solely on street-level enforcement style. 
Understanding enforcement style
There is a general agreement that street-level enforcement style is not fixed, and street-level 
bureaucrats combine different elements in varying constellations depending on the situation at 
hand (Mascini, 2013; Pautz, 2010). On top of that, street-level bureaucrats have a different style 
of enforcement during the same inspectee-encounter (Etienne, 2014; Nielsen, 2015; Mascini and 
Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000). The way these enforcement style variations are studied, 
however, differ. Scholars differ in whether enforcement style is understood to vary along on one or 
along multiple dimensions (Kagan, 1994; Lo et al., 2009; May and Wood, 2003; Reiss, 1984; May and 
Winter, 1999; 2000). Traditionally, enforcement style was conceptualized as being one-dimensional. 
The single dimension concerned the rigidness of applying rules (May and Wood, 2003). To illustrate, 
Kagan (1994) emphasizes that street-level bureaucrats vary in style from being cooperative to 
more punitive. Reiss (1984) highlights that styles vary from accommodative to more deterrent and 
sanctioning. Scholars, however, have pointed out that one dimension with two polar opposites – 
ranging from more cooperative to punitive – is not enough to grasp the complex nature of street-level 
enforcement style (Braithwaite et al., 1987; Gormley, 1998; May and Burby, 1998).
Indeed, May and Winter (1999) empirically revealed that enforcement style varied along not one but 
two dimensions, specifically formalism¹ and coercion. May and Winter (2000) define formalism as 
‘the degree of rigidity in interactions that varies from informal conversations and rule-bound instances 
on the part of the [street-level bureaucrats]’ (p. 147) and coercion as ‘the willingness to issue threats 
that vary from a trusting inspector not issuing warnings, to a skeptical [street-level bureaucrat] 
threatening to report or to impose penalties for violations’ (147). While Kagan (1994) conceptualized 
both dimensions on one dimension – the punitive dimension – May and Winter (1999; 2000) argue 
that they should be separated because street-level bureaucrats can vary in the extent to which they 
internalize each. Put differently, May and Winter (1999; 2000) show that both dimensions can be 
present – in different degrees – simultaneously which results in different patterns of enforcement styles 
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(May and Winter, 1999; 2000). Three ideal types of street-level bureaucrat enforcement style were 
identified, namely (1) legalistic (high formalism, moderate coercion); (2) flexible (moderate formalism 
and coercion) and; (3) accommodative (low formalism and coercion). May and Winter (2000) thus 
show that enforcement style is composed of two dimensions and the combination in which they are 
applied at the street-level result in different enforcement styles of street-level bureaucrats. 
May and Wood (2003) also see street-level enforcement style as two-dimensional, but they use 
slightly different labels than May and Winter (1999; 2000). They empirically show that street-
level enforcement style consists of (1) formalism and (2) facilitation which replaces the coercion 
dimension of May and Winter (1999; 2000). In line with May and Winter (1999; 2000), formalism 
is understood as rigidly applying rules and regulations. Facilitation is defined as ‘the willingness of 
[street-level bureaucrats] to help regulatees and be forgiving’ (May and Wood, 2003, p. 1999). This 
two-dimensional nature of enforcement style has now become widely accepted and used to study the 
frontline enforcement behavior of street-level bureaucrats (e.g. Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and 
Wood, 2003; Nielsen, 2015). 
In a later reflection on their own work, May and Winter (2011) point out that there could be more than 
two dimensions. Surprisingly, this notion has not been further explored. When enforcement style 
at the street-level is discussed, the traditional two-dimensional understanding of enforcement style 
remains the main conceptualization (e.g. Carter, 2017; Yee, Tang and Lo, 2014; Zhan, Lo and Tang, 
2013). One notable exception is the work of Lo et al. (2009) who do build on the idea of a multi-
dimensional enforcement style and, thus, make an important contribution to the understanding of 
street-level enforcement style. Lo et al. (2009) conceptualize that enforcement style is constructed of 
five underlying dimensions.
The first two dimensions of Lo et al.’s (2009) multi-dimensional concept include May and Winter’s 
(1999) identified formalism and coercion. First, formalism stresses the attention paid to the rigidness 
of the law during interactions by being reserved and legal-oriented (Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 
1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003). Examples of the formal dimension would be putting an emphasis 
on a firm implementation of rules and regulations and not considering mitigating circumstances 
of inspectees (Lo et al., 2009). Second, coercion focuses on the force of the law and, thus, the 
willingness of street-level bureaucrats to issue and signal threats (Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 
1999; 2000). Street-level bureaucrats focusing on coming across as an authority, keeping inspectees 
on their toes and making threats adhere to the coercive dimension of enforcement style. 
Third, educational highlights the communicative aspect of the law (Lo et al., 2009). Street-level 
bureaucrats encounter numerous inspectees who did not intend to break laws, but merely do not 
understand them because they are too complex and exhaustive (e.g. Nielsen, 2015). Focusing 
on informing and educating inspectees during interactions are examples fitting the educational 
enforcement style dimension. Fourth, prioritization entails pragmatic enforcement. Street-level 
bureaucrats applying this dimension are focused on prioritizing contextual circumstances on the one 
hand, like the inspectees’ cooperation, while on the other hand also focusing on being effective at 
the same time (Lo et al., 2009). Prioritizing during inspectee encounters is, thus, concerned with 
placing more emphasis on contextual circumstances and being effective than on other elements 
– like informing inspectees (see Tummers et al., 2015). Finally, accommodation emphasizes ‘the 
reconciliation of the demands of key stakeholders in regulatory enforcement’ (Lo et al., 2009, p. 
2710). Street-level bureaucrats, thus, consider the opinions of other stakeholders like colleagues or 
supervisors (Lo et al., 2009; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Notably, this dimension slightly 
differs from the other four. Street-level bureaucrats cannot emphasize the opinions of others during 
inspectee encounters but, merely, keep them in the back of their mind. 
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The five dimensions of enforcement style are summarized in table 2.1. This table provides a definition 
for each dimension to clarify the conceptual differences between each dimension. Also, an example 
of an attitude fitting each dimension is given. It is important to note that at the street-level, street-level 
bureaucrats can employ one or combinations of the enforcement style dimensions depending on 
the inspectee they are interacting with. None of the enforcement dimensions are likely to be present 
solely in their pure form. Instead, street-level bureaucrats will combine different degrees of multiple 
dimensions of enforcement styles during interactions with inspectees which, ultimately, results in their 
street-level enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000; 
May and Wood, 2003). 
Concept Dimension Dimension definition† Example†
Enforcement style Formalism The emphasis a street-level 
bureaucrat puts on rigid 
legal requirements during 
interactions with inspectees 
An inspector 
emphasizing strict 
requirements that must 
be met by the inspectee
Coercion The emphasis a street-level 
bureaucrat puts on issuing 
threats during inspectee 
interactions
An inspector threatening 
the inspectee with 
issuing a sanction
Educational The emphasis a street-level 
bureaucrat puts on educating 
a client during inspectee 
interactions
An inspector explaining 
rules and regulations to 
the inspectee
Prioritization The emphasis a street-
level bureaucrat puts on 
being effective considering 
contextual constrains during 
inspectee interactions
An inspector not 
considering the 
mitigating circumstances 
of the inspectee
Accommodation The extent to which a 
street-level bureaucrat 
takes opinions of other 
stakeholders into account 
during inspectee interactions
An inspector taking 
opinions of colleagues in 
his/her team into account 
when interacting with the 
inspectee
† Note: Definitions and examples are inspired by and adapted from Lo et al. (2009) and May & Winter 
(1999; 2000)
Table 2.1. Five dimensions of street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style
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Measuring enforcement style
Lo et al. (2009) took the first important steps to further advance the dimensions that underlie street-
level enforcement style. There are, however, limitations. First and foremost, Lo et al. (2009) test their 
enforcement style dimensions in an Asian context, specifically China. Understanding non-Western 
contexts is, indeed, lacking from the regulatory enforcement literature and, thus, very important (Van 
Rooij et al., 2013). However, encounters between inspectors and those they regulate is context-
depended (Mascini, 2013). In this line of reasoning, there are differences between the Chinese 
regulatory context and other contexts, such as the West (Van Rooij et al., 2013; Zhan, Lo and Tang, 
2013; Zhang, 2016). Due to these cultural differences, it could very well be that the street-level 
enforcement style dimensions also differ in a Western context. The Western context, specifically 
the Dutch context, is central in this article. Second, Lo et al. (2009) create their scales ad hoc and 
do not follow measurement development steps (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017a). For example, 
no cognitive interviews are conducted to ensure that the dimensions and their operationalization 
resonate with inspectors. Likewise, no exploratory and confirmatory steps are taken to gain a deeper 
understanding of the way the five dimensions are made up. 
2.3 Method 
Case
The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) was selected as a case 
for this research. The NVWA is one of the largest Dutch inspectorates with the core responsibility 
of overseeing food- and product safety to ensure that public health and animal welfare are up to 
standard. This case was selected because the NVWA has been under a lot of pressure over the past 
decade due to several media outrages. Reforming the way the NVWA and its inspectors enforce has 
often been suggested as a way to combat such large-scale debacles as well as the risks for the public 
(Weel ,2017; Posthumus, 2015). 
Data
An online survey was distributed among inspectors in October and November 2016 at the NVWA. 
Respondents were guaranteed full anonymity and confidentiality. Only inspectors from the divisions 
Veterinary and Import, Agriculture and Nature and Consumer and Safety (n = 1201) were included, 
because face-to-face inspection visits are not central to other divisions. A total response rate of 56.5 
percent was achieved (n = 679). A total of 172 respondents were excluded from analysis because they 
filled in less than 50 percent of the questionnaire. The total sample, thus, consists of 507 respondents. 
This sample includes 71.9 percent males, 27.4 percent females and 0.4 percent others. Ages ranges 
between 23 and 73 (M = 47.99, SD = 12.85). All three divisions are represented (33.3 percent 
Consumer & Safety, 34.7 percent Veterinary & Import, 32 percent Agriculture & Nature). Work 
experience varies between 1 and 43 years (M = 16.27, SD = 11.22). The sample was representative 
(see table 2.2). The respondents in the sample only had slightly lower years of work experience than 
the total population (M = 21.3), which should be considered when interpreting the findings. 
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Measurement scale: Preparation and analysis
A two-phase approach was used to develop and validate the measurement scale for street-level 
enforcement style (DeVellis, 2016). The two phases consist of preparation and analysis (Van Engen, 
2017a). 
For the preparation, DeVellis (2016) measurement development guidelines were followed. First, a 
preliminary item pool was generated by adapting items created by Lo et al. (2009) but also adding 
to it by building on other scholars who have quantitatively measured street-level enforcement style 
(Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000). This resulted in 5 items for each dimension 
(25 in total). This item pool is larger than the expected final scale, which is common practice, since 
it allows the researcher to identify the most optimal combination of items (DeVellis, 2016; Van 
Engen, 2017b). All items were measured on a 10-point scale ranging from completely disagree (1) 
till completely agree (10). Second, the item pool was reviewed by experts (n = 11) to evaluate face 
validity. Interviewed experts included 5 senior staffers composed of middle and upper management 
and 6 inspectors. After revising the items several times, the experts recognized that the 25-item scale 
measured the different dimensions of enforcement style and were formulated appropriately for the 
enforcement context. 
For analysis, the statistical program R and packages ‘lavaan’ (Rosseel, 2012), ‘psych’ (Revelle, 2014), 
‘semTools’ (Pornprasertmanit et al., 2013) were used to conduct factor analysis and establish internal 
consistency reliability as well as construct validity (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017a). The data 
slightly diverges from multivariate normality. This does not pose a problem for parameter estimates 
if it is accounted for (Field, 2013). Consequently, the Satorra-Bentler correction for the maximum 
likelihood estimation was used to calculate the parameters (Satorra and Bentler, 1994). Following 
Osborne and Fitzpatrick (2012), internal replication was used to ensure the findings are robust and, 
therefore, the sample was randomly split in half (1n = 253; 2n = 254). The first half was used for 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and the second half for confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Reliability 
was tested by examining model fit statistics and McDonald’s omega. Finally, construct validity was 
assessed by testing the internal, convergent – and discriminant validity by relating enforcement style 
to theoretically related and unrelated measured constructs. 
Table 2.2. Sample and population characteristics
Sample (n=507) Population (n=1201)
Age (M) 48.99 49.0
Years’ work experience (M) 16.27 21.30
Female (%) 27.40 28.73
Male (%) 71.90 71.27
Other gender (%) 0.40 -
Note: No data is available on other genders for the total populations
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2.4 Results
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
The first half of the data (n = 253) was used to conduct the exploratory factor analysis. Oblique 
rotation was used since factors were expected to correlate (Field, 2013). A total of twelve items were 
excluded. This is in line with the general rule of thumb that the tested preliminary item pool is at least 
twice the size of the final scale (Van Engen, 2017b). First, three items were omitted. These items were 
reverse coded, but the factors they loaded on could not be explained theoretically. It is, therefore, 
likely that respondents failed to attend to the positive-negative wording due to the limited number of 
reverse coded items. To limit method bias, the three items were omitted (DeVellis, 2016; Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). Second, eight additional items were omitted because they had factor loadings below .4 or 
cross-loadings above .3 (Field, 2013). 
Based on the scree plot and theoretical interpretations of factors, the EFA results in a three-factor 
model instead of the expected five-factor model. Table 2.3 shows the full wording of each item using 
a template. Underlined words are generic words that can be adjusted and replaced as necessary 
to fit the context of other studies (see Van Engen et al., 2016).  The three factors are (1) legal; (2) 
facilitation and (3) accommodation. Each factor is a separate dimension that street-level behavior can 
vary on. An inspector’s enforcement style is, then, made up of the way s/he varies along the three 
dimensions. Notably, rather than being individual dimensions, both formalism and coercion (factor 1) 
as well as prioritization and educational (factor 2) collapse and make up one latent construct each. 
First, while May and Winter (1999; 2000) separate formalism and coercion this study shows they 
are interconnected. The first factor is composed of three formalism items and two coercion items 
and labelled the legal dimension. The legal dimension is revealed to be defined by the extent to 
which attention is paid to an inspector to the rigidness and force of the law.  Second, the prioritization 
and education enforcement dimension also make up one factor as opposed to the expected two 
(Lo et al., 2009). The second factor is composed of three educational items and one prioritization 
item. This factor is labelled the facilitation dimension because it is composed of both the helping 
aspect highlighted in the educational dimension and forgiving which is part of prioritization. Finally, the 
accommodation dimension formed – as expected – one of the factors. 
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Item F1 F2 F3
Legal dimension (ω = .80)
During client encounters, I focus on:
1 Implementing policy X by following the letter of the law 0.67
2 That I enforce in an unambiguous way 0.78
3 That I make strict agreements with clients 0.69
4 That I execute the client encounter as completely as possible 0.73
5 That I uphold high standards regarding clients’ compliance with 
rules and regulations 
0.80
Facilitation dimension (ω = .85)
During client-encounters, I focus on:
1 Transferring my professional knowledge to clients 0.76
2 Giving indications how to improve compliance to clients 0.79
3 Being as helpful as possible to clients 0.90
4 The circumstances of clients that I encounter 0.63
Accommodation dimension (ω = .83)
During client encounters, I consider:
1 The opinions about government task A of colleagues from my 
team
0.80
2 The opinions about government task A of other teams 0.91
3 The opinions about government task A of other clients 0.65
4 The opinions about government task A of my team leader 0.62
Table 2.3. EFA with oblique rotated factor loadings
Note: In this study, the general underlined term clients is replaced by inspectee, government task A is 
replaced by inspecting, policy X by intervention policy and client encounter by inspection(s).
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
The second half of the data-set (n = 254) was used to perform the CFA. The fit of the model was 
assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Cut-off 
criteria are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) for CFI and TLI, between ≤ .06 (good fit) 
and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) for RMSEA and, finally, ≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
model (χ2 = 99.191, df = 62). The model fit was good with CFI = .929, TLI = .911, RSMEA = .052, 
PCLOSE = .385 and SRMR = .066.
Descriptive statistics
Table 2.4 shows the descriptive statistics. It is noteworthy that inspectors’ street-level enforcement 
style is, in general, mostly legal in nature (M = 8.01) followed by facilitation (M = 7. 36). Inspectors also 
have a considerable accommodation enforcement style (M = 6.08) although the mean is considerably 
lower than for the other two dimensions. 
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Enforcement style dimension Min Max M SD
Legal 1 10 8.01 1.03
Facilitation 1 10 7.36 1.32
Accommodation 1 10 6.08 1.94
Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics of dimensions of enforcement style
Internal consistency reliability tests
The internal consistency reliability of a measurement scale concerns the homogeneity of items 
(DeVellis, 2016). The internal consistency reliability was tested using the model fit indices mentioned 
above and McDonald’s omega. First and foremost, as mentioned earlier all fit indices pass the 
recommended thresholds indicating good internal consistency reliability. Second, the EFA resulted 
in a three-factor model. The proposed measure was assessed for reliability using McDonald’s 
omega which is more sensible and less prone to over- and underestimation than the highly-critiqued 
Cronbach’s alpha (Dunn et al., 2014; Sijtsma, 2009). Reliability for all three factors were above the .7 
threshold (ω = .80 (factor 1), ω = .85 (factor 2) and ω = .83 (factor 3) indicating good reliability (see 
table 2.3).
Construct validity tests
Construct validity addresses the extent to which the underlying latent construct – here street-level 
enforcement style – “behaves the way the construct it purports to measure should behave” (DeVellis, 
2016, p. 95). The internal construct validity is assessed first, followed by convergent and discriminant 
validity (DeVellis, 2016). 
Internal construct validity
The three factors all measure a different dimension of the latent construct of enforcement style. It is 
therefore expected that they correlate. Table 2.5 shows that the legal, facilitation and accommodation 
dimension all positively correlate and are, thus, related but distinguishable. Correlations are strongest 
between facilitation and accommodation (r = 0.30) and weakest between legal and accommodation 
(r = 0.16). That all dimensions positively correlate is in line with theories on street-level enforcement 
style which indicate that none of these styles are going to be solely present. Inspectors will combine 
the different dimensions during inspectee encounters and vary concerning the extent to which each 
dimension is internalized. These different combinations of variations make up an individuals’ street-
1 2 3
1 Legal 1
2 Facilitation 0.24*** 1
3 Accommodation 0.16** 0.30*** 1
Table 2.5. Internal construct validity
*** p < .001; ** p < .05
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level enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000; May and 
Wood, 2003). 
Convergent construct validity
Convergent validity assesses the extent to which predicted related constructs are indeed related 
(DeVellis, 2016). The three dimensions of street-level enforcement style were theorized to be related 
to three constructs (perceived trust in inspectees’ compliance, years of work experience and rule 
obedience). Trust is perception-based, because perceptions of inspectors inform their regulatory 
practices and, thus, their enforcement styles (Pautz and Rinfret, 2011). Different relations are expected 
for each of the three dimensions and the related constructs, because inspectors will employ different 
combinations of the underlying dimensions of street-level enforcement styles during interactions with 
inspectees. Each dimension, thus, has a distinct nature (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; 
May and Winter, 2000; May and Wood, 2003). See appendix I for an overview of all measures and 
response categories.
Perceived trust in inspectees’ performance
The character of the relationship between inspectees and inspectors influences street-level 
enforcement style (Nielsen, 2007; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). Contrary to the New Public Management 
(NPM) model, which is built around a lack of trust between principals and agents (Bouckaert, 2012), 
there is a trusting relation between inspectees and inspectors (Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). Despite 
the lack of substantive empirical evidence, there seems to be consensus in the literature that more 
trusting inspectors favour a flexible and facilitating approach during encounters with inspectees 
(May and Winter, 1999;2000; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). May and Winter (2000) emphasize that 
inspectors with a helpful approach ‘trust regulatees and sympathize with the difficulties they face in 
attempting to comply with regulations’ (149). A positive relationship is, therefore, expected between 
an inspectors’ trust in a inspectees’ compliance and the facilitation dimension of enforcement style 
(Pautz, 2010; Pautz and Rinfret, 2011; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). The results in table 5 confirm the 
predicted relation (st.B = 0.155). This, indeed, suggests that the consensus of the relation between 
trust and a facilitative approach during face-to-face inspection visits (Pautz, 2010; Pautz and Rinfret, 
2011; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012) is, indeed, supported by empirical evidence.
Years of work experience
In addition to the character of inspector-inspectee relations, it has long been acknowledged that 
individual characteristics of inspectors matter for the way they enforce (e.g. Hawkins, 1984; Gormley, 
1998). Hawkins (1984), for instance, showed that the older the inspectors, the more flexible they 
were. Likewise, Kaufmann (2017) emphasize that inspectors with little work experience exhibit “a 
more policing, nit-picking attitude” than colleagues with more years of work experience. The newer 
inspectors do not have the confidence yet to determine which violations and risks can be overlooked 
and where they can be facilitating (Kaufmann, 2017; Hawkins, 1984). In this line of reasoning, a 
positive relationship is expected between years of work experience and the facilitation enforcement 
style dimension. Table 5 confirms that older inspectors are more comfortable with providing advice 
and sympathizing with the circumstances of inspectees (facilitation dimension) than their younger 
colleagues (st.B = 0.202).  
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Rule obedience
Next to demographic characteristics like years or work experience, personality characteristics matter 
for street-level enforcement style. It is expected that inspectors who are very rule obedient will apply 
the legal and accommodation dimension more extensively. First, rule obedience is a personality 
characteristic and inspectors possessing this will be more comfortable with being strict and formal 
(see van Kleef et al., 2015). It is, therefore, hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between 
the legal dimension and an inspectors’ rule obedience. Second, reliable judgments are central to the 
legitimacy of regulators (Tuijn et al., 2012). Rule obedient inspectors are hypothesized to be more 
accommodative because they turn to other stakeholders, like their team leaders and colleagues, for 
support on how to make judgments and, in turn, enforce (see Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). 
Table 5 shows that both expectations are confirmed (st.B = 0.308 and st.B = 0.134, respectively). 
Discriminant validity
Discriminant validity assesses whether expected unrelated constructs are, indeed, unrelated 
(DeVellis, 2016). Two unrelated constructs are traditional media usage (measured in hours) and 
social desirability (measured by 1 item and a 10-point scale ranging from completely disagree till 
completely agree). Table 2.6 shows that both constructs are, indeed, not correlated with all three 
dimensions of street-level enforcement style.
Street-level enforcement style dimensions
1 2 3
Legal Facilitation Accommodation
Convergent validity
Trust in inspectees’ 
compliance
0.035 0.155* -0.039 1
Rule obedience 0.308*** 0.031 0.134*
Years’ work experience -0.053 0.202** -0.077
Discriminant validity
Traditional media usage 0.027 -0.083 0.044
Social desirability -0.013 -0.073 0.084
Table 2.6. Convergent and discriminant validity
The standardized coefficients from the Structural Equation Model (SEM) are reported
*** p < .00; ** p < .05; * p < .01
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2.5 Conclusion and discussion
Understanding street-level enforcement is important for understanding policy implementation (May and 
Wood, 2003). This study has both a theoretical and methodological point of departure. Theoretically, 
there is an unsolved conceptual puzzle concerning the nature and number of dimensions underlying 
street-level enforcement style. Methodologically, there is a lack of a validated and psychometrically 
sound measurement scale which complicates cross-sector and cross-national comparisons. This 
study investigates and operationalizes street-level enforcement style by building on the classic work 
of May and Winter (1999; 2000) and the more recent work of Lo et al. (2009). By revealing three 
dimensions underlying street-level enforcement style (legal, facilitation, accommodation), this study 
contributes to a deeper understanding of street-level enforcement behavior generally and takes the 
first step towards understanding individual variations specifically.
Theoretically, this study contributes knowledge on how we can understand street-level behavior, and 
specifically enforcement style by addressing its underlying dimensions (May & Winter, 2011). This 
study, thus, conceptually contributes to the concept of enforcement style. While May and Winter 
(1999;2000) and May and Wood (2003) argue for a two-dimensional conceptualization, Lo et al. (2009) 
advocates a five-dimensional underpinning of enforcement style. The findings of the measurement 
development and validation analysis in this study adds to this dimensionality discussion and shows 
that – in a Western context – street-level enforcement style is composed of three dimensions. First, 
the legal dimension is constructed of both the rigidness (formalism) and force of the law (coercion) 
(Kagan, 1994; Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003). This finding 
is in line with the original notion of a punitive and legal style and, sub-sequentially, applying rules 
rigidly (Kagan, 1994). Kagan (1994), ultimately, argues that formalism and coercion make up the 
same construct. Notably, this study shows that the legal dimension is revealed to not solely consist 
of variations in flexibility of applying rules (Kagan, 1994) but also of the extent of the emphasis 
inspectors put on being rigid and strict (Kagan, 1994; May and Wood, 2003) as well as their degree 
of threatening with sanctions and consequences for non-compliant behavior (Lo et al., 2009; May and 
Winter, 1999; 2000). 
The second dimension is facilitation which encompasses the communicative function (educational) 
of the law while considering circumstances at hand (prioritization) (May and Wood, 2003; Lo et al., 
2009). This finding is in line with previous research. According to May and Wood (2003) one of the 
dimensions of street-level enforcement style is facilitation which encompasses helping and forgiving 
inspectees. The educational enforcement dimension entails the extent of the communicative function 
of the law and providing information to inspectees (Lo et al., 2009). Sharing information signals a 
positive relationship fostering cooperation and, thus, a way of helping (e.g. Bruijn et al., 2007; Etienne, 
2013; Nielsen, 2007). In addition, prioritization is a dimension composed of the extent of accounting 
for contextual circumstances of inspectees (Lo et al., 2009). Paying attention during inspections to 
the situations of inspectees can be seen as forgiving (May and Wood, 2003). In sum, though May 
and Wood (2003) do not explicitly study it, they state that helping and forgiving are at the heart of 
facilitation. The second factor revealed in this study empirically confirms this idea.
Finally, accommodation addresses the extent to which inspectors consider opinions of other 
stakeholders, like their team leaders when conducting inspection visits (Lo et al., 2009). First and 
foremost, by empirically identifying this third dimension the present study confirms that May and 
Winter (2011) were correct to point out that street-level enforcement style is more complex than 
originality thought. And consequently, indeed, best captured in more than two dimensions (Lo et al., 
2009). Furthermore, the accommodation dimension is in line with Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s 
(2000) notion that street-level workers are inherently connected to peers. Though the interactions 
street-level bureaucrats have with inspectees determines how they implement policies, it is the 
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relationship with their fellow street-level workers which shapes their attitude and support their ways of 
dealing with inspectees. Notably, as opposed to the legal and facilitation dimension, accommodation 
is more cognitive in nature. Future research could explore roles of other external stakeholders for the 
enforcement styles of street-level bureaucrats (e.g. de Boer et al., 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, 2018) 
or study variations within the enforcement style of inspectors and other cognitive behaviors (e.g. 
Tummers et al., 2015). 
The legal, facilitation and accommodation enforcement style dimensions were also theoretically 
related to individual-level characteristics of the street-level bureaucrat, namely (1)) perceived trust 
in inspectees’ performance; (2) years of work experience, and; (3) rule obedience.  The convergent 
validity tests showed that individual antecedents of inspectors positively correlate with different 
dimensions of enforcement style. This could have important consequences for scholars investigating 
street-level enforcement style variation. This study adds to the growing body of research showing 
that individual level antecedents such as demographics (Hawkins, 1984; Kaufmann, 2017), trust 
and other relational aspects of inspector-inspectee interactions (Etienne, 2013; Pautz, 2010; Pautz 
and Rinfret, 2011; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012) as well as personality traits like rule obedience (see 
Van Kleef et al., 2015) may potentially help explain enforcement style variations. Future research 
investigating individual antecedents in relation to inspectee encounters can, thus, be especially fruitful 
for understanding street-level enforcement styles. 
Methodologically, this study answers to the increasing number of articles calling for creating high 
quality measurement scales (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies, 2017; Van Engen et al. 2016; 2017a; 
Van Loon et al., 2016). The street-level enforcement scale at hand, ultimately, enables scholars to 
study this concept systematically across sectors and countries and investigate the extent of its effects. 
In other words, future studies are urged to further explore the three enforcement style dimensions 
across different types of street-level bureaucrats, its antecedents and its effects at the street-level. 
Scholars can, for instance, investigate the effects of street-level enforcement style of other street-
level bureaucrats on ways of implementing public policies (see Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009) and their 
interactions with inspectees (see de Boer et al., 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, 2018; Etienne, 2013; 
Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). 
Despite the theoretical and methodological contributions, this study has limitations. First and foremost, 
the data collected here is cross-sectional making the establishment of causal inferences impossible. 
Making causal inferences is not the goal of this study and more research is needed to fully grasp the 
causal implications of the correlations found in the convergent and discriminant tests of this study. 
Second, street-level enforcement style is situational and, thus, differs across individual inspectee 
encounters, sectors and countries. Notably, a Western population was used in this sample. Lo et 
al. (2009) street-level enforcement style study was tested in an Asian context since they surveyed 
Chinese inspectors. The Chinese regulatory context is seen as more authoritarian than the Western 
context (Van Rooij et al., 2013; Zhan et al., 2013; Zhang, 2016). The role of Chinese inspectors and 
their behavior during interactions with inspectees may, thus, differ from inspectors operating in a 
Western context but there could also be similarities. Future research should study cross-national 
similarities and differences concerning the three dimensions underpinning street-level enforcement 
style or compare across sectors within one country or individual encounters as well as its implications 
for implementation of enforcement policies. 
Finally, this measurement scale is validated using a specific kind of street-level bureaucrat, namely 
the inspector. Regardless, many other street-level bureaucrats implement enforcement policies, like 
police officers (e.g. Engel and Worden, 2003). In addition, a large portion of street-level bureaucrats 
may arguably deal with less rules (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000) but may still have to enforce 
public policies such as parole officers. More research is needed to understand the way other type of 
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street-level bureaucrats enforce at the street-level and how they combine the three dimensions during 
different encounters with inspectees. In this way, a more thorough understanding can be established 
of similarities and differences in street-level enforcement styles.
All in all, street-level enforcement style is more complex than is commonly proposed (May and Winter, 
1999; 2000; May and Winter, 2011). Studies aiming to investigate street-level enforcement style can 
benefit from taking its three-dimensional nature into account and advancing it. Using the developed 
and validated 13-item measure will allow for cross-sector and cross-national comparisons which, 
ultimately, ensures a better understanding of how street-level enforcement style is made up and how 
it can be measured systematically. 
Notes
¹ Formalism is conceptualized in the social sciences in different ways. In the political sciences, it 
is frequently referred to as the gap between what is said formally and what is actually executed in 
practice (e.g. Farazmand, 2012; Riggs, 1994). In this article, the conceptualization of formalism used 
by scholars specifically investigating street-level enforcement style is used. 
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This chapter has been published as: de Boer, N., Eshuis, J., & Klijn, E.H. (2018). Does disclosure of 
performance information influence street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement style? Public Administration 
Review, 78(5), 694-704.
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Does transparency by public 
organizations influence street-level 
bureaucrats’ enforcement style?
Abstract
Governments use different regulatory instruments to ensure businesses owners or ‘inspectees’ 
comply with rules and regulations. One increasingly applied tool is disclosing information about the 
compliance performance of inspectees to other stakeholders. Disclosing performance information has 
consequences for inspectors since it increases the visibility of their day-to-day work. Using a large 
survey (n = 679) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority, this study shows that the disclosure of performance information impacts enforcement style at 
the street-level. The study finds that perceived disclosed performance information positively enhances 
all three dimensions of inspectors’ enforcement style (legal, facilitation and accommodation). This 
effect is strongest for facilitation and accommodation and least strong for the legal style. Perceived 
resistance partly explains this effect. Opposed to our expectations, we find that more perceived 
disclosure does not result in more but in less perceived resistance of inspectees by inspectors. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats with considerable autonomy and discretion to make 
judgements about the applicability of sanctions during interactions with clients (Lipsky, 2010) such 
as business owners. They are, however, not the only ones responsible for ensuring businesses or 
‘inspectees ’adhere to rules and regulations. Inspectors function in a network of stakeholders (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2016; Meijer, 2013) including, for instance, consumers, public service organizations, 
business organizations and the media. This context has triggered regulators to use that network 
to stimulate compliance of private- and public inspectees, such as schools and hospitals. Making 
compliance performances of inspectees available to the public is an instrument that helps activate 
stakeholders operating in that network. This disclosure of performance information allows stakeholders 
to hold inspectees accountable (Bovens, 2007). For example, parents can question schools when 
they underperform, or consumers can hold firms responsible for poor quality of products (Van de 
Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). The media may, sub-sequentially, catch up with this information, report 
negatively, which, in turn, damages the image of inspectees (cf. Bennett, 2012; Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). 
Regulators are disclosing performance information in different ways, such as passively presenting 
policy information (De Fine Licht, 2014; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 
2013; Van Erp, 2010), actively publishing sanctions (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; van Erp, 2011) 
or constructing ‘rating and rankings’ (Hood et al., 2008; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). Different 
ways of disclosing performance information by governments vary in, for instance, their degree of 
completeness, color and usability (Douglas and Meijer, 2016). They, however, all share the intention 
of stimulating compliance of inspectees (Meijer, 2013; Meijer & Homburg, 2009; Van de Walle 
& Roberts, 2008) by activating other stakeholders in the network to act on that information (e.g. 
Meijer, 2103). For instance, consumers may stop eating at a local lunchroom if it is disclosed that 
it does not comply with hygiene rules and regulations. Therefore, this paper focuses on disclosed 
information about compliance performance of inspectees provided by government agencies for other 
stakeholders.
Research on disclosing performance information at the street-level is scarce and its impact remains 
unclear (e.g. Etienne, 2014). Scholars usually address other actors, such as public managers (e.g. 
Moynihan & Pandey, 2010), businesses (e.g. Meijer & Homburg, 2009) or citizens (e.g. James, 2011; 
Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). The implications for inspectors are, thus, largely missing in this 
debate. The aim of this study is, therefore, to understand the impact of disclosure of performance 
information on street-level behavior, specifically from the viewpoint of inspectors. This study proposes 
that investigating disclosed performance information may facilitate clarifications because this 
instrument might have important implications for inspectors’ day-to-day encounters with inspectees 
and, in turn their enforcement style (Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; May & Wood, 2003). 
First and foremost, the work of inspectors is becoming more visible to the public which makes it more 
accountable. The way inspectors enforce can be scrutinized by the public which, in turn, may impact 
the way inspectors enforce (Schillemans, 2008; Winter, 2003). Second, inspectees’ (non-) compliance 
will be part of the public sphere which may influence the way they behave towards inspectors during 
regulatory encounters (Levi-Flaur, 2011; Murphy, 2004). Especially for inspectees not complying, 
risks and uncertainties are increased which may trigger more resistance at the street. Inspectors may, 
sub-sequentially, enforce in a more legal manner (cf. Etienne, 2014). In sum, disclosing performance 
information potentially increases the visibility of inspectors and triggers inspectees during regulatory 
interactions. Therefore, the central research question being addressed is to what extent does the 
perceived disclosure of performance information impact inspectors’ enforcement style during 
regulatory encounters? This research contributes theoretically as it investigates why inspectors 
enforce the way they do by showing the direct impact of perceived disclosure of performance 
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information (cf. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; Meijer & Homburg, 2009; van Erp, 2011; Van de Walle & 
Roberts, 2008) and indirect impact of perceived resistance by inspectees at the frontlines (cf. Etienne, 
2013; 2014; Van Erp, 2009). 
This paper is structured as follows: The theoretical foundations will be discussed first, including 
conceptualizations of disclosing performance information, enforcement style and potentially influential 
factors like perceived resistance. Then, the methodological considerations will be presented followed 
by the findings based on a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority. Finally, a conclusion and discussion on the implications for 
understanding enforcement at the frontlines and policy implementation are provided.
3.2 Conceptual framework and 
expectations
Enforcement style 
According to May & Wood (2003), “enforcement style is a concept that is easily understood in the 
abstract but hard to pin down in the specifics” (p. 119). It has been described as ‘regulatory style’ 
(Gormley, 1998; Kagan, 1994), styles of enforcement which vary (Hutter, 1989) or it is intertwined 
with the concept of enforcement strategies (May & Wood, 2003). The general notion of these 
different labels of enforcement style addresses inspectors’ ways of enforcing at the frontline as well 
as their ways of interacting with their inspectees (May & Winter, 1999; 2000; May & Wood, 2003). 
Enforcement style is defined as “the character of the day-to-day interactions of inspectors when 
dealing with representatives of regulated entities” (May & Wood, 2003, p. 119).
Enforcement style can be understood as a single or a multi-dimensional concept (Kagan, 1994; 
May & Winter, 1999; 2000). Traditionally, it was studied along a single dimension. Kagan (1994), for 
instance, used the rigidness of applying rules to study enforcement style. More recently, however, 
scholars have empirically shown that enforcement style is multi-dimensional (e.g. de Boer, 2019; Lo 
et al., 2009; May & Winter, 1999; 2000). May and Winter (1999; 2000) illustrate that an inspectors’ 
typical enforcement style is better understood as being two-dimensional, consisting of formalism and 
coercion. The formal dimension refers to inspectors’ degrees of formality and flexibility while coercion 
addresses levels of trust and willingness of inspectors to use threats. These two dimensions can be 
applied in different degrees at the same time but can also be applied separately. This suggests that 
enforcement style is multifaceted and more nuanced than originally thought. Therefore, exploring 
more enforcement style dimensions can facilitate a deeper level of understanding (Winter & May, 
2011).  
Lo et al. (2009) make an important contribution and bring forward that enforcement style is composed 
of five dimensions. First, formalism which is “adherence to rather rigid legal requirements” (Lo et al., 
2009, p. 2709). A formalistic style entails enforcing clear penalties, setting strict deadlines and not 
considering mitigating circumstances of inspectees. Second, coercion highlights “the force of law” (Lo 
et al., 2009, p. 2709). In practice, more coercive inspectors are very willing to implement – or threaten 
with sanctions. Third, educational stresses “the communicative function of the law” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 
2709). Here, educating inspectees and the public who can, in turn, put pressure on more responsible 
behavior is central. Fourth, prioritization is defined as “pragmatic enforcement that tries to get the 
most effective result within the given contextual constraints and while considering the circumstances 
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at hand” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709). A prioritizing enforcement style entails, for instance, prioritizing 
violations in determining the consequences. Finally, accommodation refers to “the reconciliation of the 
demands of key stake holders in regulatory enforcement” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2710). In other words, 
inspectors’ keep opinions of others – like their supervisors – in the back of their mind during regulatory 
encounters with inspectees. 
Lo et al. (2009) are the first to show that enforcement style is, indeed, composed of more than 
two dimensions. There are, however, some limitations to their study. First, their instrument is tested 
among Chinese inspectors and it is unsure whether their scales are valid beyond that research 
context (de Boer, 2019). Second, their scales are created ad hoc and not validated using, for instance, 
steps like exploratory- and confirmatory factor analyses or by interviewing experts (deVellis, 2016). 
Building on Lo et al. (2009), de Boer (2019) has furthered the conceptualization and measurement of 
enforcement style by re-developing and validating a measurement scale. This work brings together 
the classic conceptualization of the two-dimensional enforcement style (May & Winter, 1999; 2000) 
and the five-dimensional enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009). 
De Boer (2019) finds that enforcement style is composed of three dimensions, namely (1) legal 
which combines both rigid and coercive applications of the law, (2) facilitation incorporating both the 
communicative application of the law as well as accounting for situational characteristics of inspectees 
and, finally, (3) accommodation which entails taking opinions of others into account. In this study, we 
use de Boer’s (2019) scales because they have been validated using measurement development and 
validation steps (DeVellis, 2016).
Disclosure of performance information 
There is a trend towards making more information available to the public about the ways the 
governments and its clients are performing (Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008; Van Erp, 2009; 2010). 
Though the extent of the disclosure of this information varies across governments, it makes both 
the work of agencies and individual inspectors more visible to the public (e.g. Etienne, 2014; Gilad 
et al., 2013; Meijer, 2013; Moar & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Winter, 2003). Performance information 
is defined as “systematic information describing the outputs and outcomes of public programmes 
and other organizations – whether intended or otherwise – generated by systems and processes 
intended to produce such information” (Pollitt, 2006, p. 39).  In this study, disclosing performance 
information specifically disclosed information about compliance performance of inspectees provided 
by government agencies for other stakeholders.
The degree of disclosure of performance information can vary along three dimensions, namely (1) 
completeness, (2) coloring and (3) usability (Douglas & Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). First, 
completeness of the information can range from “basic, brief information without any details or consist 
of elaborate information in the form of both quantitative and qualitative data” (Douglas & Meijer, 2016, 
p. 3). Second, coloring of the information refers to how “information about the organization can never 
be presented in a fully neutral manner” (Douglas & Meijer, 2016, p. 3) and consist of a certain frame. 
Finally, usability of the information entails that “information can be made available in an accessible 
format, which is easily understandable for a layperson, or be presented in such a way that only 
committed experts can understand it” (Douglas & Meijer, 2016, p. 3). Governments vary in the extent 
to which the performance information they disclose meets these criteria and, thus, how visible their 
work as well as that of their inspectors are. 
Notably, the implications of disclosing performance information are two-folded. One the one hand, 
regulators disclose information about the compliance performance of their inspectees. On the 
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other hand, the task of regulators is to ensure compliance of inspectees with rules and regulations 
(Baldwin et al., 1998; Sparrow, 2000). When regulators disclose the compliance performance of their 
inspectees, their own performance becomes available for monitoring. The less inspectees violate 
rules and regulations, the more the regulator is seen as performing well.
Hypothesized impact of disclosing performance 
information on enforcement style
Scholars have started to investigate whether this increasing visibility of inspectors’ work may help 
grasp variations in enforcement (e.g. Etienne, 2014; Winter, 2013). Inspectors are classic street-
level bureaucrats with substantive discretion and autonomy to make judgments during interactions 
with inspectees (Lipsky, 2010; Raaphorst, 2018). The increased visibility of regulators caused by 
disclosing performance information and the associated reaction of inspectees during regulatory 
encounters contributes to the uncertainties inspectors face and, in turn, influences their enforcement 
style. The disclosure of performance information may directly and indirectly have an impact on 
inspectors’ enforcement style. 
A direct relation is hypothesized because disclosing performance information may increase 
uncertainties inspectors’ experience. During regulatory encounters inspectors face uncertainties 
because they must apply their professional knowledge to complex inspection situations using limited 
information. Inspectors must interpret the situation at hand, find out what is happening and determine 
the appropriate outcome of the face-to-face interaction (Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; Maynard-Moody 
& Musheno, 2003; Raaphorst, 2018). Publishing performance information makes performances of 
inspectees part of the public sphere (van Erp, 2009; 2010). Stakeholders can scrutinize not just 
these inspectees, but also the regulators responsible for ensuring compliance (Carpenter, 2014; 
Gilad, 2012). The stakeholders are, thus, empowered to make judgments about the performance 
of regulators and their inspectors based on the disclosed information (cf. Carpenter, 2014; Meijer, 
20143; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) which increases the uncertainties inspectors face. 
It is, therefore, expected that inspectors perceiving the disclosure of performance information to be 
substantive, will become more legal, less facilitative and more accommodative. First, inspectors are 
expected to become more legal and, thus, rigidly apply rules and regulations because sticking to 
procedures they know can be used to reduce the uncertainty. Procedures prescribe fixed elements 
for their ways of working, thus reducing uncertainty (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012; Raaphorst, 
2018). In addition, it provides legitimacy and approval within their organization. Second, inspectors 
are hypothesized to have a low facilitation style and, thus, not substantively provide information on 
how compliance can be improved and consider circumstances of inspectees. By sticking to standards 
and facts, inspectors minimize the uncertainty that unambiguous enforcement behavior is made 
visible or inspectees are empowered to make judgments about their performance (cf. Carpenter, 
2014; Gilad, 2012). Finally, inspectors are expected to become more accommodative because if they 
perceive that other stakeholders, like their team leaders and colleagues, think similarly about the 
way they enforce, uncertainty is reduced. In this way, they have ‘a backing’ (Hupe & Hill, 2007). The 
hypotheses thus read as follows: 
H1a: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high 
score on a legal enforcement style. 
H1b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a low 
score on a facilitation enforcement style. 
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H1b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high 
score on an accommodation enforcement style.
To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between disclosure of performance information and 
enforcement style, it is important to look at indirect effects. Street-level work is inherently relational in 
nature and characterized by face-to-face encounters (Lipsky, 2010). Therefore, the relation between 
inspector and inspectee is considered and, more specifically, the resistance inspectors perceive 
during regulatory encounters. 
First, as mentioned earlier, disclosing performance information is intended to stimulate compliance 
of inspectees (Meijer & Homburg, 2009; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). Disclosing non-compliant 
behavior embarrasses inspectees by harming their reputation which, in turn, incentivizes compliance 
(Etienne, 2014; Van Erp, 2009; 2010; Schillemans, 2008). This risk of reputation damage may 
increase resistance against inspectors during face-to-face encounters (e.g. Etienne, 2014). On top 
of that, laws about the disclosure and its consequences for the inspectee can simply be too complex 
and exhaustive (cf. Nielsen, 2015). This may also lead inspectees to resist more during regulatory 
encounters in the way of asking for clarifications or negotiating (cf. Etienne, 2014). Perceived 
resistance is understood as “doubt about the intentions of the [inspector] to behave cooperatively 
and benignly towards those [she or he] dominates” (Murphy, 2004, p. 194). It is thus expected, that 
inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high 
score on perceived resistance.
H2: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosed performance information will have a high 
score on perceived resistance.
Second, resistance at the street-level may harm the social interaction between the inspector and 
inspectee. Inspectors operate in a context of sanctioning and limiting citizens’ or organizations’ 
freedom, to ensure compliance (Baldwin et al., 1998). Inspectors thus “deliver obligations rather than 
services” (Sparrow, 2000, p. 2). Delivering obligations goes hand in hand with negotiations during 
regulatory encounters which, in turn, increases uncertainties for inspectors because they may have to 
improvise on the spot (Etienne, 2014; Raaphorst, 2018). Much like the hypothesized direct relations 
between perceived disclosure of performance information above (see hypothesis H1a, H1b and H1c), 
inspectors are expected to reduce these uncertainties and enforce accordingly. The hypotheses, thus, 
read as follows:
H3a: Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score on a legal 
enforcement style. 
H3b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a low score on a facilitation 
enforcement style. 
H3c: Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score on an accommodation 
enforcement style.
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Perceived disclosure of 
performance information
Legal
Facilitation
Accommodation
Perceived resistance
H1a
H1b
H1c
H2
H3b
H3c
H3a
3.3 Method
The conceptual model was tested at The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority 
(NVWA). The NVWA was selected because it is one of the largest regulators in the Netherlands, 
with the important task of overseeing companies involved in food production and product safety, to 
ensure public health and animal welfare. The NVWA is currently developing and implementing ways 
of disclosing information about inspectees’ performance. The NVWA is not developing one universal 
way for disclosing performance information concerning all its inspection tasks (i.e. public safety, public 
health and animal welfare). Each division of the NVWA deals with multiple inspection topics. The 
NVWA is customizing the way performance information is disclosed for each inspection topic in order 
to ensure maximum impact on the compliance of inspectees. To illustrate, for some inspection topics 
the compliance performance of inspectees is made available by disclosing full inspection reports, 
while for other topics traffic light symbols accompanied by the most important indicators are made 
available via a smartphone application. 
Data
The data was collected in October and November 2016 using an online survey with active cooperation 
of NVWA. The NVWA is made up of the board of directors, an advisory body and 5 divisions, namely 
Staff, Management, Veterinary & Import, Agriculture & Nature and Consumer & Safety. This study 
focuses solely on inspectors who conduct face-to-face inspection visits and therefore only inspectors 
working at Veterinary & Import, Agriculture & Nature and Consumer & Safety were included. Only 
in these three divisions are inspectors employed who conduct inspection visits. The sample frame 
consists of all NVWA inspectors (n = 1201) working at Veterinary & Import, Agriculture & Nature and 
Consumer & Safety.
Respondents were assured that answers would be fully anonymous and confidential. The questionnaire 
includes new scales which were validated through expert interviews (n = 11). The consulted experts 
consisted of individual inspectors (n = 6) and a senior staff committee (n = 5). Respondents were 
informed by e-mail about the study, reminded at two week intervals and had 6 weeks to complete 
the questionnaire. In total 679 inspectors completed the questionnaire resulting in a response rate 
of 56.5 percent. Non-response was present in multiple variables. 172 respondents filled in only 50 
percent or less. These respondents were excluded from the analysis resulting in a total sample of 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual model
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507 respondents. 
In terms of demographics, 71.9 percent are male, 27.7 percent female and 0.4 percent other. 
Respondents are between 23 and 73 years old (M = 47.99, SD = 12.85) and experience as an 
inspector ranged from 1 till 43 years (M = 16.27, SD = 11.22). Of the respondents 33.3 percent worked 
in the division Consumer & Safety, 34.7 percent in Veterinary & Import, 31.7 percent in Agriculture 
& Nature and 0.4 percent in other. The sample is representative of the total population. Only work 
experience in the sample was slightly lower than that of the total population (M = 21.3) which should 
be considered when interpreting the results. 
Measures
The key variables to be explained are enforcement style, perceived degree of disclosure of 
performance information and perceived resistance. A complete overview of the items of all variables 
can be found in appendix I.
Enforcement style. Drawing on de Boer (2019), enforcement style is measured on three dimensions, 
namely (1) legal; (2) facilitation and; (3) accommodation. Legal was measured using five items and 
facilitation and accommodation using four items on a 10-point scale ranging from never (1) till always 
(10). Items included were, for instance: during inspections I focus on ‘making strict agreements with 
clients’ (legal); ‘clarifying rules and regulations to clients’ (facilitation); ‘the opinions of inspectors from 
my team about enforcing’ (accommodation). Reliability for all three factors were above the .7 threshold 
(ω = .80 (legal), ω = .85 (facilitation) and ω = .83 (accommodation) indicating acceptable reliability¹.
Perceived degree of disclosure of performance information. Building on transparency scholarship, 
the perception of disclosure of performance information of inspectors is operationalized to consist 
of three criteria, namely (1) completeness, (2) coloring and (3) usability (Douglas & Meijer, 2016; 
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). For each criterion 2 items were formulated resulting in a 6-item measure. 
Items included were, for instance: I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses 
as ‘complete’ (completeness); ‘without judgment’ (coloring); and, understandable for non-experts 
(usability). EFA showed that the third criteria (usability) entails a separate factor. Since usability is 
measured on only 2 items, both items are omitted. The resulting 4-item measure is reliable (ω = .89)². 
Perceived resistance. Perceived resistance is based on Braithwaite’s (2003) and Murphy’s (2004) 
studies targeting tax payers and measuring their doubt about the intentions of the Tax Authority. 
Inspired by Murphy’s (2004) scale, 5 items were formulated to fit the viewpoint of the inspectors 
and their context. All items were reverse coded and items included: ‘it is possible to satisfy clients 
completely’ and ‘clients actively help during inspections’. Two items were dropped after an EFA was 
conducted because of low factor loadings < .4 or cross-loadings > .3 resulting in a reliable 3-item 
measure (ω = .71)³. 
Controls. There are also several controls included based on the correlation table, namely: rule 
obedience and several demographics (gender and work experience). 
Common source bias
The variables in this study are inherently perceptual, making a survey the appropriate method 
(George & Pandey, 2017; Podsakoff et al., 2012). Potential common source bias was minimized 
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using design remedies (Podsakoff et al., 2012). First, the questionnaire was tested among informants 
which increases face validity. Second, the dependent- and independent variables were presented on 
separate pages of the questionnaire. Third, variables which consisted of multiple items were given a 
different color to increase respondent focus. Fourth, the respondents were incentivized to participate 
by informing them that a short report would be shared with them and the management of the NVWA. 
Finally, organizational support ensured that inspectors were informed through different channels 
and by different people (the researchers, their team leaders, management) about the importance of 
participating in this research (George & Pandey, 2017; Lee et al., 2012; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; 
Podsakoff et al., 2012). 
Post-hoc statistical remedies indicate that common source bias does not substantially impact the 
findings of this study. First, a confirmatory factor analysis was carried out (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
All variables in the conceptual model were loaded on one factor. The fit of the model is assessed 
using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Cut-off criteria 
are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) for CFI and TLI, between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ 
.08 (moderate fit) for RMSEA with PCLOSE >.05 and, finally, ≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). The model fit (χ2 = 1537.436, df = 171, p = .000)4 is very poor with CFI = .397, TLI = .330, 
RSMEA = .169, PCLOSE = .000 and SRMR = .160. Second, a common latent factor model was 
estimated (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All items were loaded on their theoretical constructs as well as on 
a first-order factor. An ANOVA testing the χ2 differences between the common latent factor model and 
the conceptual model is not statistically significant (χ2 difference = 2.1991, df = 2, p = .3333).  Thus, 
including the common latent factor did not improve the model. 
3.4 Findings
Several analyses were conducted to determine whether perceived disclosed performance information 
impacts inspectors’ style during regulatory encounters as well as whether this is mediated by perceived 
resistance using the statistical program R. More specifically, the packages ‘lavaan’ (Rosseel, 2012), 
‘psych’ (Revelle, 2015), ‘semTools’ (Pronprasertmanit et al., 2013) and ‘semPlot’ (Epskamp, 2013) 
were used. The parameters were estimated using the Satorra-Bentler correction because our data 
slightly violates assumptions of multivariate normality (Satorra & Bentler, 1994). 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the perceived disclosure of 
performance information, the three dimensions of enforcement style and perceived resistance. The 
correlations between perceived disclosure of performance information and legal (.12), facilitation (.25) 
and accommodation (.32) enforcement style are all statistically significant. The three enforcement 
styles also correlate significantly at the .001-level. Perceived resistance, the mediator in the 
conceptual model, correlates negatively with a facilitation style (-0.22). Perceived resistance also 
negatively correlates significantly with perceived disclosed performance information (-0.11) and does 
not correlate with a formal or accommodation style which contradicts our theoretical expectations. 
None of the control variables correlate with the independent variable (perceived disclosure of 
performance information) and the mediator (perceived resistance)4. A legal style correlates significantly 
with rule obedience (.31), a facilitation style with work experience (.15) and an accommodation style 
with the gender dummy (1 = female) (-.10) as well as rule obedience (.10). All other control variables 
correlating significantly were included in the model.  
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To further investigate the relation between the variables, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is 
used, specifically a fully latent structural regression modeling (Kline, 2015). SEM is used due to the 
latent nature of the dependent, independent and mediator variables and the multiple regressions 
hypothesized. The model (χ2 = 409.230, df = 216, p = .000)5 fit is good with CFI = .923, TLI = .911, 
RSMEA = .048, PCLOSE = .679 and SRMR = .057.
55
Chapter 3
M
S
D
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
5.
5
1.
98
1
2
Le
ga
l s
ty
le
8.
04
1.
06
0.
12
**
1
3
Fa
ci
lit
at
io
n 
st
yl
e
7.
40
1.
43
0.
25
**
*
0.
34
**
*
1
4
A
cc
om
m
od
at
io
n 
st
yl
e
5.
80
1.
83
0.
32
**
*
0.
21
**
*
0.
32
**
*
1
5
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 re
si
st
an
ce
5.
68
1.
63
-0
.1
1*
*
-0
.0
4
-0
.2
2*
**
-0
.0
9
1
6
W
or
k 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e
16
.3
7
11
.1
8
-0
.0
6
0.
00
0.
15
**
0.
04
0.
00
1
7
G
en
de
r (
1 
= 
Fe
m
al
e)
0.
28
0.
45
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
5
-0
.1
0*
*
-0
.0
1
-0
.3
4*
**
1
8
G
en
de
r (
1 
= 
O
th
er
)
0.
00
0.
06
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
1
0.
01
-0
.0
6
0.
05
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
4
1
9
R
ul
e 
ob
ed
ie
nc
e
7.
57
1.
44
0.
08
0.
31
**
*
0.
07
0.
10
**
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
1
0.
01
-0
.0
3
1
Ta
bl
e 
3.
1.
 M
ea
ns
, S
ta
nd
ar
d 
D
ev
ia
tio
ns
 a
nd
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 (n
 =
 5
07
)
N
ot
e:
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
; *
* 
p 
< 
.0
5
On the outside, looking in
56
Ta
bl
e 
3.
2.
 R
es
ul
t o
f S
E
M
De
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
Le
ga
l s
ty
le
Fa
ci
lit
at
io
n 
st
yl
e
A
cc
om
m
od
at
io
n 
st
yl
e
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 re
si
st
an
ce
 s
ty
le
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
es
z
S
t.S
E
S
t.B
z
S
t.S
E
S
t.B
z
S
t.S
E
S
t.B
z
S
t.S
E
S
t.B
Di
re
ct
 e
ffe
ct
s
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
2.
33
1
0.
03
7
0.
15
6*
*
5.
08
6
0.
03
8
0.
30
6*
**
5.
44
7
0.
05
0
0.
33
5*
**
-2
.3
43
0.
02
8
-0
.1
43
**
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 re
si
st
an
ce
-0
.1
69
0.
08
2
-0
.0
12
-3
.0
84
0.
10
9
-0
.2
41
**
-0
.0
97
0.
11
7
-0
.0
54
-
-
-
In
di
re
ct
 e
ffe
ct
s 
vi
a 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
re
si
st
an
ce
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
0.
17
1
0.
00
5
0.
00
2
2.
13
0
0.
01
0
0.
03
5*
*
0.
80
4
0.
00
8
0.
00
8
-
-
-
To
ta
l e
ffe
ct
s 
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 d
eg
re
e 
of
 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
2.
31
0
0.
03
8
0.
15
7*
*
5.
55
7
0.
03
9
0.
34
1*
**
5.
60
5
0.
05
0
0.
34
3*
**
-
-
-
N
ot
es
: *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
; *
* 
p 
< 
.0
5
57
Chapter 3
Table 3.2 shows the results of the hypothesized direct and indirect effects. First, the direct effects 
are discussed. Hypothesis 1a expects that the inspectors who score high on perceived disclosure 
of performance information will also score high on a legal style. The standardized coefficients for 
the legal enforcement style are, indeed, statistically significant indicating that the greater inspectors 
perceive the disclosure of performance information to be, the greater their legal enforcement style (z 
= 2.331, st.B = .156, SE = .037, p = .020). Hypothesis 1b expected that when inspectors’ perceptions 
of disclosed performance information increased, their facilitation enforcement style would decrease. 
This relationship is also statistically significant but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. This 
study finds that as the perception of disclosure of performance information of inspectors rises, so does 
their facilitation enforcement style (z = 5.086, st.B = .306, SE = .038, p = .000). This is, thus, the exact 
opposite of the expected relationship.  Hypothesis 1c concerns the accommodation enforcement 
style of inspectors. It was expected, that inspectors who score high on the perceived disclosure of 
performance information would have a high accommodation enforcement style. The standardized 
coefficients are, as expected, statistically significant (z = 5.447 st.B = .335, SE = .050, p = .000). In 
other words, the greater inspectors perceive the disclosure of performance information to be, the 
greater their accommodation enforcement style. The effect of disclosure of performance information 
is about half as small for legal style (st.B = .156) as opposed to the effect on accommodation (St.B = 
.335) and facilitation (St.B = .306) style. 
Our second and third set of hypotheses concerns the indirect effect of perceived disclosed performance 
information on enforcement style through the mediator perceived resistance. Hypothesis 2 states that 
a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information leads to high scores on perceived 
resistance of inspectees. This relationship is found to be statistically significant, but negatively instead 
of positively (z = -2.342, st.B = -.143, SE = .028, p = .019). When inspectors perceive the disclosure of 
performance information to be greater, they perceive less resistance by inspectees.  The third set of 
hypotheses expects that high scores on perceived resistance by inspectees will lead to a more legal 
(H3a), less facilitation (H3b) and more accommodation (H3c) enforcement style. Only the relation 
between perceived resistance and a facilitation style is statistically significant (z = -3.084, st.B = -.241, 
Figure 3.2. Graphical representation result of SEM 
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SE = .109, p = .002). In other words, when inspectors perceive the resistance by inspectees to be 
greater, they become less facilitating in their style. 
In this line of reasoning, when investigating the total indirect effects of an inspector’s perceived 
disclosure of performance information on all three dimensions of enforcement style through perceived 
resistance, one statistically significant relation is found. The relationship between the inspectors’ 
perception of disclosed performance information and a facilitation style is mediated by their perceived 
resistance (z = 2.130, st.B = .035, SE = .010, p = .033). Notably, the total indirect effect is small 
but, nonetheless, statistically significant. When an inspector scores high on perceived disclosure 
of performance information, s/he perceives less resistance by inspectees, which, sub-sequentially, 
leads to a more facilitating enforcement style. See table 3.3 for a complete overview of confirmed and 
disconfirmed hypotheses.
# Hypothesized relationship Confirmed 
1a Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance 
information will have a high score on a legal enforcement style
Yes
1b Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance 
information will have a low score on a facilitation enforcement style
No (opposite 
effect found)
1c Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance 
information will have a high score on an accommodation enforcement style
Yes
2 Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosed performance 
information will have a high score on perceived resistance
No (opposite 
effect found)
3a Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score 
on a legal enforcement style
No
3b Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a low score 
on a facilitation enforcement style
Yes
3c Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score 
on an accommodation enforcement style
No
Table 3.3. Results hypotheses
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3.5 Conclusion and discussion
This study aims to contribute to the knowledge about the reasons why inspectors vary in their 
enforcement styles during regulatory encounters with inspectees. In terms of theory, this study 
proposed that researching the impact of disclosed performance information as well as the perceived 
resistance of inspectees help to explain enforcement style variations. On basis of the literature on 
street-level enforcement (e.g. Lo et al., 2009; May & Winter, 1999; 2000) and disclosing performance 
information (e.g. Gilad et al., 2013; Moar & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 
2008; Van Erp, 2009; 2010), this study theorized that making compliance performance information of 
inspectees part of the public sphere will add visibility and, in turn, uncertainty for inspectors and thus 
stimulate them to adapt their enforcement style. A significant direct effect of inspectors’ perception of 
disclosure of performance information on all three dimensions of enforcement style (legal, facilitation 
and accommodation) was found. Also, a significant indirect effect was revealed between perceived 
disclosure of performance information, perceived resistance and a facilitation style. 
First and foremost, this study enhances the understanding of enforcement and regulation by showing 
that disclosing performance information, which makes both compliance performance of inspectees 
and the activities of the regulators themselves publicly accessible, impacts inspectors’ frontline 
enforcement behavior (cf. Etienne, 2014). More specifically, inspectors intensify all three dimensions 
(legal, facilitation and accommodation) of their enforcement style when they perceive the disclosure 
of performance information to be substantive. Future research is needed to also understand the 
unintended consequences of disclosing performance information for street-level behavior. To illustrate, 
disclosing performance information is meant to empower other stakeholders to hold regulators 
accountable (cf. Bovens, 2007; Van der Walle & Robberts, 2008). However, such disclosure may 
result in perverse incentives (Freeman, 2002) like gaming behavior by the regulators (Courty & 
Marschke, 2004) to avoid increasing visibility or mitigate possible consequences of this. For instance, 
inspectors may take extra time to complete inspection visits or resist conducting complex inspections 
such as the complete closure of businesses. Taking more time and prioritizing easy inspection visits 
may, in turn, boost the inspectors score on the performance criteria of the organization. In addition, 
inspectors may also intentionally leave details out of the inspector report or do the opposite and, 
thus, include way too many details. These unintended consequences may potentially, in the end, not 
foster but harm the quality of regulation (cf. Freeman, 2002; Werner & Asch, 2005). Future research 
connecting street-level enforcement style to these potential unintended could shed more light on this.
Second, opposed to our expectations, inspectors tend to facilitate more rather than less during 
regulatory encounters when they perceive the disclosure of performance information to be 
substantive. This could possibly be explained by the relational nature of enforcement (Lipsky, 2010). 
First, disclosing performance information is relatively new and may potentially damage the reputation 
of inspectees (e.g. Van Erp, 2009; 2010) which, in turn, may harm their relationship with regulators. 
Inspectors may use a facilitation enforcement style because providing information and considering 
circumstances at hand fosters trust and, in turn, enhances a cooperative relation between inspector 
and inspectee (e.g. Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2009) and mitigates the ‘hard’ signal that 
disclosing performance information can be. In other words, inspectors may move towards clients 
(Tummers et al., 2015) by being facilitative in their style. Another explanation could be that because 
disclosing performance information makes the work of inspectors more visible (e.g. Winter, 2003), 
they become more vulnerable in terms of blame. Inspectors will set out to minimize this risk (Hood, 
2011) and may, therefore, provide information and clarifications to ensure the inspectees’ knowledge 
on the implications of disclosure performance information is complete (cf. Nielsen, 2015). This may 
enhance the image that they did everything they could to communicate with inspectees. Further 
research (including for instance experimental methods) where the type of performance information 
that is collected or utilized is varied, is needed to fully understand why inspectors become more 
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facilitative in their enforcement style when they perceive the disclosure of performance information 
to be greater. 
Third, this study also found that the strength of the effect of the perceived disclosure of performance 
information on the three enforcement style dimensions varies. The effect on the legal enforcement 
style is only half of the effect on the accommodation and facilitation styles. These differences could 
be explained by the extent to which inspectors can use their discretionary space in each enforcement 
style. On the one hand, a legal style is closely associated with executing organizational protocols and 
sticking rigidly to rules and regulations (de Boer, 2019; Lo et al., 2009 Baldwin et al., 2012; Mascini 
& Van Wijk, 2009). This style, thus, gives inspectors little room to maneuver using their discretionary 
space. Facilitation and accommodation, on the other hand, are both styles that are less directly 
determined by organizational procedures. In other words, these two styles are associated with the 
discretionary space of inspectors (e.g. Lipsky, 2010). Thus, that the effect of disclosing performance 
information on facilitation and accommodation is larger than on a legal style, can potentially be 
explained by the notion that inspectors simply have more room to vary these styles than their legal 
style.  
Finally, a surprising result of this study is that inspectors who perceive disclosure of performance 
information to be substantive, perceive low resistance by inspectees. A potential explanation could 
be that inspectors view disclosing performance information as an effective instrument to enhance 
compliance (Meijer & Homburg, 2009). In that sense there will be less resistance among inspectees, 
since disclosure stimulates them to obey the rules and regulations. Future research, however, is 
needed to really clarify this result. Investigating the types of uncertainties inspectors experience (e.g. 
Raaphorst, 2018) or their coping mechanisms (Tummers et al., 2015) can be especially fruitful. 
There are, of course, methodological limitations. Most importantly, using a single survey has been 
critiqued because it is at risk of common source bias and relationship overestimation (Podsakoff & 
Organ, 1986; Meier & O’Toole, 2012). Here, this critique has merit, but potential common source 
bias was an unavoidable limitation. First and foremost, all variables in our conceptual model are 
perceptual in nature (George & Pandey, 2017). Nonetheless, Podsakoff et al. (2012) highlight that 
when “both the predictor and criterion variables are capturing individual’s perceptions, beliefs, 
judgments, or feelings” (p. 549) surveys are the right choice of method. Second, other objective data 
sources were unavailable due to access limitations and privacy concerns within the organization used 
in this study (George & Pandey, 2017). As was already mentioned, perceptions are at the heart of 
this study and are best collected directly from the population of interest (here inspectors). There are 
limited possibilities to collect this information in large quantities. Finally, the correlation matrix shows 
that not all variables are significantly positively related (George & Pandey, 2017) – something that 
would be expected if common source bias were present (Spector, 2006). By using design and ex-ante 
statistical remedies, this limitation was, thus, minimized. 
There are also other limitations of this study. First and foremost, this study explains only part of 
the variation in enforcement style. Future research should further address inspectors’ behavior by 
studying the impact of other potential explanatory variables, such as political pressure (e.g. Moynihan 
& Hawes, 2012). Second, a single organization was studied in this article. For generalization to other 
(regulation) organization and contexts, more cross-sector and cross-national research is needed. 
Future research can benefit from comparative approaches, including comparisons of different 
regulation systems such as command-and-control and bottom-up (voluntary-based).  
All in all, this study contributes to the public management- and administration literature by showing 
that disclosing performance information is relevant for inspectors’ enforcement style, and that the 
three dimensions of enforcement style are not mutually exclusive (see also May and Winter, 1999; 
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2000). The study also highlights that inspectors are becoming more active in the sense of intensifying 
multiple enforcement styles, as a result of disclosing performance information. They choose a more 
facilitative style, a more accommodative style and -to lesser extent a more legal style. The study 
also indicates that for a better understanding of inspectors’ enforcement styles we should look at the 
interaction between inspectors with their environment, including the strategy of their organization 
regarding disclosing public information, and inspectees’ behavior. 
Notes
¹ McDonald’s omega rather than Cronbach’s alpha is reported. Cronbach’s alpha has been heavily 
critiqued over the years because it is prone to over- and underestimation which McDonald’s omega 
is not (e.g. Sijstma, 2009). Notably, the reliability for the three factors does not differ when calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = .85 (legal), α = .88 (facilitation), and α = .83 (accommodation).
² α = .88
³ The reliability for the three factors does not differ substantially when calculating Cronbach’s alpha 
(α = .69).
4 We ran the analysis including dummies for division as controls. However, model fit statistics 
worsened and indicated model misspecification. Notably, none of our statistically (in)significant results 
changed substantially.   
5 That chi-square is significant is due to the large n (e.g. West, Taylor & Wu, 2012).
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on government transparency and regulatory performance: Does relational distance matter? Public 
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Chapter 4
A street-level perspective on 
transparency by public organizations 
and regulatory performance: Does 
relational distance matter?
Abstract
This study investigates the extent to which inspectors perceive government transparency as impacting 
regulatory performance. It theorizes that, when inspectors perceive an increase in transparency, they 
find that the perceived relational distance between themselves and their inspectees rises and this, 
subsequently, increases regulatory performance. The findings from a survey among Netherlands 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority inspectors (n = 466) confirm that inspectors view 
an increase in transparency as enhancing regulatory performance. This study further investigates 
this mechanism by comparing two divisions with different levels of factual relational distance (i.e. 
frequency of inspector-inspectee interactions). The findings reveal that only in the division with small 
factual relational distance does perceived relational distance mediate the effect of transparency on 
regulatory performance. More specifically, in divisions with frequent interactions between inspector 
and inspectee, more perceived transparency increases perceived relational distance; this in turn, 
increases perceived regulatory performance. 
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4.1 Introduction
Government transparency is commonly understood to contribute to better governance in general 
(Hood, 2007) and to improving regulation in particular (Meijer and Homburg, 2009; Van Dooren and 
Van de Walle, 2008; Van Erp, 2011). The external pressure that develops when governments make 
information public about the compliance of inspectees such as business owners is assumed to help 
governments in executing their task of ensuring and improving the compliance of inspectees (Van 
de Walle and Van Dooren, 2008). Stimulating inspectees’ compliance also implies that the public 
sector itself performs better, in the sense of its effectiveness in ensuring compliance with public rules 
and regulations. However, empirical evidence to support this assumption is scarce and mixed (see 
Meijer and Homburg, 2009; Porumbescu, 2017; Im et al., 2013). The actual effect of government 
transparency on regulatory performance, therefore, remains unclear. 
Regulatory performance depends, to a large extent, on the ways inspectors interact with inspectees 
during face-to-face encounters (Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1999). During 
these encounters, inspectors interact and form relationships with inspectees through often repeated 
interactions. The relational distance between inspector and inspectee can have important implications 
for regulatory performance. An intimate and cooperate relationship may foster inspectees’ compliance 
(see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012; Etienne, 2013; Pautz, 2009; Pautz and 
Wamsley, 2012), but it can also result in the ‘capture’ of inspectors. An inspector’s position will be 
weakened because s/he gets too close to the businesses s/he regulates and, in turn, gets captured 
(Ashworth et al., 2002; James, 2000; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992). Government transparency 
interferes with this street-level relationship because the behavior of both inspectees and inspectors 
becomes visible (see de Boer et al., 2018; Etienne, 2014; Winter, 2003) to all stakeholders in the 
public sphere, making it, in turn, less intimate (see Black, 2010). 
Transparency research has barely addressed this effect on the relational distance between inspector 
and inspectee at street-level, nor the implications for inspectors’ perceptions of regulatory performance 
(see Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017; Meijer and Homburg, 2009; Porumbescu, 2017). There is, thus, 
a lack of research on government transparency and regulatory performance in which inspectors’ 
perceptions are put at the center – even though they are crucial actors in regulatory governance (see 
de Boer et al., 2018). This study sets out to contribute empirical evidence to the debate on government 
transparency and regulatory performance by answering the question: To what extent do inspectors 
perceive government transparency as impacting regulatory performance? It is hypothesized that this 
effect can be explained by the perceived relational distance between inspector and inspectee. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical framework of government 
transparency, regulatory performance, and relational distance between inspector and inspectee is 
highlighted. Second, the method is discussed, followed by the results of a survey (n = 466) among 
Dutch inspectors from The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). Third, 
a concluding section summarizes the main points and provides a discussion on the implications for 
public administration and management scholarship, as well as policy implementation. 
4.2 Conceptual framework and 
expectations
This section theoretically explores the main concepts and their interrelations. It discusses the 
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independent variable of government transparency, the dependent variable regulatory performance, 
and the mediating variable relational distance between inspector and inspectee.
Governments are increasingly making information transparent about their own and inspectees’ 
regulatory performance (see de Boer et al., 2018; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2008). Government 
transparency has been defined in many ways. Cucciniello et al. (2017) emphasize that these 
definitions often address the availability of information about decision-making processes such as 
budgetary matters, about operational aspects, or about the performance of governmental bodies. 
Government transparency enables inward observability. Inward observability allows stakeholders to 
monitor governmental bodies’ internal workings, for example regulators’ activities and decision making 
(Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2012). Stakeholders will be able to 
monitor and make judgements about whether or not regulators are performing well because regulators 
make the level of compliance by inspectees transparent. Therefore, government transparency is 
defined as ‘the availability of information about an organization or actor allowing external stakeholders 
to monitor the internal workings or performance of that organization’ (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 55). 
For instance, when regulators disclose how restaurants are performing concerning hygiene rules and 
regulations, this allows citizens to observe not only the performance of specific restaurants but also 
the performance of regulators; if restaurants fail to comply with hygiene regulations, the regulator has 
failed to enforce those rules. 
Government transparency can vary concerning the amount and type of information disclosed. 
Regulators must make choices about the amount of performance information they disclose, and 
this varies across regulators. It is important to understand these variations, because the greater 
the amount of information made public, the more visible the performance of regulators, and, in turn, 
the greater the inward observability. The amount of regulatory performance information can be 
understood to vary along three dimensions (Douglas and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012): 
completeness, color, and usability. 
Firstly, governments vary in the completeness of performance information made available to 
stakeholders (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Some may disclose only basic information lacking details, 
whereas others disclose elaborate quantitative and qualitative data (Douglas and Meijer, 2016). To 
illustrate, governments may translate the performance of inspectees into a smiley system. They may 
indicate good or bad performance by displaying a happy or a sad smiley (Meijer and Homburg, 2009), 
or make full datasets transparent that include all sanctions any inspectee has received over a certain 
period of time 
Second, governments must decide about the color of performance information disclosed. The 
extent to which presented information is colored varies however (Douglas and Meijer, 2016; 
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Notably, facts in the political realm are always interpreted and presented 
in a certain way (Stone, 2002); neutral information does not exist (Douglas and Meijer, 2016). For 
example, governments can present all steps and communication with inspectees online for each 
restaurant in a specific city, or disclose solely the names of violators of a hygiene law. Color does 
not necessarily concern a purposeful intention to cover or hide information; rather, it addresses the 
consciously or unconsciously invoked overtone and connotation of performance information.
Third, the usability of performance information differs. The advent of information and communication 
technologies means that anyone can read government information anytime, but the information is not 
necessarily understandable and usable by all actors. Disclosed information may be usable by experts 
but not by laypeople, or vice versa.  Meijer and Homburg (2009) describe how the Danish National 
Veterinary and Food Inspectorate places happy or sad smiley faces on the door of restaurants and on 
their own website because they are simple and easy to interpret. This system is specifically targeted 
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at laypeople, but it may not be very useful to experts who want details about food quality. 
Finally, besides the amount of transparent information, the type of information that governments 
disclose can also vary. This study specifically addresses transparency about regulatory performance 
information. One of the core tasks of regulators is to enforce rules and regulations and, ultimately, limit 
social risks (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012). Therefore, regulatory performance 
information concerns data about the ways inspectees comply with rules and regulations, and about 
assessing social risks. Notably, Performance remains a contested concept and needs conceptual 
clarification (Andersen et al., 2016; Boyne, 2006). This study focuses specifically on regulatory 
performance, which is defined as governments’ effectiveness in achieving inspectees’ compliance 
with public rules and regulations and in assessing social risks.
Hypothesized effects of government transparency on regulatory performance       
We hypothesize both a direct and an indirect effect of transparency on regulatory performance. 
Figure 4.1 shows the conceptual model underpinning this study. All core variables are based on 
the perceptions of street-level inspectors. The model shows that inspectors’ perceived government 
transparency is expected to impact perceived regulatory performance directly. Because theories 
on capture and responsive regulation emphasize that relational distance between inspectors and 
inspectees plays an important role (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Black, 2010; Hood et al., 1999; 
Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009), it is hypothesized that the relation between government transparency 
and regulatory performance is also mediated by perceived relational distance. The remainder of this 
section addresses the variables and relationships in the conceptual model. 
Direct effect
Scholars frequently question whether transparency is the ‘golden tool in policy making’ (de Fine Licht, 
2014, p. 262). Although transparency is often positively associated with performance for a range of 
different reasons, such as reducing corruption and enhancing financial efficiency and accountability 
(Cucciniello et al., 2017; Hood, 2007), the pros and cons of transparency are contested and results 
are mixed (see Cucciniello et al., 2017; de Fine Licht, 2014; Fung et al., 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen 
et al., 2013; Hood and Heald, 2006; Porumbescu et al., 2017). These mixed results are, however, 
almost solely based on studies addressing effects of transparency on citizens (see Grimmelikhuijsen 
et al., 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). For example, effects of transparency on citizens’ trust in 
government, their perceived government legitimacy and their voice behavior (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 
2017). None of these transparency studies, however, are – to the authors’ knowledge – based on the 
perspective and insights of street-level bureaucrats. 
A notable exception is the recent work by de Boer et al. (2018). De Boer et al. (2018) study the effect 
of perceived government transparency on the perceived resistance of inspectees by inspectors and 
their enforcement style during face-to-face encounters with inspectees. De Boer et al. (2018) find that 
when regulators disclose more performance information, inspectors experience less resistance from 
inspectees during face-to-face interactions. They explain this result by suggesting that inspectors 
actually see government transparency as an effective instrument to enhance compliance and assess 
social risks. In this line of reasoning, Meijer and Homburg (2009) studied government transparency 
explicitly within the regulation sector. They argue that, under certain conditions, transparency practices 
can, indeed, contribute to the minimization of social risks. In sum, inspectors view that government 
transparency reduces resistance of inspectees (de Boer et al., 2018) and thus contributes positively 
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to ensuring compliance and assessing social risks (de Boer et al., 2018, Meijer and Homburg, 2009). 
It is, therefore, expected that transparency will be perceived by inspectors as enhancing regulatory 
performance. The first hypothesis reads as follows:
H1: Perceived government transparency has a positive effect on perceived regulatory performance  
Indirect effect via perceived relational distance 
We do not expect the direct effect to fully explain the hypothesized relationship between perceived 
transparency and perceived regulatory performance. Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding 
of the relationship between perceived government transparency and regulatory performance, we 
investigate an indirect effect. We focus on an often-discussed but under-researched element in 
effective regulation at the street-level, namely relational distance between inspector and inspectee 
(Ashworth et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2012; Black, 2010; Hawkins, 1984; Hood et al., 1999). 
Relational distance concerns the degree to which the inspector and the inspectee participate in each 
other’s (professional) lives (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002). Relational distance may 
have profound implications for regulatory performance. Indeed, Black (2010) argues that intimacy 
breeds partnership. To illustrate, the intimacy of small relational distance may help inspectors to better 
understand the inspectee and be responsive (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995), as well as facilitate trust 
between inspectors and inspectees. According to Pautz (2009) and Pautz and Wamsley (2012), a 
trusting relation between inspector and inspectee can stimulate inspectees’ cooperation. To put it 
differently, small relational distance may benefit regulatory performance because it allows inspectors 
to be responsive and encourage inspectees towards more compliant behavior (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1995). Nevertheless, the unintended consequences of being responsive while also punishing 
wrongdoers and (re)building trust present difficulties for inspectors in practice (Mascini and Van Wijk, 
2009).
Hood et al. (1999) argue that, in intimate relationships, there is a chance of inspectors sympathizing 
with their inspectees and becoming allies. In other words, small relational distance could also hinder 
regulatory performance because it may result in capture. Capture occurs when inspectors ‘go native’ 
and identify too much with the business organizations with which they interact (James, 2000; Makkai 
and Braithwaite, 1992). The perceived relational distance between inspectors and inspectees, 
Figure 4.1. Conceptual model
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ultimately, becomes too low (see Ashworth et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2012). Capture undermines 
regulatory performance because it clouds inspectors’ independent judgement and, thus, the 
information collected about inspectees’ regulatory performance (Ashworth et al., 2002). In essence, 
inspectors must juggle between cooperation and persuasion while ensuring that they are not getting 
too close to inspectees and, ultimately, getting captured. 
Relational distance consists of two dimensions, namely a perceived and a factual one. First, the 
factual dimension concerns the frequency of face-to-face interactions between an inspector and 
inspectee (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002). Factual relational distance is largely beyond 
the control of inspectors themselves. Even though inspectors as street-level bureaucrats have certain 
discretion (Lipsky, 2010), organizational boundaries and regulatory structures largely determine how 
often certain groups of inspectees are to be inspected (see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin 
et al., 2012; May and Burby, 1998; Sparrow, 2000). For instance, in risk-based regulation regimes 
certain ‘at-risk’ groups are identified that are more likely to non-comply. These groups are then set to 
more frequent inspection visits than non-risk groups (Rothstein et al., 2006). Second, the perceived 
dimension concerns the experienced intimacy between an inspector and inspectee. This intimacy 
builds and evolves during the face-to-face inspection visits of inspectors with inspectees. Perceived 
relational distance is, thus, shaped through the way inspectors behave and interact with inspectees 
(see Etienne, 2013; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). Both dimensions of relational distance together make 
up the total relational distance between an inspector and inspectee. 
Factual and perceived relational distance are interrelated. To illustrate, when the frequency of face-
to-face interactions between an inspector and inspectee is high (i.e. small factual relational distance), 
inspectors physically meet inspectees and have the opportunity to build an intimate relationship (i.e. 
small perceived relational distance) and almost become ‘insiders’. When the frequency of interactions 
is low (i.e. high factual relational distance), inspectors cannot build such a close relationship simply 
because they do not interact with the inspectee often. Intimacy between and inspector and inspectee 
cannot evolve and inspectors stay ‘outsiders’ (Baldwin et al. 2012; Boyne et al, 2002, Etienne, 2013; 
Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). 
In this line of reasoning, this study primarily investigates the role of perceived relational distance 
because a governmental organization’s decision to make information about compliance transparent 
and public may have consequences for the perceived relational distance between inspectors and 
inspectees, but not for the factual relational distance. When an inspector perceives the government 
transparency to be substantial this may have implications for their level of intimacy between inspector 
and inspectee (i.e. perceived relational distance) because their relationship becomes more visible 
(see de Boer et al., 2018), but not for the frequency of interactions (i.e. factual relational distance) 
since this is mostly beyond the control of inspectors and pre-determined by organizational structures 
(see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012; May and Burby, 1998; Sparrow, 2000). 
If information is disclosed, external stakeholders become monitors in the background of the intimate 
relationship between inspectors and inspectees (de Boer et al., 2018). Ultimately, this brings the 
relationship into the public sphere and, therefore, the relationship becomes less intimate (see Black, 
2010) and, in turn, the perceived relational distance becomes larger. Because of the difficulties that 
inspectors face while being responsive and controlling for the unintended consequences during 
face-to-face interactions (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009), the potential hindrance of capture (Hood et 
al., 1999) to regulatory performance is expected to outweigh the potential benefits of being able to 
persuade inspectees towards more compliance (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995). In other words, it is 
expected that, inspectors will perceive the growing perceived relational distance to be beneficial for 
regulatory performance because it limits their struggle with getting captured. 
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In addition, as we mentioned before, factual relational distance and perceived relational distance 
are interrelated. We, therefore, expect perceived relational distance to work differently for inspectors 
in environments with large and small factual relational distance to inspectees. For inspectors 
in environments with small factual relational distance, perceived relational distance will play an 
important role in enforcement at the street-level (see Etienne, 2013; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). 
These inspectors must, as we mentioned above, juggle being responsive while not getting too close 
and captured (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; Hood et al., 1999). On the other hand, for inspectors 
who enforce policies in street-level environments where the factual relational distance is large, the 
relationship with the inspectee will matter much less in their day-to-day work (see Baldwin et al., 
2012; Boyne et al., 2002) simply because they do not meet inspectees often or more than once. 
In sum, when the factual relational distance is small, inspectors must deal with the implications of 
their intimate relationship with inspectees for the regulatory performance. However, when the factual 
relational distance is large inspectors do not face the consequences of an intimate relationship with 
inspectees, because it is not present in the first place. Our final hypotheses, therefore, read as follows: 
H2a: In a division where factual relational distance is large, perceived relational distance does not 
mediate a positive effect of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance. 
H2b: In a division where factual relational distance is small, perceived relational distance does mediate 
a positive effect of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance.
4.3 Method
This research was carried out at the NVWA. The NVWA is among the largest inspectorates in the 
Netherlands. Its core task is to ensure compliance with rules and regulations concerning public 
safety, public health, and animal welfare. Moreover, the NVWA is in the process of developing and 
implementing ways of disclosing performance information about compliance performance of the 
businesses that it regulates. Furthermore, responsiveness and relational distance are prominent 
topics in the NVWA’s enforcement strategy (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; Van Rooij et al., 2015). 
NVWA inspectors conduct face-to-face inspection visits based on performance criteria. For some 
sectors, business organizations’ performance on several of these criteria is made available to the 
public on the NVWA website or via a mobile application. 
NVWA inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats because they implement public policies with 
autonomy and room to maneuver using their discretion (Lipsky, 2010). Inspectors deliver not only 
public services – like social workers or physicians – but also obligations, because they set out to 
punish wrongdoers (Sparrow, 2000); this makes them especially powerful (Raaphorst, 2018). They 
are particularly suitable for studying the influence of relational distance, as they often interact with a 
heterogeneous clientele – such as powerful corporations – and often have repeated interactions with 
their inspectees (Braithwaite, 2003; Nielsen, 2015).
Data
Between October and November 2016, an online survey was distributed among NVWA inspectors. All 
respondents were informed by e-mail about the research and assured full anonymity and confidentiality 
of their answers. The NVWA consists of five divisions, an advisory board, and a board of directors. 
The sample frame consists of all inspectors working for two divisions (n = 804), namely, Veterinary 
& Import (n = 406) and Consumer & Safety (n = 398). These two divisions were chosen because in 
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Veterinary & Import there is a high frequency of interactions between inspectors and business owners 
and in Consumer & Safety there is a low frequency. Thus, we could compare inspectors with low 
levels and high levels of relational distance vis-à-vis inspectees. Experts from the NVWA confirmed 
that these divisions differed in terms of relational distance between inspectors and inspectees. A 
complete overview of the departments within each division can be found in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Departments within the divisions Veterinary & Import and Consumer & Safety
Division Department 
Veterinary & Import Veterinary 1
Veterinary 2
Import
Consumer & Safety Catering industry
Food safety & industrial production
Sustainability, food safety, and EU subsidy
Product safety (excluding laboratory)
New scales are used in this study. These were developed and validated using expert interviews (n 
= 11). The experts were inspectors from the divisions Consumer & Safety (n = 4) and Veterinary & 
Import (n = 2) and a senior staff committee including middle and upper management (n = 5). The 
items were revised in light of the feedback from the expert interviews, and the survey was distributed 
after the final set was approved to suit the context of street-level bureaucrats and their day-to-day 
enforcement. 
A total of 466 inspectors filled in the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 58.0 percent. The 
number of respondents from Consumer & Safety was 221, and 245 from Veterinary & Import. Because 
they filled in less than 50 percent of the questions, 123 respondents were omitted from the analyses, 
resulting in a total sample of 343 respondents. Of these, 168 were from Consumer & Safety and 175 
from Veterinary & Import. The total sample consists of 69.1 percent male, 30.3 percent female, and 
0.6 percent other. Respondents were between 23 and 73 years old (M = 49.7, SD = 10.78). Their work 
experience ranged between 1 and 40 years (M = 15.9, SD = 10.77). Table 4.2 gives an overview of the 
characteristics of the two samples and the actual population. The total sample is representative of the 
total population. Only work experience is slightly lower in the sample than in the total population (M = 
19.9 years). This slight difference in years’ work experience is present in both samples (M = 23.8 and 
16.0, respectively). Also, women are slightly under- and men overrepresented in both samples. This 
should be considered when the findings are being interpreted.
Measures
The three key variables in this study are: perceived government transparency, perceived regulatory 
performance, and perceived relational distance.
Perceived government transparency: Building on Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) and Douglas and 
Meijer (2016), the focus is on the perceived amount of performance information made available by 
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governments to other stakeholders. The amount of performance information disclosed is based on 
the three criteria mentioned earlier, namely (1) completeness; (2) coloring, and (3) usability (Douglas 
and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Two items were formulated for each criterion. Examples 
of items included are: ‘I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses as detailed’ 
(completeness); ‘shedding light on all aspects of an inspection’ (coloring); and ‘understandable for 
non-experts’ (usability). Using exploratory factor analysis, it was found that the three criteria did 
not form one factor, but two. The third criteria – usability – formed a separate factor. Usability was, 
however, measured by only two items and therefore omitted from further analysis. The four items that 
remained formed a reliable measure for perceived government transparency (ω = .88). McDonald’s 
omega is reported and not Cronbach’s alpha; Cronbach’s alpha has been criticized because it is 
prone to over- and underestimation (Sijtsma, 2009). 
Perceived regulatory performance: The core tasks of the government body that employs the inspectors 
in this study, the NVWA, were used to develop a measure of regulatory performance. The NVWA has 
two core tasks in which the inspectors are involved. First, enforcement entails all proceedings that 
are geared towards influencing compliance behavior. Second, risk assessment concerns judgements 
of societal dangers (Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit, 2015). For each core task, two items 
were formulated. To illustrate, an item included is: ‘My division is successful in…tracing violations of 
rules and regulations’ (enforcement). The first two core tasks formed a reliable measure of perceived 
regulatory performance (ω = .85). 
Perceived relational distance: Part of the relational distance index (Hess, 2003) was used to measure 
the way inspectors perceive the relational distance between themselves and business organizations. 
Hess (2003) describes three tactics that people can use to distance themselves, namely, (1) avoidance, 
(2) disengagement, and (3) cognitive dissociation. The first tactic was not used to operationalize 
relational distance, as business organizations cannot avoid street-level bureaucrats during face-
to-face inspections. This tactic is, therefore, not realistic or suitable for the context in this study. 
Disengagement entails individuals’ efforts to disengage from those with whom they are interacting. 
Cognitive dissociation ‘refers to changing perceptions about the relationship and the meaning of 
people’s actions in effort to perceive less association in the relationship’ (Hess, 2003, p. 203). For 
both disengagement and cognitive dissociation, two items were created. These included, amongst 
others, ‘when I talk to the inspectee, I do not mention personal subjects’ (disengagement) and ‘In my 
mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees in order to make a clear distinction between myself 
and them.’ 
Table 4.2. Sample and population characteristics
Consumer & Safety
(n = 168)
Veterinary & Import
(n = 175)
Total
(n = 343)
Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population
Age (M) 49.2 48.5 50.2 49.0 49.7 48.8
Years’ work 
experience (M)
18.6 23.8 13.4 16.0 15.9 19.9
Female (%) 24.6 28.1 35.4 40.2 30.3 29.0
Male (%) 74.3 71.9 64.2 59.9 69.7 71.0
Other sex (%) 1.2 - 0 - 0.6 -
Note: No data are available on other sexes for the total population
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The exploratory factor analysis and reliability statistics showed that the four items did not form a 
reliable scale. Dropping items did not result in a reliable scale either (Field et al., 2012). Therefore, 
it was decided to use one item only. Out of the four items, the items ‘In my mind, I position myself 
as superior to inspectees in order to make a clear distinction between myself and them’ was chosen 
because it is the least ambiguous and the least open to multiple interpretations. In addition, this item 
measures cognitive dissociation, and this fits well with the focus on perceptions in this research 
(Hess, 2003). 
Controls: Sex, age, and work experience were included as demographic control variables. Trust 
in government transparency was also included and measured using one item, namely, ‘I think that 
disclosing inspection results will increase the compliance of inspectees.’ Controlling for the extent of 
street-level bureaucrats’ trust in the effect of the instrument is important, because it may relate to the 
way they perceive the overall effectiveness of government transparency and regulatory performance. 
Appendix I provides an overview of all items.
Common source bias: Design – and ex-post remedies
Common source bias is a potential limitation for survey research using perceptional data (George and 
Pandey, 2017; Podsakoff et al., 2012). Design remedies are best suited to limiting common source 
bias, and therefore several measures were taken (Podsakoff et al., 2012). First, the importance 
of this research was communicated by the researchers but also by the NVWA management and 
team leaders to ensure support and careful answering of the questions by the respondents. There 
was, thus, substantive organizational support. Second, respondents were informed that the NVWA 
management and they themselves would get a report; this served as an incentive to participate. Third, 
all items of the multi-item questions were colored in a different shade of grey to facilitate respondents’ 
focus while answering the questionnaire. Finally, as already mentioned, the questionnaire was tested 
among experts. This enhances face validity (George and Pandey, 2017; Lee et al., 2012; Podsakoff 
and Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012).
Although post-hoc statistical remedies have been criticized substantially (George and Pandey, 2017; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012), they are a useful indication of whether common source 
bias influences model estimation. Two tests were conducted. Firstly, the independent, dependent, and 
mediating variables were all loaded on one latent factor for a confirmatory factor analysis (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003). The comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root square residual (SRMR) were used to 
assess the fit of the models. Cut-off criteria are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) for 
CFI and TLI, between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) for RMSEA with PCLOSE >.05, and ≤ 
.08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The fit of the model for the total sample is very poor 
(χ2 = 339.021, df = 27) with CFI = .665, TLI = .553, RSMEA = .232, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = 
.152. When the sample is split, the model fits remain poor (χ2 = 187.580, df = 27, CFI = .615, TLI = 
.486, RSMEA = .226, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .161; and χ2 = 174.552, df = 27, CFI = .714, TLI 
= .618, RSMEA = .238, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .138, respectively).
Secondly, all individual items of the variables were loaded on a first-order factor as well as on their 
own latent constructs. This is known as a common latent factor model estimation (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). The differences in χ2 between the conceptual and the common latent factor model were tested 
in the total sample using ANOVA. The ANOVA is not statistically significant (χ2 difference = 1.182, df 
= 1, p = 0.277). For both samples separately, the ANOVA tests are not statistically significant either 
(χ2 difference = 1.925, p = 0.1653; and χ2 difference = 0.222, p = 0.6377, respectively). Adding a 
common latent factor to the conceptualized model did not result in a better fit. It can, therefore, be 
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concluded that there is no indication that common source bias impacts the findings in this study.
4.4 Findings
The statistical program R was used to determine the impact of perceived government transparency 
on perceived regulatory performance, as well as the extent to which relational distance mediates 
this relationship. The packages ‘lavaan’ (Rosseel, 2011), ‘psych’ (Revelle, 2014), and ‘semTools’ 
(Pornprasertmanit et al., 2013) were used. Our data vary slightly from normality, and therefore the 
parameters in our models were estimated using the Satorra-Bentler correction (Satorra and Bentler, 
1994). 
Table 4.3 displays the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the independent, dependent, 
mediating, and control variables. Perceived government transparency correlates positively with 
perceived regulatory performance (.37) as well as perceived relational distance (.16). Likewise, 
perceived relational distance correlates positively with perceived regulatory performance (. 22). Both 
government transparency and regulatory performance correlate positively with the control variable 
trust in government transparency (.18 and .18, respectively). Perceived regulatory performance also 
correlates positively with the sex dummy (1 = Female) (.13). Perceived relational distance correlates 
with none of the control variables. All significant correlations were included in the estimation of the 
parameters. 
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Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to further study the relationship between the core 
variables in this study because of the latent nature of both the independent and the dependent 
variables and the multiple regression paths (Kline, 2015). The sample was split, as we were interested 
in a comparison between the division with a low frequency of interactions (Consumer & Safety) and the 
division with a high frequency of interactions (Veterinary & Import) between street-level bureaucrats 
and businesses. For both samples, the same model was used for parameter estimation. Table 4.4 
shows the model fit statistics for both models; the fit is good in each case.
Model 1 (Consumer & Safety) Model 2 (Veterinary & Import)
χ2 63.618 43.579
df 41 41
CFI 0.949 0.995
TLI 0.932 0.994
RESMA 0.066 0.021
PCLOSE 0.225 0.880
SRMR 0.060 0.066
Table 4.4. Model fit statistics
The results of the hypothesized relations are displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 and Table 4.5. The 
first hypothesis concerns the direct relation between perceived government transparency and 
perceived regulatory performance. More specifically, it predicts that inspectors’ perceptions of 
government transparency and regulatory performance are positively related. The standardized 
regression coefficients for both models confirm this expectation. For both the inspectors who have 
few interactions with the same inspectees (Model 1 Consumer & Safety) and the inspectors who 
have frequent and recurrent interactions (Model 2 Veterinary & Import), it is found that, when their 
perception of government transparency rises, so does their perceived regulatory performance (z = 
2.305, st.B = .245, SE = .054, p = .021; and z = 3.516, st.B = .419, SE = .077, p = .000, respectively). 
The effect is strongest for the inspectors with a high frequency of contact (Model 2). 
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Perceived government 
transparency
.245**
Sex (1 = Female)Trust in government transparency
-.004
Perceived regulatory 
performance
Perceived relational 
distance
-.038 -.114
.110.099
FIGURE 2 Graphical representation SEM result Model 1 (Consumer & Safety division)
Figure 4.2. Graphical representation SEM result Model 1 (Consumer & Safety division)
Perceived government 
transparency
.419***
Sex (1 = Female)Trust in government transparency
.083**
Perceived regulatory 
performance
Perceived relational 
distance
.368*** .227**
.112.213**
FIGURE 3 Graphical representation SEM result Model 2 (Veterinary & Import division)
Figure 4.3. Graphical representation SEM result Model 2 (Veterinary & Import division)
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The second set of hypotheses concerns the mediating effect of perceived relational distance. On the 
one hand, hypothesis 2a predicts that the effect will not be mediated by perceived relational distance 
for inspectors working for divisions where the recurrence and occurrence of contact with inspectees is 
low (Model 1). Hypothesis 2b, on the other hand, expects that inspectors working at divisions where 
the frequency of face-to-face interactions with inspectees is high, the relational distance between 
them will mediate the effect between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory 
performance (Model 2). Both hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b are confirmed. Model 1 shows, 
indeed, that the relationship between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory 
performance is not explained by perceived relational distance (z = -.409, st.B = -.004, SE = .005, p 
= .681). 
In addition, this study finds a statistically significant total indirect effect for Model 2 (z = -2.265, st.B 
= .024, SE = .083, p = .023). When the inspectors’ perceptions of government transparency rise, 
so does their perceived relational distance and, consequently, also their perception of regulatory 
performance. When we examine this relationship more closely, a statistically significant relationship is 
found between perceived government transparency and relational distance (z = 3.621, st.B = .368, SE 
= .132, p = .000) as well as between relational distance and regulatory performance (z = 2.625, st.B = 
.227, SE = .043, p = .009). In sum, the relationship between perceived government transparency and 
perceived regulatory performance of inspectors working in a division where the frequency of contact 
between themselves and inspectees is low can be explained by their perceived relational distance. 
4.5 Conclusion and discussion
This study investigates the extent to which inspectors, who are classic street-level bureaucrats, 
perceive an impact of government transparency on regulatory performance and how this is mediated 
through perceived relational distance between the inspector and the inspectee. Our findings contribute 
to the existing literature in three ways.
Firstly, transparency scholars often stress that the pros and cons of government transparency are 
contested (Cucciniello et al., 2017; de Fine Licht, 2014; Fung et al., 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; 
Hood and Heald, 2006; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2008). The transparency debate, however, 
lacks a street-level perspective (see de Boer et al., 2018). Our findings indicate that, according to 
street-level bureaucrats, government transparency does contribute to good performance of their 
division. More specifically, the more street-level bureaucrats perceive that regulatory performance 
regarding business organizations’ compliance is made transparent, the more they perceive that their 
division is performing well in fulfilling its public tasks such as tracing rule violations and monitoring 
risks. 
Second, one reason why street-level bureaucrats perceive regulatory performance as improving when 
more performance information is made transparent is because of an indirect effect through increased 
perceived relational distance. The results show that, for street-level bureaucrats working in divisions 
where the factual relational distance is small (i.e. frequency of interactions with business owners is 
high), there is not only a direct positive effect of increased perceived government transparency on 
perceived regulatory performance, but also an indirect effect: increases in perceived government 
transparency lead to larger perceived relational distance, which, consequently, increases perceived 
regulatory performance. This indirect effect does not occur in divisions where the factual relational 
distance is large (i.e. the interaction between street-level bureaucrats and business owners is low). 
In other words, in divisions with a lot of face-to-face encounters, the perceived mechanism through 
which regulatory performance is realized changes when the level of transparency increases. 
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In such divisions, perceived regulatory performance becomes less dependent on the close relationship 
between the street-level bureaucrat and the inspectee, and more dependent on public scrutiny by 
other stakeholders. This points to a shift from a more relational regulatory procedure to a more public 
regulatory process. Interestingly, although scholars investigating the relationship and interactions 
between street-level bureaucrats and their clients have shown that fostering trust and a cooperative 
relation may be beneficial for delivering and implementing public policies (Pautz, 2009; Pautz and 
Wamsley, 2012), our findings indicate that, according to street-level bureaucrats’ perceptions, the 
shift towards more transparent public procedures and less intimate relationships enhances regulators’ 
ability to perform. Future research is needed to assess whether these findings also hold among 
other stakeholders such as public managers or business owners. A cross-sector approach using, for 
instance, experiments may be especially fruitful (see de Fine Licht, 2014; Porumbescu et al., 2017). 
Finally, the results contribute to the literature on regulatory capture (Baldwin et al., 2012; Carpenter 
and Moss, 2013; Mitnick, 2011; James, 2000) by providing empirical confirmation for theory stating 
that, when there is little contact between street-level bureaucrats and business owners, street-level 
bureaucrats do not go native, because the factual relational distance is high and, consequently, the 
regulated industry does not control or capture government agencies (James, 2000; Makkai and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Mitnick, 2011). When there is a lot of contact, street-level bureaucrats run the risk 
of going native because the factual relational distance is small and, in turn, get captured. The findings 
may indicate that street-level bureaucrats feel pressure from their clients and are not able to create 
a desirable perceived relational distance themselves but need institutional arrangements – such as 
government transparency – to remain at a distance. In sum, this research indicates that increasing 
government transparency helps to limit regulatory capture because it increases perceived relational 
distance (see Carpenter and Moss, 2013). Future research is needed to understand implications of 
increasing relational distance at the street-level, for instance, in terms of bureaucrats’ engagement in 
policy design (see Lavee et al., 2018), policy alienation (see Van Engen et al., 2016) and enforcement 
style (see de Boer, 2019; de Boer et al., 2018).
As with any research, there are methodological limitations to this study. First, surveys collecting data 
from respondents at a single point in time have been criticized because of the risk of common source 
bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Meier and O’Toole, 2012). Risking common source bias was 
unavoidable, as we are interested in perceptions, but common source bias was limited through design 
remedies. The ex-post remedies conducted did not indicate common source bias in our findings 
(George and Pandey, 2017). Second, it is not possible to make causal inferences, because our data 
are cross-sectional. Future studies, for instance using experimental methods, could be used to further 
distill the mechanisms identified in this research. Third, relational distance is only measured by one 
item since the intended four-item scale did not pass reliability thresholds (Field et al., 2012). Relational 
distance may be more complex and nuanced than the single item using in this study. Future research 
should pay attention to continuing the development and validation of a reliable measurement scale 
for relational distance. 
Finally, this research has theoretical limitations. First, it addresses a specific type of street-level 
bureaucrat, namely, inspectors, in a specific context, The Netherlands. Inspectors are similar to 
other street-level bureaucrats. For instance, they enforce policies, just as for example police officers. 
Inspectors may, however, also differ from other street-level bureaucrats. Second, the Dutch context 
may differ from other countries, for example because of specific features of Dutch culture or of the 
Dutch regulatory system. More research is needed to determine which contextual features may 
be of influence and whether our results can be generalized to other countries and sectors. Future 
research with cross-sector and cross-national comparisons will help to assess how other street-level 
bureaucrats view the impact of government transparency on regulatory performance in other sectors 
and countries across the globe. 
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Third, this study addresses the impact of government transparency on regulatory performance 
and assesses whether relational distance matters. The transparency of the bureaucrat-inspectee 
encounter may, however, also influence their relational distance and have implications for how street-
level bureaucrats perceive the impact of government transparency. Future research could compare 
the impact of government transparency for bureaucrat-inspectee encounters which are public (e.g. 
police arrests) and not public (e.g. slaughterhouse inspection visits). Finally, and most importantly, 
this study is unable to explain how street-level bureaucrats interpret the effects of government 
transparency on their relational distance with inspectees and regulatory performance. Future research 
using qualitative methods, such as interviews, will be crucial to distill the interpretations of street-
level bureaucrats on how government transparency, relational distance and regulatory performance 
interact with one another. 
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# Sub-question Chapter
1 How can street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement during frontline encounters be 
conceptualized and measured?
2
2 What is the effect of transparency on street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement and 
experienced resistance by citizens during frontline encounters?
3
3 What is the effect of transparency on regulatory performance and does street-
level bureaucrats’ relational distance from citizens matter?
4
4 In frontline encounters with little transparency, how are different street-level 
bureaucrats assessed by citizens in terms of warmth and competence traits?
5
5 What is the effect of street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement during frontline 
encounters on citizens’ transparency and obedience?
6
Table 7.1 Sub-questions 
7.1 Recapping the research question
The research aim of this dissertation was to understand what happens to both street-level bureaucrats 
and citizens during frontline encounters in the context of enforcement when transparency comes 
into play. This topic is important to understand because transparency continues to root itself into 
public organizations. Meanwhile, academics have primarily focused on effects external to those public 
organizations, such as increasing citizens’ trust, and tackling such issues as low public performance 
perceptions and raising participation rates (see Cucciniello et al., 2017 for an overview). Other actors 
also, such as citizens, increasingly have contributed to transparency of public organizations and 
street-level agents (e.g. Brucato, 2015a; 2015b; Trigg, 2014). Understanding how bureaucrats enforce 
public policies at the frontline is crucial for understanding the functioning of public organizations (see 
Bartels, 2013; Lipsky, 2010; Zacka, 2017). Therefore, this dissertation investigated: 
What are the effects of transparency on street-level bureaucrats and citizens?
This chapter, first, answers the research questions by combining insights from all the empirical 
chapters (2 through 6) (section 7.1). Second, it discusses what the answers contribute to academia 
and practice by presenting four key conclusions (section 7.2). Finally, an agenda for future research 
is given that incorporates the most prominent theoretical and methodological limitations as concluded 
by this dissertation (section 7.3.).
The overarching question was broken down into five sub-questions as depicted in Table 7.1. While 
the first three research questions addressed the perspective of the street-level bureaucrat, the fourth 
and fifth research question addressed the perspective of the citizen.  
7.2 Answering the research question
This section aims to reveal what the answers are to the research questions by summarizing the 
findings, as well as conclusions, for each empirical chapter separately. 
7.2.1 Sub-question 1: Street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement is best conceptualized in three 
dimensions
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Chapter 2 dissected the multi-dimensionality of bureaucrats’ attitudes during face-to-face enforcement 
encounters using the concept of enforcement style (May & Winter, 1999, 2000). Chapter 2 also 
developed and validated a measurement scale for street-level enforcement style. Based on the 
enforcement and regulation literature, five underlying dimensions were identified: formalism, coercion, 
education, prioritization and accommodation. These dimensions can be combined in varying extents 
and result in a bureaucrats’ total enforcement style. Based on the five dimensions, questionnaire 
items were developed and validated using a survey (n = 507) among inspectors of the NVWA. Results 
showed that, in a Dutch context, enforcement style consisted of not five, but three dimensions. First, 
the legal dimension was made up of both formalism (i.e. rigidness) and coercion (i.e. force of the 
law). Facilitation, the second dimension of enforcement style, was composed of both education (i.e. 
the communicative function of the law) and prioritization (i.e. considering circumstances at hand). 
Lastly, accommodation (i.e. considering opinions of others) was a cognitive dimension revealing that 
colleagues also shape bureaucrats’ enforcement activities. 
7.2.2 Sub-question 2: Transparency by public organizations intensifies all dimensions of 
bureaucrats’ enforcement attitude and lowers resistance from citizens 
Using the same survey data, chapter 3 tested whether transparency by public organizations10 affected 
the three dimensions of enforcement attitude and studied the effect of resistance by citizens. Combining 
insights from the literature on transparency with those of street-level bureaucracy, it was theorized 
that transparency adds to the uncertainties street-level bureaucrats face while enforcing public 
policies. In order to reduce these uncertainties, it was expected that bureaucrats’ would be stricter 
(i.e. legal), provide less information (i.e. facilitation) and keep in mind what others think about policy 
enforcement (i.e. accommodation). The results indicated that the amount of perceived transparency 
was positively related to all dimensions of enforcement attitude. Contrary to expectations, rather than 
facilitating less, bureaucrats facilitated more when they perceived more transparency. This may be 
due to bureaucrats’ explaining (i.e. a core aspect of facilitation) the implications of transparency more 
to citizens, since its implementation was relatively new. Chapter 3 also theorized that transparency 
would result in more reputational damage for citizens and, in turn, create more resistance towards 
bureaucrats. The result was surprising: the effect between transparency and resistance by citizens 
was found to be negative. Thus, this chapter indicated that street-level bureaucrats intensified their 
enforcement attitude and, potentially, believed it to be an effective instrument to ensure compliance 
since it reduced resistance at the frontline.
7.2.3 Sub-question 3: Transparency by public organizations enhances performance and, for 
bureaucrats with frequent encounters with citizens, this is due to the cognitive distance from 
citizens that transparency creates
Chapter 4 also used survey data from NVWA inspectors. Chapter 4 builds on the surprising result 
of Chapter 3, namely that the more transparency is perceived, the less perceived resistance there 
is from citizens. Chapter 4 builds on this result by testing whether street-level bureaucrats found 
transparency to be positively associated with overall regulatory performance. Chapter 4 argued that, 
if this is indeed the case, it could explain chapter 3 findings that more transparency leads to less 
resistance: because transparency is an instrument that stimulates ‘good’ compliance behaviour and, 
10  In chapter 3 transparency is labelled ‘disclosure of performance information’.
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thus, lowers resistance. Drawing on capture theory (e.g. Black, 2010; Hood et al., 1999), chapter 
4 also studied whether the relational distance between bureaucrats and citizens explained the 
relationship between transparency and regulatory performance. 
It was found that more transparency, indeed, led to better regulatory performance. By comparing 
two different groups of bureaucrats – one with a high, and one with a low, frequency of face-to-face 
encounters (i.e. factual relational distance) – this chapter showed that more transparency increases 
perceived relational distance. More perceived relational distance, in turn, increased perceived 
regulatory performance. Both results were found only for the bureaucrats who did frequently interact 
with citizens. This finding indicated that, although it was often stressed that bureaucrats who met 
citizens often benefited from a close relationship (e.g. Pautz & Wamsley, 2009), transparency can 
increase bureaucrat-citizen relational distance which benefits performance. 
7.2.4 Sub-question 4: In frontline encounters with little transparency, citizens warmth and 
competence assessment of street-level bureaucrats depend on the bureaucrats’ core task 
and gender
In order to understand what the effects are of street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement attitudes on 
transparency by citizens (sub-question five and chapter 6), it is important to first understand citizens’ 
biases of enforcement bureaucrats whom they have never met and have very limited information 
about. Chapter 5 builds on the previous chapters because it assessed bureaucrat-citizen encounters 
where there was not a lot of information available about the street-level bureaucrat. Chapter 5 
investigated how citizens assessed bureaucrats who they had encountered for first-time via telephone 
regarding two traits: warmth and competence. In addition, it was tested as to whether the core task 
and gender of the bureaucrat altered those trait assessments. Chapter 5 used a factorial survey (n 
= 580) and survey experiment (n = 1,602) among Dutch citizens. The theorizing was based on issue 
ownership theory (Hayes, 2005) where it was to be expected that bureaucrats with different core tasks 
would become ‘owners’ of different social issues. This ownership, in turn, would affect how citizens 
were assessed in terms of warmth and competence.  Drawing from role congruency theory (e.g. 
Eagly & Karan, 2002), it also was to be expected that (a) when bureaucrats were assessed differently 
based on their gender and (b) when the bureaucrats’ gender was congruent with their core task, trait 
assessments would be amplified. 
The factorial survey showed that three groups of bureaucrats can be constructed, based on whether 
their core task was perceived as regulation- or service-oriented by citizens; namely (1) primarily 
regulation-oriented bureaucrats; (2) primarily service-oriented bureaucrats and; (3) bureaucrats who 
were both regulation- and service-oriented. The experimental findings showed that regulation-oriented 
bureaucrats were assessed as less warm than both service-oriented bureaucrats and bureaucrats with 
both core tasks. Contrary to the hypothesized relations, regulation-oriented bureaucrats were also 
assessed as less competent than the two other groups of bureaucrats. This could be due to the more 
punitive reputation that regulatory organizations have (see Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Moreover, 
female bureaucrats were assessed as warmer than males. Both female and male bureaucrats were 
assessed as equally competent. These findings indicated that citizens relied on stereotypical notions 
of bureaucrats when assessing their traits and, ultimately, these assessments varied. 
7.2.5  Sub-question 5: Neither a legal nor facilitation enforcement attitude results in citizens’ 
obedience, but facilitation lowers their negative transparency intentions
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Chapter 6 builds on chapter 5 by conducting an experiment and replication with two regulation-
oriented bureaucrats: parking officers and conductors. Chapter 6 aimed to enhance understanding 
of the citizen-side of service provision by testing the effects of street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement 
attitudes on citizens’ intentions to obey paying a fine and to be negative in their public transparency11. 
Drawing from literature on enforcement style, relational distance and the social interactionist theory 
of coercive actions (Tedeschi & Feldson, 1994), it was theorized that a legal attitude would have led 
to more obedience than facilitation, but a legal attitude also would have led to public shaming (i.e. 
negative transparency). Using a survey experiment (n = 318) and a replication (n = 311) among Dutch 
citizens, the findings showed no effect of a legal, nor facilitation attitude on obedience in situations 
where citizens had met a bureaucrat for the first time. Moreover, being legal did not result in more 
intended shaming by citizens. However, being facilitative did result in less intended shaming. Chapter 
6 showed that when bureaucrats were facilitating, citizens intended to be positive in their transparency 
about their encounters with bureaucrats. 
7.3 The four key conclusions
The previous section has shown ‘what’ this dissertation found by answering the central research 
question via its sub-questions. However, it did lead one to wonder ‘so what’ does this answer mean 
for understanding transparency at the frontline? Answering the research question does not end this 
debate – it is only the beginning. Therefore, this section moves beyond solely answering the research 
question and reflects on their implications for academia and practice. This reflection is structured by 
presenting the four key conclusions of this dissertation to move the discussion on transparency’s 
frontline implications forward. 
7.3.1 Conclusion 1 – Transparency helps street-level bureaucrats to do their job 
This conclusion discusses how transparency facilitated street-level bureaucrats in executing their 
core tasks. First, transparency enhanced overall regulatory performance. The effect of transparency 
on regulatory performance was almost twice the size for bureaucrats with frequent interactions 
compared with those with infrequent interactions (with st.B = .419 and .245 respectively). Thus, 
transparency seemed to be especially helpful for those bureaucrats with frequent interactions with 
citizens. A positive effect was found of perceived relational distance on performance for bureaucrats 
with regular contact with citizens, but this effect did not occur for bureaucrats without regular contact. 
More transparency was found to enlarge perceived relational distance only for bureaucrats with close 
contact with citizens. This could indicate that street-level bureaucrats, especially who frequently meet 
citizens, struggled to not get too close (i.e. capture) to citizens as this complicated doing their job. 
Therefore, transparency can create the distance from citizens that the bureaucrats with frequent 
contact needed during frontline encounters. Last, but not least, this dissertation found that enforcing 
policies during frontline encounters was helped by transparency since it reduced resistance that 
bureaucrats experienced (st.B = 0.306). 
This conclusion contributes to the scholarly debate between transparency ‘optimists’ and ‘skeptics’ 
(see Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012) by adding support to the transparency ‘optimists.’ Notably, transparency 
often has been implemented as an instrument by public organizations because it allows stakeholders to 
11  In chapter six negative public transparency is labelled ‘public shaming’ and measured by citizens’ 
intentions to write a negative online review.
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monitor and judge governments’ decision-making generally, but also the performance of entrepreneurs 
specifically and, ultimately, to act accordingly (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen 
et al., 2013). Citizens will be empowered to question under-performance. Entrepreneurs will fear 
reputational damage and, ultimately, loss of revenue and resist the implementation of transparency 
policies (see Meijer & Homburg, 2009; van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). This dissertation has 
provided more nuances to this notion by showing that street-level bureaucrats did not perceive 
more resistance when there was more transparency, but rather less resistance. Thus, street-level 
bureaucrats may be transparency ‘optimists’, at least in terms of the enforcement process at the 
front line. This insight is relevant for public managers and supervisors of bureaucrats with complex 
dossiers because highlighting the presence of transparency practices may help bureaucrats deal with 
resistance.
The transparency literature has long been dominated by the study of external implications, specifically 
regarding effects on policy- and citizen-oriented goals (see Cucciniello et al., 2017 for an overview). 
At the same time, leading authors, such as Lipsky (2010), Maynard-Moody & Musheno (2000) and 
Hill & Hupe (2002) have long stressed that the face-to-face enforcement of public policies by street-
level bureaucrats is a core part of the functioning of governments and its legitimacy. This dissertation 
adds that, besides external (i.e. policy- and citizen-oriented) effects, transparency also has internal 
effects on public organizations and, specifically, on street-level bureaucrats during their enforcement 
of public policies and how they (cognitively) relate to the citizens they encounter. This contribution 
is useful for policymakers tasked with drafting internal informative documents about transparency 
practices that are – or will be – implemented, because it may be beneficial to state explicitly the 
benefit for street-level bureaucrats: smoother frontline encounters.
Furthermore, regulation scholars often research ‘capture’ because it undermines effective regulatory 
performance (Baldwin et al., 2012; Carpenter & Moss, 2013; Hood et al., 1999; James, 2000; 
Mitnick, 2011). Capture occurs when street-level bureaucrats get too close to those they inspect in 
circumstances of low relational distance. It is then that bureaucrats can sympathize too much with 
entrepreneurs, become allies and cannot objectively collect and assess information (Ashworth et 
al., 2002; Hood et al., 1999; James, 2000; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992). This study indicates that 
transparency limits bureaucrats’ capture and can ensure that bureaucrats assess information in a 
manner that can benefit service provision. More specifically, transparency could be a way to keep 
a workable balance for a relational distance that is close, but not too close. Finally, transparency 
scholars are often concerned with the instrumental value of transparency to achieve citizen- and 
policy-related goals (Cucciniello et al., 2017). This dissertation has revealed that transparency’s 
instrumental value may expand well-beyond those and include, at least, the bureaucrat-oriented goal 
of limiting capture.
Notably, all street-level bureaucrats implement policies when facing stress factors, such as limited 
time, resources and information (Lipsky, 2010). For practitioners generally, it is relevant to note that 
bureaucrats who interact with citizens regularly face a specific stressor: keeping a cognitive distance. 
Public managers should be aware that bureaucrats need this cognitive distance from those they inspect 
in order to get the feeling that they can do their job properly. There is good news for policymakers 
tasked with implementing transparency practices: more transparency could be one intervention that 
can mitigate bureaucrat-citizen closeness and facilitate bureaucrats in the execution of their tasks. It 
is important to note that practitioners should not overestimate the ‘promise’ of transparency to create 
and, potentially, keep distance between bureaucrats and citizens. This only applies to bureaucrats 
with frequent contact with citizens and not bureaucrats with sporadic contact. 
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7.3.2 Conclusion 2 – More transparency by public organizations can indirectly stimulate 
positive transparency by citizens 
The second conclusion reflects on how transparency by public organizations and by citizens is 
connected and could, ultimately, reinforce each other. Due to, amongst others, ICT developments, 
public organizations are by no means the only actor contributing to the increasing transparency 
of public organizations and its frontline agents (e.g. Adams, 2013; Brucato, 2015a; 2015b; 
Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Trigg, 2014). This dissertation studied transparency by public 
organizations and by citizens separately, but its results have indicated that they could reinforce each 
other. The findings have shown that, when there was more transparency by public organizations, 
street-level bureaucrats’ enforcement attitudes became more legal, facilitating and accommodating. 
At the same time, this study has found that, when bureaucrats’ enforcement attitude was legal-based, 
citizens did not intend to be negative, nor positive, in their transparency. However, the results also 
showed that when bureaucrats’ enforcement attitudes were facilitation-based, citizens intended to be 
less negative in their transparency. By combining both findings, it can be concluded that transparency 
by public organizations and by citizens could, in some instances, form a reinforcing mechanism, 
namely: more transparency by public organizations results in a more facilitation-oriented enforcement 
attitude by street-level bureaucrats which, in turn, results in less negative transparency by citizens. 
Notably, when street-level bureaucrats combine different dimensions due to more transparency, 
this reinforcing mechanism surrounding the facilitation attitudes of bureaucrats may become more 
complex.
Scholars often have focused on transparency by one type of societal actors. For instance, governments 
presenting policy information (e.g. de Fine Licht, 2014; Grimmelikhuisen & Meijer, 2014; Piotrowski 
et al., 2017), disclosing sanctions (e.g. Van Erp, 2011), showing ratings and rankings (Hood et al., 
2008; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008) or individuals filming other individuals (e.g. Brucato, 2015a; 
2015b). This dissertation has been no different and has explored two transparency types separately. 
However, the results have indicated that transparency by public organizations and citizens could 
be interconnected. This is important for scholars now studying types of transparency in isolation. 
Including transparency by other societal actors could help scholars reach a better understanding of 
the transparency practices of the actor(s) they already study. 
7.3.3 Conclusion 3 -- While transparency by public organizations is often a form of punishment, 
transparency by citizens is not
The third conclusion reflects on the nature of transparency by public organizations and by citizens. 
Within the enforcement context, transparency by public organizations as an instrument was 
predominantly built on the notion that disclosing poor performance would result in reputational damage 
for entrepreneurs and in, turn, loss of consumers and revenue. As such, transparency was used to 
shame poor performance and to stimulate compliance of both citizens and entrepreneurs (Meijer, 
2013; Meijer & Homburg, 2009; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). Conspicuously, this dissertation did 
not investigate this assumption, since its aim was to dissect the effect of transparency on street-level 
encounters and not on compliance. This study did investigate transparency practices by citizens. 
An experiment and replication found that bureaucrats’ enforcement style did not result in negative 
transparency by citizens or shaming. However, the results did show that a facilitative enforcement 
attitude resulted in less negative transparency by citizens. In other words, citizens were less negative 
in what they disclosed publicly when bureaucrats had a facilitating enforcement attitude and may, 
arguably, even ‘fame’. These results indicate that the instrumental nature of transparency between 
both actors may differ: public organizations use transparency to disclose negative performance, while 
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citizens can also use and discuss positive experiences.  
This conclusion is in line with recent research that has shown that citizens are less negative (i.e. 
ready to blame) about those providing the service directly when they were given more information 
about certain aspects, such as context and responsibility (Piatak et al., 2017). This conclusion 
contributes to the scholarly debate on negativity bias. Negativity bias means that citizens respond 
stronger to negative information than they do to positive information. Thus, citizens are asymmetrical 
in their ways of reacting (Olsen, 2015). Scholars have examined negativity bias predominantly for 
how citizens interpret performance information by public organizations and found mixed results (e.g. 
James, 2010; James & Mosley, 2014; Olsen, 2015). This study indicated that citizens might not have 
a strong negativity bias when it comes to information based on how street-level bureaucrats issue 
them with fines. Citizens could even have a positivity bias when bureaucrats do so with a facilitation 
approach. In other words, how citizens respond to negative information may work differently when this 
information is drawn from encounters with street-level bureaucrats on the frontline. 
For street-level bureaucrats tasked with sanctioning and fining citizens, it is relevant to keep in mind 
that, when citizens shame them after an encounter, this will be the exception and not the rule when 
it comes to negative online reviews. However, this study’s investigations were restricted solely to 
shaming via online review writing. There are, for instance, recent examples of other forms of shaming 
by citizens that occur after a frontline encounter that seem to have become more the rule, rather 
than the exception. For instance, citizens film street-level bureaucrats and, while filming, obstruct 
bureaucrats from properly helping citizens in need. Americans have even named this phenomenon 
‘rubbernecking’ (Mudde, 2018; Van Leeuwen, 2019). To put this differently, this dissertation by no 
means has argued that the consequences of public shaming should be under-estimated for street-
level bureaucrats. Rather, citizens writing negative public reviews after a ‘negative’ experience, such 
as getting fined will be rare.
7.3.4 Conclusion 4 – Citizens have biases about different bureaucrats’ traits they meet screen-
to-screen, but these do not clearly explain how citizens behave face-to-face
The last conclusion addresses frontline encounters where there was no explicit transparency 
and, thus, there was limited information available to citizens about bureaucrats. This dissertation 
investigated how different types of bureaucrats were classified by citizens and, as a result, revealed 
their biases. This dissertation has revealed that citizens classify bureaucrats into three categories 
based on their core task, namely (1) regulation-oriented; (2) citizen-oriented, and; (3) oriented at both 
(chapter 5). More importantly, citizens, in terms of their warmth and competence traits in screen-to-
screen encounters, assessed the three identified types of bureaucrats differently.  
The results have indicated that regulation-oriented street-level bureaucrats were assessed lowest 
in terms of their competence and warmth. Female bureaucrats were assessed as being warmer 
than males when citizens encountered them via telephone (i.e. screen-to-screen). However, the size 
effects were small (d ranging between 0.16-0.26). This study did not explain how citizens act on these 
predispositions when they met bureaucrats face-to-face. Experimental evidence has shown that, in 
face-to-face settings, neither a legal nor facilitation enforcement attitude increased citizens’ obedience 
with paying fines. At the same time, only a facilitation attitude decreased negative transparency by 
citizens. A legal enforcement attitude did not impact transparency by citizens whatsoever. In other 
words, this dissertation has indicated that, while citizens stereotype enforcing bureaucrats in terms 
of competence and warmth screen-to-screen, these stereotypes did not result in clear face-to-face 
behavioural intentions regarding, for instance, intended obedience or transparency.
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This literature on stereotyping and discrimination has focused solely on how street-level bureaucrats’ 
stereotyped or discriminated citizens. There is some evidence compiled, at least to some extent, on 
how bureaucrats assessed citizens and how this affected their decision-making (Harrits, 2019; Jilke 
et al., 2018; Pedersen et al., 2018; Raaphorst et al., 2018; Thomann & Rapp, 2018). This study has 
shown that citizens also had stereotypical notions of bureaucrats in terms of their traits. Scholars 
have shown that stereotypical notions of bureaucrats by citizens can have important implications for 
policy implementation. For instance, there is an increasing amount of evidence that gender-matching 
increases the efforts of both bureaucrats and citizens (Guul, 2018; Meier, 2018; Riccucci et al., 2015) 
this benefits service provision. The results of this study have provided a nuanced account of the 
implications of stereotypical notions held by citizens for street-level bureaucrats. This has indicated 
that, much like bureaucrats’ stereotypical notions of citizens, biases about bureaucrats may work in 
subtle ways (see Raaphorst et al., 2018).  
The literature on representative bureaucracy has investigated the effects of a street-level bureaucrats’ 
gender on service provision. This scholarship predominantly investigated the effects of symbolic, 
active or passive gender representation or gender-matching between bureaucrat and client (see 
Doornekamp et al., 2019; Guul, 2018; Meier & Nicholsen-Crotty, 2006; Piatak & Mohr, 2019; Riccucci 
et al., 2015; 2016). This study contributes to that body of literature because it helps understand 
the constellation of stereotypical beliefs of bureaucrats based on gender by revealing differences in 
trait perceptions (see also Doornekamp et al., 2019). This dissertation has indicated that variations 
in warmth between male and female street-level bureaucrats in particular may be worthwhile to 
investigate in terms of effects on citizens’ behaviour during service provision.  
An important take-away for practitioners is that, according to citizens, one uniform street-level 
bureaucrat does not exist and citizens hold different stereotypical notions about bureaucrats based on 
their traits. Trends in digitalization and ICT innovations have meant that bureaucrats increasingly meet 
citizens screen-to-screen, rather than face-to-face (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). Dutch respondents in 
screen-to-screen situations have assessed various regulation-oriented bureaucrats (e.g. inspectors in 
healthcare, catering industry, tax and labour) as being the least competent and warm by citizens. Such 
bureaucrats should be aware of these biases to help them relate, understand and deal with citizens 
via telephone or other screen-to-screen settings, such as e-mail. The biases in competence and 
warmth assessments are also useful for public managers when assessing individual performances 
based on input from citizens, especially when this is based on electronic forms of communication. 
Awareness ensures fair and just evaluations of individual street-level bureaucrats. 
7.4 Limitations
All research has its limitations and this dissertation is no exception. Although specific limitations 
are discussed separately in the empirical chapters 2 through 6, the most prominent overarching 
theoretical and methodological limitations are highlighted here. 
Theoretically, this dissertation has focused, primarily, on the role of transparency of performance 
information (i.e. inspection results) during frontline encounters. This type of transparency is central in 
the first part (chapter 2, 3 and 4) of this dissertation. This focus, unfortunately, limited the conclusions 
to one type of information that can be disclosed by public organizations or citizens. Numerous forms 
of transparency on the frontline could play a role, such as: (1) whether bureaucrats enforced ‘on 
the street’ with bystanders or behind closed doors in offices (see Gofen, 2015); or, (2) what type of 
information citizens disclosed or not when bureaucrats probed for answers about their (non)compliant 
behaviours. While this dissertation has shown transparency of performance information matters for 
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frontline encounters, other forms of transparency could work in (dis)similar ways and, arguably, play 
an even bigger role during frontline encounters than disclosure of inspection results. 
Moreover, this dissertation has focused on the context of enforcement. The inspectors at the centre of 
the first part of this dissertation are employed by the Netherlands Food and Product Safety Authority. 
The NVWA uses transparency as a enforcement tool and was, at the time of data collection, in the 
middle of making all relevant information about regulation public (see section 1.7.). It is, therefore, likely 
that the findings translate to both inspectors and other bureaucrats working in similar enforcement 
contexts where transparency is a prominent tool. In addition, the findings also likely translate to other 
street-level bureaucrats working in enforcement contexts such as, for instance, tax officials because 
their ‘power’ and highly regulated interactions with citizens or entrepreneurs will be similar (see Van 
de Walle & Raaphorst for an overview of current research on inspectors). Last but not least, all 
the data was collected in the Netherlands. When the frontline encounters are of similar nature, it 
is likely that the conclusions will transfer. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that there is little cross-
national research about effects of transparency. Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013) investigated the effect 
of transparency on trust of citizens by hypothesizing different effects in the Netherlands and South 
Korea. Surprisingly, they found similar patterns. Therefore, it is unclear if and how the results of this 
dissertation might translate to other countries. 
Methodologically, this dissertation was based partly on cross-sectional data. Therefore, no 
conclusions could be drawn about causality in chapter 2 through 4 and this should be considered 
when interpreting the results. Reversed causality also cannot be ruled out. Theoretically, it seems 
unlikely that, while it was hypothesized that transparency influences bureaucrats’ enforcement style 
(chapter 3), this relationship could be reversed. However, it was also theorized that transparency 
perceptions influenced performance perceptions (chapter 4). It is possible that this relationship could 
be reversed. Nevertheless, in chapter 4, it was argued why the proposed hypothesized relation was 
most reasonable. In the second part of this dissertation, experimental methods were used. Thus, the 
results of chapters 5 and 6 show conclusions could be drawn about causality. However, experiments 
are often critiqued for their limited external validity because they induce simplistic treatments that 
are less complex than real world scenarios (James et al., 2017). This limitation was combatted, 
as much as possible, by, for instance, making the treatments as realistic as possible, by carefully 
piloting experiments and by replicating experiments. Nevertheless, external validity concerns remain 
a limitation of the experimental results. 
7.5 Future research directions
Transparency practices by public organizations, citizens and other actors are likely to expand over the 
upcoming decades due to, amongst other things, ICT developments. The insights of this dissertation, 
hopefully, can be useful to scholars wishing to better grasp transparency and/or frontline encounters. 
Drawing on the previous sections of this chapter, this last section will outline venues for future 
research. 
Those interested in understanding transparency could investigate the internal effects of transparency 
by public organizations, rather than just the external effects, such as the implications for frontline 
encounters. To illustrate this, scholars could investigate unintended consequences of transparency 
because it could result in perverse incentives, such as gaming behaviour and cutting corners (see 
Freeman, 2002; Hood, 2007; 2011) which harms public performance. Scholars could also link 
transparency to bureaucrats’ ethical behaviour and honesty (Belle & Cantarelli, 2017; Olsen et al., 
2018). It could be hypothesized that by raising transparency functions as an internal monitoring system 
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for bureaucracies will, in turn, raise bureaucrats’ self-awareness, moral standards and, ultimately, 
could decrease their unethical behaviour (Belle & Cantarelli, 2017). In other words, researchers could 
test if internal transparency makes street-level bureaucrats more ethical and honest. If transparency 
does, citizens could receive more equal and equitable service. Furthermore, whether more internal 
transparency is created because humans disclose bureaucrats’ performance, or if computers do, 
also may be interesting to explore (see Cohn et al., 2018), especially since bureaucratic processes 
and bureaucrats’ decision-making are being increasingly automated (e.g. Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). 
Whether or not a ‘computer says no’ may affect fairness perceptions of citizens.
Explicitly studying transparency mechanisms at the street-level may also be of interest to those 
scholars interested in bureaucrat-citizen encounters. Transparency mechanisms have been examined, 
predominantly, as being top-down in terms of their effects on citizens and policies (see Cucinniello 
et al., 2017). However, the different consequences of transparency on ‘the street’ are unexplored. To 
illustrate this, contact between street-level bureaucrats and citizens has become evolved increasingly 
from screen-to-screen, instead of face-to-face (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). This makes the actual 
encounter less transparent. Citizens have fewer cues about the type of street-level bureaucrats that 
they are meeting. Scholars could study how this affects street-level bureaucrats’ service provision 
and enforcement. Research could also investigate if it matters for either policy implementation or 
enforcement as to whether bureaucrat-citizen encounters happen on the street with bystanders or 
behind closed doors in an office. Understanding differences in service allocations and sanctions, 
when bureaucrats’ encounters with citizens are more transparent than others is important, because it 
potentially harms public organizations’ overall legitimacy and citizens’ trust. 
Future research could explore the role of relationships between street-level bureaucrats and citizens 
and their implications for service provision. There is growing academic attention for helping the 
behaviour of bureaucrats (Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Thomann & Rapp, 2018), when bureaucrats decide 
to bend or break rules for citizens (Borry & Hendersen, 2019; DeHart-Davis, 2007) and the role of 
empathy in bureaucrats’ use of discretion (Jensen & Pedersen, 2017). How street-level bureaucrats 
make sense of the citizens they are processing is central in these studies. This study has shown that 
some street-level bureaucrats interact by design more with some citizens than others and this can 
generate intimacy. For street-level bureaucrats dealing with such close relations, limiting this was 
found to be beneficial for public performance. It could be hypothesized that bureaucrats who fail to 
keep a certain amount of distance cannot make just and fair decisions about service allocation and 
this explains why bureaucrats bend rules. Future research could further test theories around when 
close bureaucrat-citizen relations benefit and when they harm public performance. 
Methodologically, survey research over the past decade has become less popular among public 
management and administration scholars. This has been due to, for instance, criticisms of common 
source bias (see Podsakoff et al., 2003). This dissertation has shown that, when the aim is to understand 
perceptions of large populations, surveys are an appropriate method that can generate valuable 
insights. The limitations of methods do need to be considered when deciding upon which methods to 
use, but they should not be leading. The research aim and question must be the determining factor 
when deciding which methods to use. Moreover, experimental methods have been increasingly used 
(Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016) that frequently focus on intended behaviour. For many public 
management and public administration, measuring behavioural intentions may be the closest we can 
get to measure ‘real’ behaviour given that, for instance, field experiments are often hard to realize. 
Our field would benefit from moving beyond solely measuring intentions and supplementing the 
approach with insights from actual behaviour. In this way, we could assess whether there is, indeed, a 
‘intention-behaviour gap’ or not (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). By combining insights from intentions with 
actual behaviours, we may get another step closer to understanding frontline behaviour.  
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To conclude, I will go back to how this dissertation started with the example of the disclosed report 
about the Islamic Cornelius Haga School. Education inspectors visited the school almost daily for 
months after the warning about the school was issued. Their inspections, as well as their report, were 
heavily scrutinized. Overall, many societal actors actively voiced their opinions while the inspectors 
were still conducting their inspection. This included the Minister of Education, university professors, 
banks, independent accountants, and parents, while the school also received threats (Hart van 
Nederland, 2019; Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019a; 2019b; 2019e; NOS, 2019a;2019b;2019d; 
Zwart, 2019). The media reported on one unannounced visit with a team of six inspectors because 
it had angered the director of the school, teachers and parents. They indicated that the visit was 
conducted in an ‘intimidating way’. The Inspectorate stated multiple inspectors were needed to 
ensure the visits would be over as fast as possible (Gualtherie van Weezel & Kuiper, 2019c; Kuiper 
& Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019). Nevertheless, regardless - or perhaps because of all the public 
scrutiny - the number of new students for the Cornelius Haga School increased from 84 to 135 
(Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019d). Notably, this example shows that transparency had real 
implications for policy implementation when it became scrutinized in public debates. Although this 
dissertation has completed an important step, it is only the beginning of really grasping what actually 
happens and can happen when ‘the street’ is made transparent. 
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Chapter Construct Item(s) Measure 
2,4 Perceived 
organizational 
effectiveness (labelled 
in chapter 4 as 
‘perceived regulatory 
performance’)
(ω = .83; α = .82)
My division is successful in:
1. Tracing violations of rules and 
regulations
2. Ensuring companies comply with
 rules and regulations
3. Monitoring risks
4. Reducing risks
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely   
agree
2 Perceived trust I would typify my degree of trust 
in inspectees concerning their 
compliance as:
10-point scale with:
1 = low trust
10 = high trust
2,3 Rule obedience In general, I am someone who follows 
the rules even if I disagree with them
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely 
agree
2,3,4 Work experience How many years have you been 
employed at the NVWA (or a 
predecessor of the NVWA)?
Filled in in years
2 Traditional media 
usage
How many hours do you spend using 
traditional media per day?
Filled in in hours
2 Social desirability I am always willing to admit to a 
mistake 
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely 
agree
2,3 Legal 
(ω = .80; α = .80)
During inspections, I focus on:
• Implementing the intervention policy 
by following the letter of the law
• That I enforce in an unambiguous 
way
• That I make strict agreements with 
inspectees  
• That I execute the inspection as 
complete as possible
• That I uphold high standards 
regarding
 inspectees’ compliance with rules and 
 regulations
10-point scale with:
1 = never
10 = always
Appendix I
Items used in questionnaire among NVWA inspectors for chapter 2, 3 and 4
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2,3 Facilitation 
(ω = .85; α = .85)
During inspections, I focus on:
• Transferring my professional 
knowledge to inspectees
• Giving indications how to improve 
compliance to inspectees
• Being as helpful as possible to 
inspectees
• The circumstances of inspectees 
that I encounter
10-point scale with:
1 = never
10 = always
2,3 Accommodation 
(ω = .83; α = .84)
During inspections, I consider:
• The opinions about inspecting of 
colleagues from my team
• The opinions about inspecting of
 other teams
• The opinion about inspecting of 
inspectees
• The opinions about inspecting of my 
teamleader
10-point scale with:
1 = never
10 = always
3 Perceived resistance
(ω = .71; α = .69)
• It is possible to satisfy clients 
completely (R)
• Clients actively help during 
inspections (R) 
• Clients are forward with information 
during inspections (R)
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely 
agree
Perceived degree of 
disclosed performance 
information (labelled 
in chapter 4 as 
‘perceived government 
transparency’)
(ω = .89; α = .88)
I would typify the inspection results 
that the NVWA discloses as:
• Complete
• Detailed
• Shedding light on all aspects of an 
inspection
• Without judgement
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely 
agree
Perceived relational 
distance
In my mind, I position myself as 
superior  to inspectees in order to 
make a clear  distinction between 
myself and them
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely 
agree
Trust in government 
transparency
I think that disclosing inspection 
results will  increase the compliance of 
inspectees
10-point scale with:
1 = completely 
disagree
10 = completely 
agree
Gender What is your gender? 3 answer categories 
(male; female; 
other)
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Appendix II
Decks of vignettes for chapter 5
Deck # Vignettes Domain²
1 Police officer¹ 1
Neighborhood manager 2
School attendance officer¹ 3
Nurse 5
Tax inspector¹ 6
2 Municipal enforcers¹ 1
Elementary school teacher 3
Labor inspector¹ 5
Maternity assistant 5
Catering industry inspector¹ 6
3 Parking officer¹ 1
High school teacher 3
Tram conductor¹ 4
Youth care worker 5
Customs officer¹ 6
4 Municipal desk officer 1
Forest ranger¹ 2
Bus driver 4
Education inspector¹ 3
Physiotherapist 5
5 Emergency medical technician 1
Bridge operator¹ 2
Debt councilor 5
Social investigator¹ 5
Youth councilor 5
6 Fire officer 1
Waterways inspector¹ 2
Social worker 5
Healthcare inspector¹ 5
Wedding officiant 6
¹Street-level bureaucrats with investigative authority (buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaar) 
²Domains: (1) Public space; (2) Environment, wellbeing and infrastructure; (3) Education; (4) Public
 transport; (5) Work, income and healthcare; (6) General investigation
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Appendix III
Balance checks for chapter 5
Sex Ethnicity Education Age Prior 
experience
Political 
preference
z/t-value 0.90 1.16 1.06 -0.20 2.55 -0.32
B 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.05 -0.01
s.e. 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.02
p-value 0.36 0.25 0.29 0.84 0.01** 0.75
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Appendix IV 
Items used in questionnaire among citizens for chapter 6
Construct Item(s) Measure 
Year of birth In what year were you born Open-ended
Gender What is your gender?? 3 answer categories (male;
 female; other)
Education level What is your highest completed 
education?
No education; Elementary 
education; High school 
education; Bachelor degree 
(MBO, HBO, WO); Master 
degree (HBO; WO); MBA or 
Doctoral/PhD
Ethnicity Do you belong to an ethnic minority 
in The Netherlands?
Yes; No
Screener On which of the following social 
media platforms do you have an 
account?
Twitter; Facebook; Snapchat; 
Vine; Musical.ly; LinkedIn; 
Yammer; Instagram; Flickr; 
Pinterest; Other, namely___; I 
do not have an account on any 
social media platform
Legal The train conductor/city watch was:
1. Threatening 
2. Coercive 
3. Rigid  
10-point scale with:
1 = completely disagree
10 = completely 
agree
Facilitation The train conductor/city watch was:
1. Advising
2. Helpful 
3. Facilitating
10-point scale with:
1 = completely disagree
10 = completely agree
Obedience You have two options regarding the 
fine. Which of the two options do you 
choose
1. Pay the conductor/
city watch the fine immediately
2. Object to the fine 
and do not pay the conductor/
city watch the fine immediately
Public shaming 1. What is the tone of your review?
2. How do you describe your
 interaction with the conductor?        
3. How do you describe the 
conductor?
Scale 1- 10 (completely 
negative – completely positive; 
very unpleasant – very 
pleasant – very incompetent – 
very competent)
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Procedural 
fairness
To what extent do you (dis)agree with the 
following statements: 
(1) In the execution of their tasks, the 
public transport respects passengers’ rights
(2) You can rel y on just actions from the 
public transport
(3) The public transport treats every 
passenger equally
Scale 1 – 10 
(completely disagree; 
completely agree)
Compliance 
motivations
1. The chance of getting caught for violating 
public transport laws is high [calculative]
2. I comply with public transport 
laws because it is my duty [normative]
3. My friends and family expect me 
to comply with public transport laws [social]
Scale 1 – 10 
(completely disagree; 
completely agree)
Time spend on 
social media
How many minutes do you spend per day 
on average on social media?
Open-ended
Public transport 
usage
How many times per week do u use public 
transport on average? Note: 1 journey 
equals 1 time. Please count one-way 
journeys. A round trip, thus, counts as 2 
times. 
Open-ended
Experience fines How many times in the past month have 
you been fined while using public transport?
Open-ended
Attention check Please select red for this question. Green; Red; Blue 
Treatment check To what extent do you (dis)agree with the 
following statements?
Scale 1 – 10 (completely 
disagree; completely agree)
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Appendix V
Factor analysis latent variables for chapter 6
Treatment check
Perceived enforcement style (Scale from 1 – 10)
Experiment 1: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?
The train conductor was:
Item Facilitation dimension Legal dimension
1 Advising .903 -.193
2 Helpful .904 -.261
3 Facilitating .890 -.104
4 Threatening -.166 .877
5 Coercive -.138 .925
6 Rigid -.229 .844
α .907 .882
Eigenvalue 3.46 1.52
Variance explained 57.65 25.27
Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings
Experiment 2: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?
The city watch officer was:
Item Facilitation dimension Legal dimension
1 Advising .790 .074
2 Helpful .843 -.266
3 Facilitating .873 -.124
4 Threatening -.050 .856
5 Coercive -.113 .908
6 Rigid -.106 .852
α .797 .852
Eigenvalue 1.73 2.77
Variance explained 28.72 46.24
Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings
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Dependent variable
Online public shaming of bureaucrats (Scale from 1 – 10)
Experiment 1: After your train journey, you decide to write an online review about your interaction with 
the conductor: 
Item F1
1 What is the tone of your review? (R)
(Scale: completely negative – completely positive)
.862
2 How do you describe your interaction with the conductor? (R)
(Scale: very unpleasant – very pleasant)
.893
3 How do you describe the conductor? (R)
(Scale: very incompetent – very competent)
.848
α .835
Eigenvalue 2.26
Variance explained 75.28
Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings
Experiment 2: After your car journey, you decide to write an online review about your interaction with 
the city watch officer:
Item F1
1 What is the tone of your review? (R)
(Scale: completely negative – completely positive)
.891
2 How do you describe your interaction with the conductor? (R)
(Scale: very unpleasant – very pleasant)
.926
3 How do you describe the conductor? (R)
(Scale: very incompetent – very competent)
.900
α .890
Eigenvalue 2.46
Variance explained 82.02
Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings
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Covariates
Procedural fairness (Scale from 1 – 10)
Experiment 1: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?
Item F1
1 In the executing of their task, the public transport respects 
passengers’ rights
.888
2 You can rely on just actions from the public transport .873
3 The public transport treats every passenger equally .871
α .851
Eigenvalue 2.31
Variance explained 77.00
Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings
Item F1
1 In the executing of their task, the city watch respects passengers’ rights .912
2 You can rely on just actions from the city watch .936
3 The city watch treats every passenger equally .919
α .910
Eigenvalue 2.55
Variance explained 85.10
Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings
Experiment 2: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?
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Appendix VI 
Description of samples 
Inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Product 
Safety Authority (NVWA)
Chapter 2,3, and 4 all use part of a sample collected at the NVWA. Between October and November 
2016, a questionnaire was distributed among all inspectors of the NVWA who conduct face-to-face 
inspection visits (n = 1201). Therefore, inspectors working at divisions Veterinary and Import (V&I), 
Agriculture and Nature (A&N) and Consumer and Safety (C&S) were included. Respondents were 
invited via e-mail, had six weeks to complete the questionnaire and reminded on two-week intervals. 
In order to conduct this study, a board of 5 members was assigned as advisors. This advisory 
board informed team leaders about the questionnaire and informed them to stimulate inspectors to 
participate. There was also a short call posted on the intranet of the NVWA to inform inspectors about 
the study. Chapter 2 and 3 both use the total sample (n = 507). 
For the study in chapter 4, however, using the total sample was not suitable to answer the research 
question. In Chapter 4 only inspectors working at divisions V&I and C&S were included and not A&N 
because it best fitted the conceptualization of factual relational distance (n of face-to-face inspections 
between the same inspector and citizen). Based on data from the NVWA’s annual report from 2016 
an overview was created of the n of face-to-face inspections conducted annually at the division-level. 
This overview was checked, verified and substituted with input from the advisory committee (both 
based on their expertise and confidential internal data). Combining these insights, it was concluded 
that at the division V&I the n of these inspections was highest, while at the C&S division this was 
lowest. The n of face-to-face inspections at the division A&N was neither high nor low and fluctuated. 
Our advisory board, therefore, indicated that this division would not be suitable to investigate the 
effect of high or low factual relational distance. The total sample in chapter 4 is made up of 343 
respondents. 
Dutch citizens
Chapter 5 and 6 both use samples from the Dutch population. In chapter 5, four independent samples 
were used. The first two samples served to test the experiments (i.e. pilots) while the second samples 
served to conduct the full-fledged experiments. In chapter 6, two independent samples were used. 
Qualtrics was hired to recruit participants for all samples in chapter 5 and 6. Samples in chapter 5 
were recruited in May and July 2018. Samples in chapter 6 were collected in February and June 
2019. Qualtrics has been offering online samples for over a decade. These samples have been widely 
used by researchers, included those in public management – and administration (e.g. Porumbescu 
et al., 2017; Riccucci et al., 2018). Notably, samples in chapter 5 did not have any selection criteria 
for its respondents. Samples in chapter 6 did have a selection criterion: respondents had to have at 
least one social media account. Respondents who did not meet this criterion were not included in 
the samples. Overall Qualtrics avoids duplications by using IP addresses and digital fingerprinting 
technologies for each respondent. In this way, no respondents ended up twice in the samples.
Qualtrics does not recruit participants from a single panel but collaborates with sample partners 
offering traditional market research panels across the globe to enable the most diverse and, if 
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needed, representative datasets. The sampling partners randomly select respondents that qualify to 
participate. Qualtrics or its sampling partners compensate respondents based on the length of the 
study and their target characteristics. Compensation may include cash, gift cards or vouchers. We 
paid Qualtrics around 4 euros per respondent.
Qualtrics does not guarantee national representation unless specified prior to sampling. In both 
chapter 5 and 6, national representation was not specified because the prime interest was not 
to draw conclusions about the population at large but investigate the clear effect of a treatment. 
Randomization of respondents ensured that bias was minimized as much as possible, because all 
respondents had equal chance of ending up in one of the control or treatment groups. In this way, 
there was no relation between the individual characteristics of respondents and the treatment they 
were assigned to. Indeed, balance checks for the between-subject designs of both study 1 and study 
2 in chapter 5 as well as study 2 in chapter 6 showed that randomization was successful, and the 
samples were balanced. 
Qualtrics invites respondents to participate by via e-mail, SMS notifications or mobile in-app 
notifications. The invitations did not include specifics concerning the content of the questionnaire to 
avoid self-selection effects. Qualtrics replaced all respondents who finished in less than ½ the median 
survey completion length. On top of that, once data collection was completed for each sample, the 
quality of the data was hand checked by me by, for instance, checking the open-ended answers (e.g. 
year of birth) or identifying respondents who filled in the same category on the used measurement 
scales for almost the entire questionnaire (also known as ‘flatlining’). These respondents were 
replaced by Qualtrics. In all samples, about 10 percent of the respondents was replaced. 
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Wat is de hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift?
Openbaarmaking wordt vaak als veelbelovend gezien voor overheden en publieke organisaties 
omdat het een instrument is om anderen, bijvoorbeeld burgers, te laten zien dat er niks te verbergen 
valt. Op deze manier kan openbaarmaking de relatie met burgers verbeteren. Verschillende publieke 
organisaties maken dan ook actief openbaar wat ze doen en hoe het uitvoeren van hun taken gaat. 
Hierdoor ontstaat ‘inwaartse zichtbaarheid’, wat betekent dat  burgers, journalisten, bedrijven en 
anderen die buiten de organisatie staan  naar binnen kunnen kijken. Externe partijen kunnen de 
activiteiten en beslissingen van publieke organisaties monitoren. Openbaarmaking is ‘de beschikbare 
informatie over een organisatie of actor die externe partijen in staat stelt de interne mechanismen en 
performance van die organisatie te monitoren’ (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 5). 
In het debat rondom openbaarmaking staan voornamelijk de externe effecten van openbaarmaking 
centraal zoals op het vertrouwen, de tevredenheid en participatie van burgers. In dit proefschrift 
wordt onderzocht of er ook interne effecten zijn, specifiek op interacties tussen handhavende 
contactambtenaren en burgers wanneer ze elkaar tegenkomen op ‘straat’. Begrijpen hoe 
contactambtenaren beleid handhaven is cruciaal voor begrijpen hoe publieke organisaties en de 
overheid functioneren. Beleid wordt pas ‘echt’ wanneer contactambtenaren het handhaven omdat zij 
ruimte (i.e. discretionaire bevoegdheid) hebben het geschreven beleid zo goed mogelijk te matchen 
met de complexe situaties die zij aantreffen (Lipsky, 2010). Openbaarmaking zorgt er echter niet 
alleen voor dat publieke organisaties gemonitord kunnen worden, ook contactambtenaren worden 
zichtbaarder voor externe partijen. Zo worden er bijvoorbeeld steeds meer online reviews geschreven 
over individuele contactambtenaren.  
De context waarin contactambtenaren en burgers elkaar ontmoeten is de afgelopen decennia 
veranderd door onder andere ICT-ontwikkelingen. Voor burgers hebben deze ontwikkelingen de 
barrière om informatie te verkrijgen en verzenden verlaagd. Bijvoorbeeld, een smartphone geeft 
iedereen de macht om met één druk op de knop een parkeerwachter te filmen, het materiaal te 
uploaden of iets op sociale media te schrijven. Voor contactambtenaren hebben ICT-ontwikkelingen 
de omvang en hoeveelheid van informatie over hun organisatie en hunzelf vergroot. Veel 
politiebureaus en individuele politieagenten, bijvoorbeeld, hebben een account op sociale media. Door 
openbaarmaking zijn de één-op-één interacties tussen contactambtenaar en burger dus veranderd in 
één-op-veel interacties. In dit proefschrift zijn daarom de interne effecten van openbaarmaking voor 
de frontline onderzocht aan de hand van de centrale onderzoeksvraag:
Wat zijn de effecten van openbaarmaking op contactambtenaren en burgers?
Dit proefschrift richt zich specifiek op de effecten van openbaarmaking op handhavingsinteracties 
tussen contactambtenaren en burgers. De taken van handhavende contactambtenaren zijn 
misstanden opsporen en bestraffen. Zij voeren dus eerder verplichtingen uit dan diensten, wat ze 
een machtig soort contactambtenaar maakt. In deel 1 van dit proefschrift staat het perspectief van de 
contactambtenaar centraal en specifiek inspecteurs van de Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit 
(NVWA). Hun taak bestaat uit het handhaven van, onder andere, voedsel- en productveiligheid en 
dierenwelzijn. De NVWA heeft als doelstelling om uiterlijk in 2022 alle informatie over toezicht en 
de uitvoering daarvan openbaar te maken, wat het een passende casus maakt voor dit proefschrift. 
In deel 2 staat het perspectief van de burger centraal. In deel 2 worden burgers bevraagd over 
verschillende soorten handhavende ambtenaren, omdat burgers in hun leven niet met maar met 1 
handhavende contactambtenaar te maken maar met meerderen.
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Waarom is dit proefschrift relevant?
Dit proefschrift heeft wetenschappelijke waarde omdat het twee stromingen literatuur, die voorheen 
gescheiden waren, samenbrengt: openbaarmaking en street-level bureaucracy. Hierdoor kunnen 
implicaties van openbaarmaking die tot op heden niet substantieel onderzocht zijn, namelijk die voor 
ambtenaar-burger interacties, blootgelegd worden. Bovendien staat in deel 2 van dit proefschrift de 
burger centraal. Burgers zijn geen passieve dienstafnemers, maar nemen een actieve rol in tijdens 
contactambtenaar-burger interacties. Dit proefschrift helpt de burger-kant van beleidsuitvoering beter 
begrijpen. Tot slot is kwantitatief onderzoek naar contactambtenaren groeiende, maar nog beperkt. Dit 
proefschrift draagt bij aan de ‘kwantificering’ van de literatuur over contactambtenaren wat bijdraagt 
aan vergelijkbare en generaliseerbare inzichten. 
Dit proefschrift heeft ook maatschappelijke waarde. De hoeveelheid beschikbare informatie voor 
burgers maar ook contactambtenaren is groeiende door ICT-ontwikkelingen en de implementatie 
van wetten van openbaar bestuur in verschillende landen. Tegelijkertijd is misinformatie een steeds 
grotere maatschappelijke uitdaging. Contactambtenaren hebben dan ook te maken met burgers die 
openbaarmaking eisen, soms geïnformeerd zijn en met een smartphone in de hand ‘bewapend’ zijn. 
Dit proefschrift biedt inzichten voor de praktijk over de impact van openbaarmaking op zowel het 
dagelijks werk van contactambtenaren, burgers en hoe zij met elkaar omgaan. Voor publiek managers 
laat dit proefschrift zien dat openbaarmaking gevolgen heeft voor hoe contactambtenaren handhaven. 
Voor beleidsmakers wordt duidelijk wat de consequenties zijn van openbaarmakingsbeleid. Tot slot, 
voor burgers wordt inzichtelijk hoe openbaarmaking de contactambtenaar die tegenover hen staat 
beïnvloedt. 
Wat zijn de kernbevindingen van dit proefschrift?
Om een antwoord te geven op de hoofdvraag is deze opgesplitst in vijf empirische hoofdstukken die 
elk een deel van de hoofdvraag helpen beantwoorden (hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 6). 
1. De handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren kan worden geconceptualiseerd door 
middel van drie dimensies.
Het doel van hoofdstuk twee was om de multi-dimensionaliteit van de handhavingshouding van 
contactambtenaren te achterhalen met behulp van het concept ‘handhavingsstijl’. Daarom werd een 
meetinstrument ontwikkeld en gevalideerd (oftewel getest op juistheid en geldigheid). Theoretisch 
werden vijf onderliggende dimensies van handhaving stijl geïdentificeerd, namelijk (1) formalisme; 
(2) dwang; (3) educatie; (4) prioritering en, tot slot; (5) accommoderen. Op basis van data van 
een vragenlijst (n = 507) onder inspecteurs van de NVWA werd gevonden dat, in een Westerse 
context, handhaving stijl niet uit vijf maar uit drie dimensies bestaat. De wettelijke dimensie bestaat 
uit zowel formalisme als dwang. Deze dimensie bestaat uit het benadrukken van regelgeving maar 
ook dreigen met sancties. De faciliterende dimensie bestaat uit educatie en prioriteringselementen. 
Contactambtenaren benadrukken naar ondernemers  bijvoorbeeld hoe ze naleving kunnen verbeteren 
en houden rekening met hun omstandigheden. De laatste dimensie is de accommoderende dimensie 
die omvat in hoeverre contactambtenaren rekening houden met de mening van anderen, bijvoorbeeld 
hun collega’s of teamleider, over handhaven.
2. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties intensifieert alle dimensies van de 
handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren en reduceert weerstand.
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In hoofdstuk drie het effect van openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties op de wettelijke, 
faciliterende en accommoderende dimensies van de handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren 
onderzocht op basis van data uit dezelfde vragenlijst. De resultaten laten zien dat de wanneer 
contactambtenaren meer openbaarmaking ervaren, alle drie hun handhavingsdimensies worden 
versterkt. Oftewel: hoe meer openbaarmaking contactambtenaren ervaren, hoe meer wettelijk, 
faciliterend en accommoderend ze worden in hun handhavingshouding. Hoofdstuk drie vindt ook een 
verrassend resultaat: openbaarmaking zorgt niet voor meer maar minder weerstand van burgers naar 
contactambtenaren toe. Hoofdstuk drie laat dus zien dat openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties 
handhaving ‘op straat’ beïnvloedt. 
3. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties verbetert de uitvoering van toezicht en dit 
komt, voor contactambtenaren met frequent contact met burgers, door de grotere ervaren 
afstand die openbaarmaking tussen contactambtenaar en burger creëert 
Voortbouwend op de vragenlijst data onder NVWA-inspecteurs onderzocht hoofdstuk vier of 
openbaarmaking leidt tot betere performance en of de afstand in de relatie tussen contactambtenaar 
en burger deze relatie verklaart. Deze afstand tussen twee actoren (hier contactambtenaar en 
burger) in een relatie wordt ook wel relationele afstand genoemd. Twee dimensies van relationele 
afstand werden meegenomen, namelijk (1) feitelijke relationele afstand (i.e. de frequentie face-to-
face contact) en (2) ervaren relationele afstand (i.e. de ervaren intimiteit). Resultaten laten zien dat 
openbaarmaking inderdaad bijdraagt aan betere uitvoering van toezicht. Hoofdstuk vier vergelijkt 
twee groepen contactambtenaren, een met weinig en veel face-to-face contact (i.e. feitelijke rationele 
afstand). Alleen voor contactambtenaren met veel face-to-face contact vergroot openbaarmaking de 
ervaren relationele afstand en deze grotere afstand draagt bij aan betere uitvoering van toezicht. 
Oftewel: contactambtenaren die burgers vaak face-to-face tegenkomen willen relationele afstand 
ervaren en dit verbetert de uitvoering van toezicht.
4. In situaties met weinig informatie, schatten burgers de warmte en competentie van 
ambtenaren in op basis van hun hoofdtaak en geslacht.
In hoofdstuk vijf zijn ambtenaar-burger interacties onderzocht waarin er weinig informatie beschikbaar 
is over de contactambtenaar. Het doel was achterhalen hoe burgers de warmte en competentie van 
contactambtenaren inschatten die ze voor het eerst telefonisch ontmoeten. Ook werd gekeken of de 
hoofdtaak en het geslacht van de contactambtenaar deze schattingen veranderden. Aan de hand 
van een factoriale vragenlijst (n = 580) en experiment (n = 1602) onder Nederlandse burgers werd 
gevonden dat contactambtenaren in drie groepen ondergebracht konden worden op basis van hun 
hoofdtaak, (1) hoofdzakelijk handhavende contactambtenaren; (2) hoofdzakelijk dienstverlenende 
contactambtenaren en; (3) contactambtenaren die zowel handhaven als diensten verlenen. Ook werd 
gevonden dat handhavende contactambtenaren zowel het minst warm als competent werden gezien. 
Vrouwelijke contactambtenaren werden als warmer dan mannen geschat. Vrouwen en mannen 
werden als even competent geschat. 
5. Zowel een wettelijke als faciliterende handhavingshouding resulteren niet een meer 
gehoorzaamheid onder burgers, maar faciliteren verlaagt wel de intenties van burgers om zich 
negatief te zijn in hun openbaarmaking
Hoofdstuk zes voerde een experiment (n = 318) en herhaling (n = 311) uit onder Nederlandse burgers 
over twee hoofdzakelijk handhavende contactambtenaren: een parkeerwachter en conducteur. Het 
effect werd getest van een wettelijke en faciliterende handhavingshouding op de gehoorzaamheid en 
de intentie van burgers om op een negatief manier informatie openbaar te maken over de interactie. 
Resultaten laten zien dat geen van beide handhavingshoudingen de gehoorzaamheid van burgers 
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bevordert. Ook heeft een wettelijke handhavingshouding geen effect op negatieve openbaarmaking 
door burgers. Een faciliterende handhavingshouding, daarentegen, verlaagt de intenties van burgers 
om negatief te zijn in hun openbaarmaking.
Wat zijn de belangrijkste conclusies van dit 
proefschrift?
Nu de hoofdvraag is beantwoord aan de hand van de kernbevindingen van dit onderzoek, is de 
discussie over de effecten van openbaarmaking op ambtenaar-burger interacties niet afgerond, maar 
slechts begonnen. Daarom worden ook vier belangrijke conclusies getrokken die verder gaan dan het 
antwoord op de hoofdvraag.
Conclusie 1 -- Openbaarmaking helpt contactambtenaren met het doen van hun werk
Dit proefschrift heeft laten zien dat openbaarmaking de uitvoering van toezicht verbetert. Het effect van 
openbaarmaking op de uitvoering van toezicht was bijna twee keer zo groot voor contactambtenaren 
met frequent contact met burgers dan contactambtenaren met geen frequent contact. Openbaarmaking 
is dus vooral nuttig voor contactambtenaren die burgers vaak tegenkomen. Ten tweede vergroot 
openbaarmaking de ervaren relationele afstand tussen contactambtenaar en burger, maar alleen 
voor contactambtenaar en burger met frequent contact. Deze grotere afstand draagt bij aan betere 
performance van toezicht. Tot slot, de handhaving van beleid wordt ook bevorderd tijdens ambtenaar-
burger interacties omdat openbaarmaking de weerstand die contactambtenaren ervaren van burgers 
reduceert. Dit proefschrift onderschrijft dus dat openbaarmaking contactambtenaren helpt bij de 
uitvoering van hun taken. 
Conclusie 2 -- Meer openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties kan indirect positieve 
openbaarmaking door burgers stimuleren
De tweede conclusie reflecteert op hoe openbaarmaking door zowel publieke organisaties als burgers 
verbonden zijn. Door onder andere ICT-ontwikkelingen zijn publieke organisaties niet langer de enige 
actor die zorgen voor de toegenomen openbaarmaking over overheden en hun contactambtenaren. 
Dit proefschrift onderzocht openbaarmaking door zowel publieke organisaties als burgers apart 
van elkaar. Echter, de resultaten laten zien dat beide vormen van openbaarmaking elkaar kunnen 
versterken. Meer openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties versterkt  onder andere  de faciliterende 
handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren. Tegelijkertijd lieten de resultaten van dit proefschrift 
ook zien dat wanneer contactambtenaren alleen faciliterend zijn in hun handhavingshouding, burgers 
minder negatief worden in hun openbaarmaking. Wanneer we beide inzichten combineren kan het 
geconcludeerd worden dat openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties en burgers een versterkend 
mechanisme kunnen vormen: meer openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties resulteert in meer 
faciliteren door contactambtenaren wat weer positieve openbaarmaking door burgers tot gevolg heeft.
Conclusie 3 -- Terwijl openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties vaak een vorm van straffen 
is, is openbaarmaking door burgers dat niet
De derde conclusie gaat over de aard van zowel openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties als 
burgers. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties gaat, als instrument, er vooral vanuit dat 
anderen (bijvoorbeeld: bedrijven) gestimuleerd kunnen worden zich beter te gedragen door inzichtelijk 
te maken in hoeverre zij zich aan regels houden. Wanneer er onwenselijk gedrag wordt vertoond kan 
dit tot reputatieschade en, uiteindelijk, verlies van klanten en inkomsten leiden. Openbaarmaking door 
publieke organisaties toont slechte performance dus publiekelijk om zo beter gedrag te stimuleren. 
Dit proefschrift heeft niet onderzocht of openbaarmaking samenhangt met beter naleefgedrag, want 
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de frontline interactie tussen contactambtenaar en burger stond centraal. Echter, heeft dit proefschrift 
wel gekeken naar de openbaarmaking door burgers. Dit proefschrift vond dat de handhavingshouding 
van contactambtenaren niet resulteert in negatieve openbaarmaking (i.e. ‘shaming’) door burgers. 
Maar, een faciliterende handhavingshouding resulteert wel in minder negatieve openbaarmaking 
door burgers (i.e. faming). Oftewel: burgers worden positiever in wat zij openbaar maken wanneer 
contactambtenaren zich faciliterend in hun handhaving opstellen. Dit proefschrift laat dus zien dat de 
instrumentele aard van openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties en burgers verschillen: de ene is 
meer straffend en de ander meer belonend.
Conclusie 4 -- Burgers hebben vooroordelen over karaktertrekken van contactambtenaren die 
zij ontmoeten via de telefoon, maar deze verklaren niet hoe burgers zich face-to-face gedragen
De vierde en laatste conclusie gaat over frontline interacties waar er geen expliciete openbaarmaking 
is en erg beperkte informatie beschikbaar is voor burgers over contactambtenaren. Dit proefschrift 
laat zien dat ‘de contactambtenaar’ niet bestaat. Verschillende contactambtenaren kunnen in drie 
groepen worden geclassificeerd op basis van de hoofdtaak die burgers vinden dat zij uitvoeren 
(handhaven of diensten verlenen). De eerste groep zijn hoofdzakelijk handhavers, de tweede 
groep hoofdzakelijk dienstverleners en de derde groep heeft beide hoofdtaken. Burgers schatten 
deze groepen verschillend in met betrekking tot  twee karaktereigenschappen, namelijk warmte en 
competentie, wanneer burgers ze telefonisch spreken. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat, bij telefonisch 
contact, handhavende contactambtenaren het laagst worden ingeschat wat betreft warmte en 
competentie. Vrouwelijke contactambtenaren worden warmer geschat dan mannen, maar beide 
zijn even competent. Dit proefschrift kan echter niet verklaren hoe burgers zich, op basis van deze 
vooroordelen, opstellen face-to-face naar contactambtenaren toe. Het werd bijvoorbeeld gevonden 
dat handhavingshouding van de contactambtenaar niet uitmaakt voor de gehoorzaamheid van 
burgers. In andere woorden, dit proefschrift laat zien dat burgers handhavende contactambtenaren 
stereotyperen wat betreft hun competentie en warmte bij telefonisch contact, maar dit lijkt zich niet 
duidelijk te uiten in gedragsintenties. 
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Public organizations see transparency as a promising tool to boost relations with 
citizens and their perceptions of public performance. Due to transparency, 
however, the work of street-level bureaucrats is also scrutinized. Moreover, 
technological advancements have empowered any societal actor to make the 
behavior of street-level bureaucrats transparent by, for instance, filming it with a 
smartphone. This doctoral dissertation examines the effects of transparency on 
the daily work of street-level bureaucrats and their interactions with citizens. By 
studying food and product safety inspectors, this dissertation shows that 
transparency helps street-level bureaucrats do their job. By studying citizens’ 
perceptions of multiple enforcing street-level bureaucrats (e.g. parking wardens), 
this dissertation reveals that citizens are biased about the street-level bureaucrats 
they meet, but this does not mean they will make what street-level bureaucrats do 
transparent to others. This dissertation concludes that transparency matters for 
the daily work of bureaucrats and, in turn, the citizens they meet, but it is just the 
beginning of grasping what happens when ‘the frontline’ is made transparent. 
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